


The Princeton Theological Review



CONTENTS

Eschatology of the Psalter	GEERHARDUS VOS	I
Albrecht Ritschl and His Doctrine of Christian Perfection—Article II	BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD	44
Use of the Words for God in the Apocryphal and Pseudepigraphical Literature of the Jews	ROBERT DICK WILSON	103
Problems of Peace	DANIEL S. GAGE	123
Reviews of Recent Literature		157
Survey of Periodical Literature		188

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS
PRINCETON

LONDON: HUMPHREY MILFORD
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

1920

The Princeton Theological Review

EDITED FOR

THE FACULTY OF PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

BY

OSWALD T. ALLIS

Each author is solely responsible for the views expressed in his article
Notice of discontinuance must be sent to the Publishers; otherwise subscriptions will be continued

Subscription \$2.00 a year, 60 cents a copy, for the U. S. A. and Canada

Foreign postage 50 cents additional

Entered as Second Class Mail Matter at Princeton, N. J.

BOOKS REVIEWED

ABBOTT, H. P. A., <i>The Religion of the Tommy</i>	186
BARKER, J. M., <i>The Social Gospel and the New Era</i>	174
BRADSHAW, M. J., <i>The War and Religion</i>	176
CUNNINGHAM, W., <i>The Secret of Progress</i>	172
DORCHESTER, D., JR., <i>Bolshevism and Social Revolt</i>	184
GALLOWAY, G., <i>The Idea of Immortality</i>	162
GRAHAM, D., <i>Religion and Intellect</i>	159
HARRIS, C., <i>The Creeds and Modern Thought</i>	172
HOLMES, E., <i>The Secret of the Cross</i>	178
JOHNSON, W. J., <i>George Washington the Christian</i>	184
MCALPIN, E. A., <i>On to Christ</i>	180
MACARTNEY, C. E., <i>Truths Tested by the World War</i>	158
MACINTOSH, D. C., <i>Theology as an Empirical Science</i>	165
MITCHELL, C. A., <i>The Model Prayer and Other New Testament Studies</i>	183
MICKLEM, N., <i>The Open Light</i>	157
PENTECOST, G. F., <i>Fighting for Faith</i>	179
RICE, W. N., <i>The Poet of Science and Other Addresses</i>	181
ROBERTSON, A. T., <i>The New Citizenship</i>	177
SCHLISTER, F., <i>Religion and Culture</i>	158
SNOWDEN, J. H., <i>Is the World Growing Better?</i>	160
SPITTA, F., <i>Die Auferstehung Jesu</i>	173
STIGER, W. L., <i>Soldier Silhouettes on Our Front</i>	185
TIPLADY, T., <i>Social Christianity in the New Era</i>	176
WARING, <i>Christianity's Unifying Fundamental</i>	180
WEST, W. B., <i>The Fight for the Argonne</i>	187

The Princeton Theological Review

JANUARY, 1920

ESCHATOLOGY OF THE PSALTER

There are certain editions of the New Testament which by way of appendix contain the Psalter, an arrangement obviously intended to serve the convenience of devotion. It has, however, the curious result of bringing the Apocalypse and the Psalms into immediate proximity. On first thought it might seem that scarcely two more diverse things could be put together. The storm-ridden landscape of the Apocalypse has little enough in common with the green pastures and still waters of which the Psalmist sings. For us the Psalter largely ministers to the needs of the devotional life withdrawn into its privacy with God. Such a life is not usually promotive of the tone and temper characteristic of the eschatological reaction. This will explain why the ear of both reader and interpreter has so often remained closed to strains of a quite different nature in this favorite book.

It requires something more strenuous than the even tenor of our devotional life to shake us out of this habit and force us to take a look at the Psalter's second face. It has happened more than once in the history of the Church, that some great conflict has carried the use of the Psalms out from the prayer-closet into the open places of a tumultuous world. The period of the Reformation affords a striking example of this. We ourselves, who are just emerging from a time of great world-upheaval, have perhaps discovered, that the Psalter adapted itself to still other situations than we were accustomed to imagine. To be sure, these last tremendous years have not detracted in the least from its familiar usefulness as an instrument of devotion. But we have also found that voices from the Psalter accompanied us, when forced into the open to face the world-

tempest, and that they sprang to our lips on occasions when otherwise we should have had to remain dumb in the presence of God's judgments. This experience sufficiently proves that there is material in the Psalms which it requires the large impact of history to bring to our consciousness in its full significance. It goes without saying that what can be prayed and sung now *in theatro mundi* was never meant for exclusive use in the oratory of the pious soul. This other aspect of the Psalter has not been produced by liturgical accommodation; it was in its very origin a part of the life and prayer and song of the writers themselves.

After all, these two uses, the devotional and the historical, are not so divergent as one might imagine. We need only to catch the devotional at its proper angle to perceive how it forms part of a broader, more comprehensive piety uniting in itself with perfect naturalness the two different attitudes of withdrawal into the secrecy of God and of intense interest in the unfolding of the world-drama. The deeper fundamental character of the Psalter consists in this that it voices the subjective response to the objective doings of God for and among his people. Subjective responsiveness is the specific quality of these songs. As prophecy is objective, being the address of Jehovah to Israel in word and act, so the Psalter is subjective, being the answer of Israel to that divine speech. If once this peculiarity is apprehended, it will follow that there must be place, and considerable place, in the Psalms not merely for the historical interest in general, but particularly for that heightened interest which the normal religious mind brings to the last goal and issue of redemption. To the vision of faith that which Jehovah will do at the end, his conclusive, consummate action, must surpass everything else in importance. Faith will sing its supreme song when face to face, either in anticipation or reality, with the supreme act of God. Let Mary's case be witness from whose heart the great annunciation of Messianic fulfillment drew that Psalm of all Psalms, the *Magnificat*. The time when God gathers

his fruit is the joyous vintage-feast of all high religion. The value of a work lies in its ultimate product. Consequently, where religion entwines itself around a progressive work of God, such as redemption, its general responsiveness becomes prospective, cumulative, climacteric; it gravitates with all its inherent weight toward the end. A redemptive religion without eschatological interest would be a contradiction in terms. The orthodox interpretation of Scripture has always recognized this. To it redemption and eschatology are co-eval in biblical history.¹ The case stands quite different with unorthodox criticism. By it the redemptive content and the teleological outlook of the ancient religion of Israel are denied. The ancient, that is the pre-prophetic, Israelite in this respect lived the life of a religious animal. Hence for the older period the absence of eschatology is characteristic. Still, even from the standpoint of this criticism, the eschatological aspect of the Psalms is not affected. For the Psalter is now commonly considered in these circles a product of the exilic and post-exilic times, that is of a period when through the prophetic channel and from foreign sources a flood of redemptive and eschatological ideas had streamed in upon Israel, so that the Psalm-singing Jew was bound to answer to its call in corresponding notes. Besides, the great influx of eschatological material is placed by many of these writers not in the early period of written prophecy, but in the later exilic and post-exilic times, most of the material of this kind now contained in the older prophets being treated as spurious in its present environment and brought down to a much later date. But this late dating brings it into close proximity to the time fixed by these same critics for the Psalter. Hence criticism has a direct and powerful stimulus to search the Psalms for the presence of that spirit with which the religious atmosphere is supposed to have been charged in that period. And, since under the control of God exegetical good not seldom comes

¹ In so far as the covenant of works posited for mankind an absolute goal and unchangeable future, the eschatological may be even said to have preceded the soteric religion.

out of critical evil, it has happened here also, that a criticism whose general methods and results we cannot but distrust, has brought to light from the Psalter valuable facts, whose existence had not been previously recognized with sufficient clearness. It cannot be denied that unorthodox criticism has done some valuable pioneer-work in exploring the eschatological views of the Psalter.² And what is true of the Wellhausen school may in a different sense be applied to its more modern competitor,—or shall we say successor?—the school of Gunkel and Gressmann.³ Here it is not so much the inclination to fit the Psalter into the post-exilic world of thought, but rather the desire to assimilate it to Babylonian religious ideas that predisposes for the welcoming of eschatological material. For our purpose this is even better than the exegetical help received from the other quarter. It yields not only acceptable exegesis stimulated by perverse criticism, but has the additional advantage of in certain instances drawing the criticism of the Psalter back to a more conservative position from a chronological point of view. For, since according to this recent school there was an Oriental eschatology in very ancient times, there remains no longer any reason for disputing its early existence in Israel, nor for denying the pre-exilic date of any piece on the sole ground of its occurrence therein. On the contrary, other things being equal, the eschatological complexion of a document speaks rather in favor of the

² Cfr. especially Stade, *Die Messianische Hoffnung im Psalter in Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche*, 1892, pp. 369-412. The scope of the article is wider than the antiquated use of the term "Messianic" in the title would indicate. It covers the whole eschatological outlook of the Psalter, whether the Messiah occupies a place in it or not. Stade makes extensive use of a comparison between what he considers the later material in the older prophecies and the Psalms.

³ Gunkel, *Schöpfung und Chaos, in Urzeit und Endzeit*, 1895; *Ausgewählte Psalmen*, 1911; Gressmann, *Der Ursprung der israelitisch-jüdischen Eschatologie*, 1905; Cfr. Sellin, *Der alttestamentliche Prophetismus*; *Zweite Studie: Alter, Wesen und Ursprung der alttestamentlichen Eschatologie*, 1912; Stärk, *Lyrik (Psalmen, Hohes Lied und Verwandtes)* in *Die Schriften des Alten Testaments* edited by Gressmann, Gunkel, a. o. III, 1, 2, 1911.

older date than otherwise. As a matter of fact some Psalms have on this principle been again recognized as pre-exilic possibilities.⁴

As a third source, from which in recent criticism the eschatological interpretation of the Psalter has received encouragement, we may mention the widely-spread opinion, that the speaking subject in the Psalms is in many cases not a single person, but the collective mind of the congregation of Israel, into which the original composers have merged their religious individuality, nay, that many of the Psalms were written outright for liturgical use in the service of the second temple.⁵ It is hard to tell whether this theory

⁴It should be remembered that critics of the type of Gunkel and Gressmann remain, so far as the broad literary issue of Old Testament criticism is concerned, Wellhausenians. They do not revise the verdict that the law is later than prophecy. In the reconstruction of the pre-prophetic religion of Israel they pursue the same backward-reasoning, divinatory method as the others. Only they apply this method to a subject to which the Wellhausen school had, on the whole, refrained from applying it, the question of pre-prophetic eschatology. The general structure of Wellhausenianism implies that there was no such early eschatology worth speaking of, that eschatology was a later product. Consequently no inducement exists for it to trace its origins in the ancient religion. Gunkel and Gressmann do not share in this prejudice. Convinced that the thing must have existed they are on the alert for every early indication of its presence.

⁵The more recent literature on this subject consists chiefly of: Smend, *Ueber das Ich der Psalmen*, in *Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft*, 1888, pp. 49-147; *Theol. Literaturzeitung* 1889, p. 547; Beer, *Individual-und Gemeindepsalmen*, 1894; Roy, *Die Volksgemeinde und die Gemeinde der Frommen im Psalter*, 1897; Coblenz, *Ueber das betende Ich in den Psalmen*, 1897. The collective view, however, is by no means a modern product. For its history in the earliest and latest exegesis, cfr. Coblenz, pp. 2-15; Cheyne, *The Origin and Religious Contents of the Psalter*, Bampton Lectures for 1889, 1891, pp. 259-266; Beer, pp. xiii-xvii. Early traces are found in lxx; it was applied by Theodor of Mopsuestia, by Raschi, Aben-Ezra and Kimchi among the mediaeval Jewish expositors, by Rudinger among the old-Protestant exegetes, in more recent times by Rosenmüller, de Wette, especially Olshausen, Graetz. After Smend's reintroduction of the subject, and in part independently of him, the same position has been taken by Cheyne, Stade, Baethgen. Criticising, and restricting Smend's ideas are Stekhoven in *Zeitschrift für die Alttestamentliche Wissenschaft* vol. 89, pp. 131-135; Stärk, *ibid.* vol. 92, p. 146; Sellin,

apart from its intrinsic merit or demerit, has in its actual working out done more good or evil to the cause of Psalter-exegesis. For one thing it is often too-closely bound up with belief in the post-exilic origin of the Psalms, because not until after the exile, it is believed, did a specifically religious congregation of Israel, a church-Israel, in whose name such songs could have been sung, exist. Of course, the intermarriage of these two views is not beyond the possibility of divorce. For one who recognizes a church-nation of Israel in much earlier times, it would be critically quite safe to assume early Psalms of a collective import. In the next place the theory, when one-sidedly and radically carried through, threatens to wipe out all the individual coloring which renders many of the Psalms so attractive to the Christian reader and so faithful a mirror of his own individual experience. All the concrete, plastic, lifelike self-portrayal by which the figure of David stands before our eyes as the most real of realities, and which plays such a role in the New Testament, is at one stroke swept aside, and figures like Asaph and Ethan likewise lose for us their value as sources of individual comfort and delight. The individual application made by our Lord to Himself of certain Psalter-passages has to be artificially justified, if it is justified at all, on the ground that He was entitled to make of what was originally meant for Israel a personal application, since in Him Israel was summed up. Still further, and this is perhaps the most serious element in the situation, the collectivistic exegesis now threatens to swallow up all the directly Messianic material hitherto found in the Psalter. It is seriously proposed that "the Anointed of Jehovah," "the King" in several places, where these titles occur, shall not be understood of an individual eschatological figure, but of the people of Israel as the collective heir of the Messianic promises, the writers of such Psalms being even credited with the clear consciousness of the abrogation of the hope of an individual, Davidic Messiah.

De Origine Carminum quae primus Psalterii liber continet, 1892, pp. 26 ff; Rahlfs, עֲנִי and עֲנִי in den Psalmen, 1892, p. 82.

The nation of Israel then becomes the King set upon the holy hill of Zion, receiving the nations for his inheritance, the uttermost parts of the earth for his possession. Last of all, the collectivistic view has contributed toward eliminating from the Psalter the expectation of a life after death for the individual, the passages where this used to be found being now not infrequently interpreted of the immortality of the people of Israel. While undoubtedly in all these respects the view under consideration has wrought harm, it should be remembered that the several errors enumerated represent not necessary corollaries, but only abuses of an otherwise not implausible theory. The later liturgical use of the Psalms in the Jewish Church certainly supports it, for the liturgical is from its very nature collective. The instance where "I" and "we" alternate as the speaking subject, and where the context puts a national interpretation upon the "we," show how easily the self-personification of the people took place in the poet's mind, or at least how naturally the collective plural alternated with the individual singular. The sudden, abrupt changes in many Psalms from utter depression to the most jubilant assurance, which the individualizing exegesis has found it is so hard to explain, are perhaps more easily accounted for, if the personified genius of the people of God, with its indestructible, inexhaustible hope in Jehovah may be assumed to experience them. Even what may be called the pathological terminology of the Psalms, sometimes considered a serious obstacle to the collectivistic view, may be turned into an argument in its favor, for this reason that the symptoms of disease and distress enumerated could scarcely coexist in the state of an individual, whilst metaphorically explained, as details entering into the picture of the stricken nation, they cease to be subject to the same rigid test of consistency. That the nation of Israel should "water its couch with its tears" Ps. vi. 6, may seem an overbold figure to our restrained Western imagination, but we must remember the richer and different endowment of Israel's mentality. The

prophets, especially Isaiah and other parts of the Old Testament, bear witness to the strongly developed habit of personification in the Hebrew mind and supply us with a sufficient basis of analogy. It is not necessary here to enter into the psychological aspect of the problem by enquiring, whether conscious and purposeful self-projection into the mind of Israel, or spontaneous lyrical expansion of the personality, or typical generalization of what was first felt as an individual experience, will best explain the phenomena.⁶ Only one feature should be briefly touched upon: in certain cases the collective speaker is not the external, ethnical Israel, but the people conceived as to its ideal, spiritual vocation, or its pious nucleus, the church within the church, sharply distinguishing itself from the religiously disloyal majority. Such a cleavage of spirits would of itself facilitate the absorption of the individual into the ideal body.⁷ Keeping these various reservations in mind, we shall have to acknowledge, I think, that to a greater or

⁶ Beer would find the explanation in the general law of lyrical production deriving its themes from the common interests and feelings of mankind, love, religion, nature, historical happenings affecting the majority, pp. lxxix ff. But the collective spirit and sentiment of the Psalms are of too concrete and intimate a nature to rest on such a general natural basis. If the phenomenon is spontaneous, it will have to be explained from the unique cause of the special grace of God drawing all its objects into the circle of an experience, which is at once personal and alike in all individuals to whom it comes. The intenser homogeneity of redemption should be taken into account. This seems to us the truth underlying the early patristic efforts to account for the facts: Christ was in the Psalms and back of their writers, Christ and his mystical body are one, consequently the church spake in the Psalter. In Christian hymnology we can trace the effect of the same cause: hymns individual in their origin have become expressions of communal feeling, and liturgically intended pieces have been appropriated by the individual. The theory of lyrical expansion has also been brought to bear upon the problem of typical Messianism. Delitzsch identified the mystery of the consciousness of David with the mystery of all poetry: "The genuine lyric poet does not give a mere copy of the impressions of his empirical ego." Cheyne, *The Origin*, pp. 259, 260.

⁷ Roy very carefully works out this side of the case. He, as well as Cheyne, makes much of the analogy between the "servant" in the Psalms and "the servant of Jehovah" in the second part of Isaiah.

lesser extent the mind of the congregation of Israel voices itself in the Psalter.

The sole purpose for which we are led to mention this fact lies in its bearing upon the question of eschatology in the Psalter. For, if the great change, the reversal of destiny, the deliverance, the victory so often spoken of in the Psalms, concern not individuals, but Israel, or even the pious nucleus of Israel, is it not plain that this whole complex of ideas moves on eschatological ground? What else could such a crisis, such a marvelous turn for the better, nay for the best, when predicated of Israel, mean but the eschatological transformation? What in the case of the individual could be kept within the limits of the present order of things and interpreted as a relative change, when understood of Israel, necessarily bursts through these bonds and opens us a totally new prospect, a wholly different mode of existence. It is true, the frequent description of the content of the hope in earthly, temporal forms, so characteristic of the Old Testament, might seem to imply a merely relative difference between present and future. But this is only apparently so. Notwithstanding the retention of this form there are two points which clearly mark off the one from the other. On the one hand, the truly eschatological expectation contemplates the fulfilment of all the promises of God. It has too large a sweep to be simply coördinated with any single good turn in the fortunes of Israel. And on the other hand, the coming state of affairs bears the stamp of unchangeableness, everlastingness: it is no longer, like the present, subject to the vicissitudes of history. Paradoxical though it may seem, revelation has not shunned here to wed the eternal in point of duration to the temporal in point of make-up. The inheriting of the earth, the eating and drinking before Jehovah, and what there is more of this description, is to be forevermore.

In the form of subjective responsiveness which the eschatological ideas assume in the Psalter lies for us the greater part of their value. So far as the content objectively con-

sidered is concerned, the difference from prophecy is not perhaps sufficiently pronounced to justify separate treatment. The general scheme is in both essentially the same. On the dynamic side we meet here as well as there such ideas as that of Jehovah's accession to the kingship, the judgment, the conquest of the nations, the cup of wrath, the recovery of territory, the vindication of Israel, the repulsion of the last great assault by the nations. On the static side we encounter the ideas of peace, universalism, paradise restored, the dwelling of Jehovah's presence in the land, the vision of God, the enjoyment of glory, light, satisfaction of all wants, the outlook beyond death towards an uninterrupted contact with God and a resurrection. Only in the Psalms all this is suffused with the genial warmth of religious feeling. We have here a great province of objectivity translated into terms of living religion, and that religion at the very acme of its functioning. The Psalter teaches us before all else what the proper, ideal attitude of the religious mind ought to be with reference to its vision of the absolute future. The trouble with eschatology in the experience of the church has frequently been that it was either dead or overmuch pathologically alive. In the Psalter we can observe what is its normal working. And through observing this we can learn the even more principal lesson, what is the heart and essence of all religion, because when eschatologically attuned the religious mind responds to the highest inworking and closest approach of God, and therefore operates up to the full potentialities of its own nature. To this must be added something else of almost equal value. Through the subjective, practical spirit in which these things are treated by the Psalter, we are most profoundly made aware of our vital unity with the church of the old dispensation. It is true, of course, that, just as we in the consciousness of the fulfilment of prophecy, make our faith reach back into the Old Testament, so the Old Testament, by means of prophecy, in advance lays its hand upon us: we are sons of the

prophets and of the *diatheke* God made with Abraham. But this is a purely objective bond; it is the bond between a program and its execution; it does not directly enable us to feel our oneness with the Old Covenant people of God. No sooner, however, do we pass out from the region of prophecy into that of psalmody, than we come into touch with something that is internally akin to us, a preformation of our own living religious embrace of the realities of redemption. This must be so all the more, because our whole New Testament life and heritage was, from the Old Testament point of view, an eschatological thing. Here, therefore, we find ourselves and them occupied with identical fact; what they eschatologically contemplated we retrospectively enjoy, and the religious apprehension of it, while formally different, is in essence the same. In the eschatology of the Psalms we may trace the embryonic organism of our own full-grown state. We are enabled to see how our faith was made in secret and curiously wrought, when our substance was as yet imperfect and our members continually fashioned before the eyes of God.

When we say that the Psalter is more practically akin to us than prophecy, we must not be led by this to overlook another feature well worth our notice. Response to the work of God of necessity leads to a more or less reflective state of mind. There is a point where the devotional, the contemplative and the doctrinal, in its simplest form, touch one another. Underneath all the emotion that pulsates through the Psalter, there lies a deep water of serious thought and reflection. The feeling here is not the substitute for faith, it is the natural outcome of faith, the wave-swell of the sea, when the wind of the Lord has blown upon it. If one will only read and sing with the understanding, he shall perceive that the Psalmists pray and sing out of a rich knowledge of God. It is not for nothing that they have "meditated" upon Him and his works. Nor can it be accidental that so considerable a part of the New Testament faith-fabric is derived from this source. Paul

over and over again quotes from the Psalter, and his appeal to it is not less apt and convincing than that to the Torah and the prophets.

Let us now endeavor briefly to review the outstanding characteristics of Psalter-eschatology. The first thing requiring notice is the historical background in the past of the Psalter's treatment of the future. True, in this it only proves itself a genuine Old Testament product, partaking of the specific difference that marks off the biblical eschatology from that of the pagan nations. The pagan eschatological beliefs have a mythical or astronomic basis; they bear no definite relation to any scheme of historical progress, and, with the exception of Parsism, know of no absolute final crisis, beyond which no further change is contemplated. These two defects are closely connected. Because the ideas have their origin within the present world-process, they cannot lead to anything beyond it. The world-cycle runs its course, obeys its stars, absolves its round, and then the end links on to a new beginning, ushering in a repetition of the same sequence. The golden age is bound to return, but it will be no more enduring than it was before. Old Testament teaching concerning the end is not born from myth and chaos and zod'acal "precession". Its origin lies in the realm of history, in the past creative and redemptive activity of God, ultimately in the theistic conception of the character of Jehovah Himself, as an intelligent, planning, building God, whose delight is ever in the product of his freely shaping hands. And consequently, what Israel expects is not a quasi-consummation, which would bear on its face the Sisyphus-expression of endless toil; it is an absolute goal, consisting in an age of more than gold, made of a finer metal beyond all rust and deterioration.⁸

⁸ It is true, the Old Testament, and also the Psalter, know the thought of a correspondence of the end to the beginning, of the point of arrival to the point of departure. The river that makes glad the city of God is a reproduction of the streams of paradise. But this is not intended as a mere equation of the two. The past paradise is viewed as a

The Psalter is wide awake to the significance of history as leading up to the eschatological act of God. It knows that it deals with a God, who spake and speaks and shall speak, who wrought and works and shall work, who came and is coming and is about to come. To no small extent it is the dignity of Jehovah as Creator and Redeemer from which the eschatological necessity springs. As a Psalmist says, Jehovah cannot abandon the work of his own hands (cxxxviii. 8); He will perfect that which concerns his people. His work must appear unto his servants, his glory unto their children (xc. 16). The Psalms that engage in great historical retrospects were written with this thought in mind. A more concise illustration is offered by Ps. cxiv. Here we have first the retrospect: "When Israel went out of Egypt, the house of Jacob from a people of strange language, Judah was his sanctuary and Israel his dominion. The sea saw it and fled; Jordan was driven back," and then, as a corresponding prospect, the vision of the greater theophany at the end: "Tremble thou earth at the presence of the Lord, at the presence of the God of Jacob." The references also to the flood, as bound to repeat itself, must be interpreted on this principle. Jehovah's control for his own purpose of the primeval world-catastrophe is typical of his action in the final upheaval, when out of the last judgment a last world will be born. It is of importance to notice the sequence of the past and future tense-forms in Psalms xciii. and xxix. "The floods have (once) lifted up their voice . . . the floods will lift up their waves. Jehovah on high is mightier than the noise of many waters, the mighty breakers of the sea." And again: "Jehovah (once) sat (as King) at the flood, yea, Jehovah will sit as King forever."

There are certain phrases and figures in the Psalter, which are connected with the idea of plan and continuity in the work of God and of its destination to arrive at a final beginning, that of the future stands in the sign of consummation; that it will inaugurate a new process is never reflected upon, far less that what it introduces will be a repetition of the ancient course of history.

goal. Most characteristic of these, because most Psalm-like, is the phrase "a new song," occurring five times.⁹ It receives light from the idea of the "new things" found in prophecy, especially in the latter part of Isaiah. There the "new things" mean the great unparalleled events about to introduce the future state of Israel. The "new things" and the "new song" belong together, as may be clearly seen from Isa. xlii. 9, 10: "Behold the former things are come to pass and new things do I declare . . . Sing unto Jehovah a new song, his praise from the ends of the earth." This prediction of the "new things" culminates in the promise of the "new heavens and a new earth."¹⁰ Here seems to lie the root of the later employment of the word "new" in eschatological connections, the new name, the new creature, the new *diatheke*, the new Jerusalem.¹¹ Further, the use made of the term "morning," again both in the prophets and in the Psalter, is significant. From Isaiah we are familiar with the figure of the watchman peering into the darkness of the world-night, to whom the prophet addresses the question, "Watchman, what of the night?", and from whom he received the answer, "The morning cometh, and also the night."¹² In the Psalter we find again this idea of "the morning" signifying the dawn of the new great day of Jehovah, and hence symbolic of all hope and deliverance: "God is in the midst of her; she shall not be moved, God will hear her and that in the morning." "Death shall be their shepherd, and the upright shall have dominion over them in the morning." "My soul waiteth for Jehovah, more than watchmen for the morning: O Israel, hope in Jehovah."¹³ It is perhaps worth while asking, whether the phrase "the day of Jehovah" has not some connection with this eschatological use of the phrase

⁹ xxxiii. 3; xcvi. 1; xcvi. 1; cxliv. 9; cxlix. 1.

¹⁰ Isa. lxv. 17; lxvi. 22.

¹¹ Isa. lxii. 2; Jer. xxxi. 31; Mk. xiv. 24; 2 Cor. v. 17; Gal. vi. 15; Rev. ii. 17; iii. 12; v. 9; xiv. 3; xxi. 2, 5.

¹² Isa. xxi. 6 ff.

¹³ Ps. xlv. 6; xlix. 15; xc. 14; cxxx. 6. Cfr. also xvii. 15; xlviii. 15.

morning," so that it would mean the great light-filled day of the reign of Jehovah. It is hardly accidental that "the day of Jehovah" appears in some passages associated with the idea of light.¹⁴

Owing to this vivid consciousness of the historically-conditioned appointment of the end, the attitude of the Psalmists towards it is, on the whole, one of serene confidence and quiet expectation. Their soul is as a weaned child within them. There are Psalms that have as their keynote the question "How long?", but they are few, and even in them towards the end the trusting mood regains the upper hand.¹⁵ There are only three Psalms which contain nothing but complaint.¹⁶ Of the feverish impatience that is so apt to inflame the eschatological state of mind and of its usual correlate, the apocalyptic calculation of times and seasons, there is no trace in the Psalter. "True, with characteristic eschatological eagerness they continually suppose the end nearer than it actually is, but they do not attach their faith to a near parousia in such a way that it would be imperilled by disillusionment. . . . When doubting thoughts beset . . . they go into the sanctuary."¹⁷

The Psalmists know that the end is not flung upon the world out of the lap of chance, but that it proceeds with stately, unhastened, unretarded step from the council-chamber of God. The phrase "a set time" marks this conviction.¹⁸ The connection between prophecy and the Psalms in this point may be observed in the statement "to execute the judgment written."¹⁹ The "judgment written" is the judgment announced in the prophets; precisely because written it cannot fail to come. In a most striking way the dependence of the last great hope of redemption upon what

¹⁴ Am. v. 8, 18; Rom. xiii. 11 ff. 1 Thess. v. 5.

¹⁵ Ps. vi. 4; xiii. 1; lxxiv. 10; lxxvii. 8; lxxix. 5; lxxxv. 6; xxxix. 47; xc. 13; xciv. 3.

¹⁶ Ps. xxxviii (but cfr. v. 16); xxxix. (but cfr. v. 8); lxxxviii.

¹⁷ Cheyne, *Origin*, p. 373.

¹⁸ Ps. cii. 31.

¹⁹ Ps. cxlix. 9.

Jehovah has done before is expressed in Ps. lxxiv.: "God is my King of old, working salvation in the midst of the earth; thou didst divide the sea by thy strength; thou breakest the heads of the dragons in the waters: . . . thou didst cleave fountain and flood; . . . remember that the enemy has reproached O Lord; O deliver not the soul of thy turtle dove unto the multitude; forget not the congregation of thy poor forever; have respect unto the covenant; . . . arise O God."

A second striking feature of the eschatology of the Psalter consists in the central, dominating position it assigns to Jehovah in all that pertains to the coming change. The prospect of the future is God-centered in the highest degree. Of course, the Psalmists who could say "Whom have I in heaven but thee, and none upon earth I desire besides thee"; "God is the strength of my heart and my portion forever" and "Thou art my Lord, my welfare is naught without thee," might be confidently expected to carry this feeling with them, when projecting themselves into the future.²⁰ What is more characteristic of the Psalter is this, that, besides eschatology evoking worship, the opposite also takes place: The elemental urge of worship summons the last great realities to its aid, because it cannot be satisfied with aught short of this for expressing itself. The eschatology of the Psalter is in part begotten by the praises of Israel. No doubt the Psalter contains much of what is most humanly human in all religious occupation with God: the need and desire and prayer for help in distress. In their extremity of danger and affliction the Psalmists sustain and reassure themselves by the thought of the great deliverance which the end must bring. They lift up their heads, because their redemption draws nigh. They will not fear, though the earth be removed and the mountains be cast in the midst of the sea. The absoluteness of the assurance and the suddenness of attainment unto it are in many instances accounted for by the eschatological import. The appeal

²⁰ Pss. lxxiii. 25, 26; xvi. 2.

lies not to second causes or elements of hopefulness within the fabric of the present world, but to the great, crowning interposition of Jehovah *ab extra*. At this point especially we have occasion to remember, that often not an individual but Israel is the speaking subject. What within the limitations of the Old Testament the individual could scarcely hope for himself, that the people of God carried as a sure faith in its bosom through the ages. Ploughers might plough upon Israel's back and make long their furrows, the waters might overwhelm them, it could not extinguish the conviction, that the future and the end belonged to the chosen of Jehovah. Specifically the thirst for justice over against enemy and avenger quenched itself in anticipation at this deep fountain of judgment to be opened up at the last. But in the midst of all this soteric motivation the higher point of view of the subserviency of Israel's salvation to the glory of God is never lost sight of. When the Psalmists make eschatology the anchor of salvation, this is not done in a self-centered spirit. The very fact of the anchor being cast into such deep water implies a comparative estimate of human and divine help, which in itself cannot but be honoring to God.²¹ The prayer for salvation inevitably embodies praise of the Saviour. That at least no individual selfishness underlies it, appears from the way in which clearly individualistic Psalms join together the deliverance of the suppliant and the salvation of Israel. The Psalmist succeeds in forgetting his own woes for the woes or for the hopes of the people as a whole. But it is even more important to notice that he is able to forget them for the overwhelming thought of the glory of Jehovah. The *gloria in excelsis* which the Psalter sings arises not seldom from a veritable *de profundis* and, leaving behind the storm-clouds of its own distress, mounts before Jehovah in the serenity of a perfect praise.²² Nothing reveals more clearly the innate nobility of the Psalter's religion than this quality of its praise. But even where this highest altitude

²¹ Pss. xx. 7; xlv. 6; xlix. 6; cxviii. 8, 9; cxlvi. 3, 4.

²² Cfr. Roy, p. 25 note 2.

is not reached, where the thought of salvation remains consciously present to the end, the closing note of praise is seldom wanting.²³ Praise and prayer are inseparable, because God's very divinity is in his saving habit.²⁴ In the phrase "for thy name's sake" the recognition is expressed that the ultimate purpose of salvation lies in the glory of God.²⁵ Where the prayer assumes the form of a desire for vindication and deliverance through judgment and destruction of the enemy, it might seem as if the center were shifted from God to man. Still on closer examination this appears not to be so. When the praying subject is Israel and the opposing party the hostile pagan world, the conflict between these two, of course, coincides with that between Jehovah and the world, between light and darkness. And when the two parties belong both to Israel, their mutual opposition is again due to the fact that the party praying represents the cause of Jehovah and the true faith, whilst the party prayed against has aligned itself with the other side and becomes apostate from Jehovah and his people.²⁶ So that in either case the self-interest is identical with the interest of God. Of personal rancor or party-animosity not religiously motivated there is no trace in the Psalter. While it is true, therefore, that the eschatological pressure is heightened, as it usually is, by fierce conflict and strife, this does not detract in the present case from its purity and God-centered character.²⁷

Cheyne offers the suggestion that an unselfish religion was easier for the Psalmists than it is for us, because the sense of individuality was less developed at that time.²⁸

²³ Pss. xxxii. 17; l. 15; lxxx. 18, 19.

²⁴ Cheyne, *Origin*, p. 344.

²⁵ Roy, p. 42.

²⁶ Ps. lxxiii. 15, 27, 28.

²⁷ Cfr. Roy, pp. 28, 29, 73; not nations but two *Weltanschauungen* stand over against each other; Cheyne, *Origin*, p. 293.

²⁸ *Origin*, p. 265; cfr. Cheyne's own striking statement at a later point: "that the people of Israel is to work out the divine purpose in the earth and do this with such utter self-forgetfulness, that each of its own successes shall but add a fresh jewel to Jehovah's crown," p. 340.

But this would apply only over against man and not over against God. And it is hardly in accordance with his own dating of the Psalms. The collectivism of the post-exilic Jews was not of the naïve, instinctive kind, a sort of primeval, semi-physical sense of solidarity; it partakes far more of the intelligent affectionate surrender to an ulterior object of devotion. Here collectivism is but another name for unselfishness. The awakening of the sense of individuality lies not beyond but back of it. It is spiritual loyalty, not ethnic coherence that binds the members of Israel together. The same is true of the still closer bond uniting the pious Israel within the larger body.

The acknowledgment that in the future salvation all is for the glory of God is not of the nature of a mere formal acknowledgment. Owing to the character of psalmody as the instrument of responsiveness, and owing to the uniqueness of the eschatological situation upon which it works, it develops a peculiar fervor and attains a degree of sympathetic projection into the interest of God scarcely equalled elsewhere. The Psalmists sometimes succeed in transporting themselves into the midst of the joy and blessedness, wherewith Jehovah himself contemplates the consummate perfection of his work. This faculty for entering into the inner spirit of God's own share in the religious process represents the highest and finest in worship; it closes the ring of religion, and in Scripture, as we might expect, it is peculiarly the Psalter that illustrates it. If even the Psalm of nature, after enumerating the wonders of creation, closes with the exquisite note, "The glory of Jehovah shall endure forever, the Lord shall rejoice in his works. . . . I will sing . . . as long as I live . . . my meditation of Him shall be sweet, I will be glad in Jehovah," could we expect less where the Psalmist's mind turns to the greater wonders in redemption?²⁹ "Sing unto Jehovah a new song, his praise in the congregation of saints, for Jehovah takes pleasure in his people, He will beautify the meek with sal-

²⁹ Ps. civ. 31-34.

vation." And again, "Jehovah takes pleasure in them that fear him, in them that hope in his mercy; Praise Jehovah, O Jerusalem, praise thy God, O Zion."³⁰ There is something deeper in this than the spontaneous welling up of gratitude from the heart that has received favor. It is the devotion of a mind able to lose itself in the very inward grace of God which is greater and more satisfying than even its greatest and final gift.³¹

The theocentric character of Psalter-eschatology appears also in this that it is prevailingly kingdom-eschatology. By this is meant a form of statement representing Jehovah as becoming, or revealing, Himself in the last crisis the victorious King of Israel. Certain Psalms may be called specific kingdom-Psalms. Pss. xciii, xcvi, xcix, open with the words "Jehovah is King." The context shows that this is declared from the standpoint of the eschatological future, when, after the judgment, his universal dominion shall be established. Into this future the Psalmist projects himself. The situation is the same in Ps. xcvi. 10, "Say among the nations, Jehovah is King; the world also is established, and it cannot be moved."³² It will be remembered that the shout "Absalom is King" was the shout of acclaim at his assumption of the kingship.³³ Still in the Apocalypse this mode of

³⁰ Pss. cxlix. 1, 4; cxlvii. 11, 12.

³¹ Cfr. Cheyne, *Origin*, p. 343. "Precious as is the sympathy of God for us, still higher is the ability put by Him into us to enter into his thoughts and feelings."

³² Cfr. Ex. xv. 17; Isa. xxiv. 23; lii. 7.

³³ 2 Sam. xv. 10. Cfr. Gunkel, *Ausgewählte Psalmen*, pp. 186-192; 324; Gressmann, *Ursprung*, pp. 294-301. According to Gunkel such accession-hymns might have been first sung for human rulers and afterwards transferred to the eschatological enthronement of Jehovah. Gressmann seeks to meet the difficulty that Jehovah's kingship is represented as purely future, by the suggestion, that the background is polytheistic, Jehovah's universal dominion being conceived as beginning with the conquest of the other gods, and that this mode of speaking was retained in the (no longer) polytheistic Psalms. The simple solution seems to lie in this that "kingship" is in the O. T. more a concept of action than of status. Jehovah becomes King=Jehovah works acts of deliverance.

speaking is employed with eschatological reference, xix. 6 "Hallelujah, for the Lord God, the Almighty reigneth." In other cases the act of enthronement is described and the accession is identified with an ascension. Thus Ps. xlvii. 5-8 "God is the King of all the earth . . . God reigneth over the nations. God sitteth upon his holy throne."³⁴ The ascension-feature might be explained from the elevation of the throne-seat, to which the king mounts by steps, or from the going up to the height of Zion, after a victorious return from war, in which Jehovah, as present in the ark, would participate and lead. Pss. lxxviii. 18 and xxiv. 7-10 suggest the possibility of another explanation. In the former passage we read: "Thou hast ascended on high, thou hast led away captives." The Psalm is at its opening escatologically-prospective, but vss. 7-20 seem to be historically-retrospective, so that the statement about Jehovah's ascent is not directly eschatological. It does, however, describe a real ascent *into heaven*, and not a mere going up unto the earthly sanctuary.³⁵ In Ps. xxiv the language might more easily remind of the earthly dwelling-place of Jehovah (cfr. vs. 3), but even here in the second part of the Psalm the "everlasting doors" point to the higher habitation.³⁶ The idea of Jehovah's glorious return into heaven after accomplished victory, must have existed, and if so, would influence directly-eschatological representa-

³⁴ Besides the shout of acclaim the blowing of the trumpet and the clapping of hands accompanied the enthronement, Ps. xlvii. 1; 1 Kings i. 34-45; 2 Kings ix. 13; xi. 12.

³⁵ Cfr. Baethgen, *Die Psalmen*³, who observes that מָרוֹם is always used of the height of heaven. The N. T. adaptation to the ascension of Christ has, therefore, a good support, so far as the local conception is concerned. Gressmann also argues in favor of what he calls the "mythical-eschatological" view of Ps. xlvii. 6 from the use of the verb עָלָה, which according to him is not used of ordinary throne-ascension, the proper term for this being יָשָׁב. But the two acts of "ascending" and "sitting down" are obviously distinct, and the idea of ascent, might, as stated above, have arisen from the elevation of the throne.

³⁶ For the idea of the doors being opened by "lifting up" cfr. Gressmann, *Ursprung*, p. 295, note 1.

tions, like that of Ps. xlvii. 5-8. In Ps. xxiv. this seems to be actually the case.³⁷

It is obvious that a representation which thus throws the emphasis on the future enthronement of Jehovah intends to magnify what the end means for God and for Israel in relation to its God. The core of the belief is that there must come and will come a time, when God will visibly take his place as the end and focus of all the glory of the world process. As the antique idea makes the state subserve the glory of the king, so the ripened ages will be made to yield their accumulated fruit to Him who is their King. Although the kingdom-idea has also its soteric aspect, the Psalter shows that side by side with this, and as even in a sense superior, the manifestation of the glory of Jehovah is expressed by it. The thought is not merely that Jehovah becomes King in order to save, but that through the salvation, as well as in other acts, He arrives at the acme of his royal splendor.

In still another way we can trace the same principle by observing the mode of Jehovah's activity in the coming crisis. The fundamental conception is that of the theophany. It may seem at first a trite thought, that Jehovah must appear on the scene before He can interpose. But the theophany does not occur as the mere prerequisite or precursor of the divine action, it is the vehicle of the action itself. This is facilitated by the realistic conception of the judgment, as a judgment of execution, rather than a formal forensic procedure. In a forensic procedure the bare appearance of Jehovah could figure only as the initial act, after which further steps would be indispensable. The realistic idea, putting sentence and execution in one, condenses the whole into a single act and this act is the supernatural arrival of God upon the field. While, however, fitting into this view of the judgment, the epiphanic character of Jehovah's action has not been exclusively produced by it. At the basis lies again the motive to exalt the majesty and power of Him, who by his mere entrance into the crisis

³⁷ According to Stade, *Zeitschrift f. Theol. u. Kirche*, II. p. 407, the scene of Ps. xxiv is eschatological.

decides the issue and thus centers all attention and interest upon Himself. Here lies the source of that technical eschatological phrase "the coming of the Lord," which like an unbroken thread runs through both testaments.³⁸ He comes, Jehovah comes, the Messiah comes, from Genesis to Revelation this is the import of the message in which ultimately the eschatological hope embodies itself. And the imagery of the theophanic representation is wholly in accord with this intent to make God the central figure. No matter whether Jehovah's coming be linked with or compared to the thunder-storm, or the tempest, or the flood or the volcanic eruption, in each case the sudden, inavertible, overwhelming nature of the event is emphasized.³⁹ Precisely for this reason the impression is sometimes most vivid where every attempt at the use of concrete imagery is abandoned, because the figures threaten to break down under the sheer weight of the reality signified. Nothing could be more effective than the studied avoidance of all intermediate apparatus, nay even of the mention of Jehovah Himself in a passage like Ps. xlvii. 4, 5, "For, lo the kings assembled themselves, they passed by together. They saw it, then they were amazed; they were dismayed, they hastened away." It need not so much as be said, that Jehovah appears; it suffices that He exists: his being God brings the crisis to its inevitable issue.⁴⁰

³⁸ Cfr. Sellin, *Der alttestamentliche Prophetismus*, p. 181.

³⁹ For the reason stated the description of the eschatological scene has an inherent tendency to turn into a description of the theophany as such, even to the extent of the purpose of the latter being for the moment lost sight of. This is a feature observed also in prophecy, cfr. Isa. ii. The Psalm in Hab. iii. and also the opening part of Ps. xviii illustrate this. For an enunciation of the principle involved by Jehovah Himself, cfr. Ps. xli. 10 "Be still and know that I am God. I will be exalted among the nations, I will be exalted in the earth."

⁴⁰ Stade, *Zeitschrift f. Theol. u. Kirche*, pp. 393-398 finds the eschatological theophany in a number of recurring phrases in the Psalter. He enumerates as such "to arise"; "to be exalted" or "lifted up"; "to awake"; "to be not silent"; "to hasten"; "to be not far"; "to stir up might"; "to restore"; "to heal"; "to quicken"; "to redeem"; to save";

One more observation may be made under this head. The profoundly religious state of mind with which the end is contemplated appears in this that it imparts the same coloring to the Psalmist's mood in view of its retardation as does the prospect of impending death by itself. As has been often remarked the attitude towards the latter furnishes a gauge for the depth of religious attachment to Jehovah. There is much in death to terrify the creature regardless of religious considerations. We find that with the Psalmists the chief cause of solicitude and perplexity is the problem of their future relation to Jehovah. Will there be in these strange shadowy regions remembrance of Jehovah, experience of his goodness, praise of his glory? "What profit is there in my blood, when I go down to the pit, shall the dust praise thee, shall it declare thy truth?"⁴¹ What they most feared was not death as such, nor that they might lose themselves in death, but that they might lose contact with Jehovah. Now the same state of feeling asserts itself in regard to the great future coming of Jehovah. "How long, O Jehovah? Wilt thou hide thyself forever? . . . O remember how short my time is. For what vanity hast thou created all the children of men! What man is he that shall live and not see death? That shall deliver his soul from the power of Sheol? Lord, where are thy former loving kindnesses, which thou swarest unto David in thy faithfulness?"⁴² Here the bitterness of death is measured by the danger that it may sweep out of reach the vision of Jehovah and the enjoyment of his glorious reign at the end. To lose touch with Him in Sheol would be painful, to miss Him at his final epiphany intolerable, it would be the supreme tragedy of religion. This is convincing proof that the eschatology of the Psalter seeks and loves nought above Jehovah Himself.

"to be gracious"; "to snatch out"; "to do justice." Although many or all of these terms find eschatological employment, it cannot be proven that all or any of them had become technical in that sense.

⁴¹ Pss. xxx. 9; cfr. vi. 5; lxxx. 5.

⁴² Ps. lxxxix. 46-49. A new Testament parallel is I Thess. iv. 13-18.

From a specific point of view we can observe the same principle in the universalistic statements of the Psalter. Here as in the prophets the subjection of the nations to Jehovah and their conversion form part of the great future change. In both cases this remains a hope and does not become a challenge to missionary activity. It is only through the gateway of eschatology that universalism and the missionary idea come in. More particularly it is the greatness and majesty of Jehovah from which they spring. Jehovah is so great that the nations must come and worship before Him. This is of itself a certainty. But when the idea is raised to the eschatological degree, when He is contemplated in the overpowering majesty of his final appearance, then a super-certainty results, that all the earth will be flooded with the knowledge of his glory.⁴³ While, however, with the prophets this remains, like so many other things, a matter of mere futurity, in the Psalter, owing to the entrance of the subjective element something more results. The mind of the Psalmist is not satisfied with holding the idea at the distance of objective contemplation, but translates it into an eager desire for witnessing the fulfilment of the prospect. Thus a real missionary urge is born out of the eschatological vision of Jehovah and his kingdom. This desire projects itself into the future and breaks out into a direct missionary appeal conceived as addressed to the Gentiles from that standpoint.⁴⁴ The world at large is summoned to acknowledge and praise Jehovah. Of course, this is not actual missionary propaganda.⁴⁵ Yet, at bottom, in its spiritual motivation, it is not different from the latter; perhaps one might even say that the impulse back of it is stronger than the fervor wherewith the Church seizes her present possibilities. The closest analogy to this is again

⁴³ Ps. ix. 19, 20; xviii. 47 ff.; xxii. 27, 28; xxiii. 8; xlvi. 10; xlvii. 1-3, 8, 9; lxxxvi. 8-10; xcvi. 1, 6; xcvi. 2, 3, 9; cii. 15, 21, 22.

⁴⁴ Ps. lvii. 8-11; lxvi. 1-4; lxvii. 2-5; xcvi. 3, 7-13; xcix. 3 (in the form of prayer); c. 1-3; cviii. 3; cxiii. 3, 4; cxvii. 1, 2; cxlv. 21.

⁴⁵ Rhetorically it may be put on a line with the prophetic summons to nature to "clap hands" and "sing."

found in the hymnodic portions of Isaiah. The remembrance of these things may afford us help in ever anew attuning the strain of our missionary-enthusiasm to its highest God-centered key. When we profess to missionarize, not in the last analysis, to improve the world, but to glorify God in the eternal salvation of sinners, this expresses not merely a theological conviction, but it is also eminently true to the principle inherent in the birth of the missionary idea itself. For this the missionary idea was born and for this cause came it into the world, that it should contribute to the glory of God. It was for Him and not for man alone that it was conceived in the womb of the Old Testament.

The question next claiming attention concerns the degree of spirituality in the eschatological outlook of the Psalter. This degree is often placed low, because for their descriptions of the future age the Psalms are dependent on earthly, material, time-bound forms. The future theocracy is a replica of the present one. The expected state is a state in which the eschatological people of Jehovah, dwelling in the holy land, with Jerusalem as its center, will forever enjoy without measure the blessedness afforded by Canaan, the paradise-garden of God. It would be difficult to prove, that all this was understood by the Psalmists with a clear consciousness of its symbolic, typical significance, as we, on the basis of the New Testament, believe it lay in the mind of God, the author of revelation. But, while this is true, and should not be covered up in the interest of un-historical allegorizing, it should not, on the other hand, close our eyes to the profound spirituality with which in the Psalter even this ostensibly material content of the future is approached and apprehended. The main question is after all not what forms and colors enter into the picture, but what is the subtler atmosphere that pervades it to the eye of the pious Israelite, what with his finer religious sensibilities he sought and loved and admired in it. When the question is put in this way there can be no doubt as to

the answer. The very fact of the intense concentration of the hope in God Himself supplies it in advance. The eschatological state is before all else a state in which the enjoyment of Jehovah, the beatific vision of his face, the pleasures at his right hand, the perpetual dwelling with Him in his sanctuary, form the supreme good. "Satisfy us in the morning with thy loving kindness, that we may rejoice and be glad all our days, . . . and let the beauty of Jehovah our God be upon us," these and other similar strains are characteristic of the future-music of the Psalter.⁴⁶ Whether the familiar passages in Pss. xvi., xvii., xlix., lxxiii, where the confidence of uninterrupted fellowship with Jehovah is expressed, are based on the belief in a future blessed life after death, as we think they are, or whether, on the ground of the collectivistic theory, the statements in question are interpreted of the imperishable life of Israel, on either view the underlying sentiment is clearly that of the supreme absorption of the religious life in the things of God.⁴⁷ And it will be noticed that this sentiment finds readiest expression in view of the future state. If only care be taken to exclude every idea obliterative of the sense of human personality, there is ground for speaking of a certain group of Psalms as mystical in their complexion, as in fact a mystically-inclined type of piety has shown a

⁴⁶ Ps. xc. 14, 16. Cheyne, perhaps, goes too far in spiritualizing the language of the Psalmists when he assumes the theophanic statements to have been meant as pure symbolism. This would hardly agree with the parallel drawn between the eschatological and the earlier, historic theophanies. The latter were certainly in part realistically understood. Another instance of the same nature is, where Cheyne credits the Psalmists who believed in spiritual sacrifice with the idea of a purely-spiritual sanctuary. But is there not some difference between these two? The spiritual sacrifice remains objective, the spiritual sanctuary would be a subjectivizing conception. Cfr. *Origin*, pp. 344. 387.

⁴⁷ Writers who deny the presence of the idea of personal blessedness after death in such passages, yet do not deny that the Psalmists expect participation in the Messianic era. Cfr. Beer, p. 70. Can this be entirely due to an acute sense of the nearness of the event?

marked preference for them in all ages.⁴⁸ But there is only a difference of degree between these and the Psalter in general. It is Jehovah's rest which the Psalmist desires Israel to enter, the city of his vision is the city of God.⁴⁹ How pervasively and intensely spiritual the atmosphere of the eschatology of the Psalter is, can best be appreciated by remembering to what an extent our Lord has reproduced it in his teaching. Most of the second clauses of the beatitudes are to all intent a description of the eschatological kingdom in Psalter-language. "The poor in spirit," "the pure in heart," "the meek," "the merciful," "the peacemakers," together with their respective predicates, the endowment with the kingdom, the inheritance of the earth, the obtaining of mercy, the vision of God, the adoption into sonship, these are all Psalter-types and Psalter-hopes, found fit to enter into a most highly spiritualized description of the future by the Psalter's greatest interpreter. The way in which the sanctuary is spoken of, the comparatively rare references to ceremonial sacrifice, the peculiar tenor of these references, where they do occur, which has led some to speak of a class of Puritanical psalms, the deritualisation of heaven, the emphasis on the nearness of Jehovah in the sanctuary, all these plainly show where the center of the interest lies.⁵⁰ Add to this the total absence of the weird apocalyptic element, and the predominance of a truly spiritual atmosphere, can not fail to be recognized.⁵¹ Here also, however, we should note how this fine spirituality is closely interwoven with the fundamental character of the Psalter, as that of subjective responsiveness to the divine approach and embrace in religion. Devotion, worship, the giving answer to God, cannot but spiritualize. It is, as it were, the projection into the objective sphere of the intrinsically trans-

⁴⁸ Cfr. Cheyne, *Origin*, pp. 387, 388; Beer, p. 62, refers in connection with Ps. lxxiii. 28 to the Jewish Kirbath Elohim, the unio mystica, as eschatologically approached; Montefiore, *Mystical Passages in the Psalms*, *Jewish Quarterly Review* 1889, pp. 143-161.

⁴⁹ Ps. xcv. 11; xlv. 4; xlviii. 1.

⁵⁰ Cheyne, *Origin*, pp. 314-327; Beer, p. 47.

⁵¹ Cheyne, *Origin*, p. 428.

lucent essence of the religious soul itself. And it is called to enter into the direct presence of and lay hold upon Jehovah Himself, in doing which it grasps the root of all spirituality. Truly, the new invisible throne of God, in distinction from the ark, rests in a yet higher sense upon the praises of Israel.⁵²

In conclusion we may briefly consider the Messianic element in the eschatology of the Psalter. Here also the subjectively responsive and appropriative attitude has left some traces. To be sure, before speaking of such matters, one is at present compelled to raise the question whether in the old, familiar sense there is a "Messiah" in the Psalter at all. Belief in "typically-Messianic" Psalms has practically disappeared from contemporary critical exegesis. But not only this, the Psalms which used once to be quoted as directly-prophetically Messianic are now frequently understood as relating to the people of Israel as the real "Anointed of Jehovah." The curious fact results that on such a view the title "Messiah" in its technical sense, as the designation of the individual eschatological King, disappears from the Old Testament, for it is in the Psalter and in the Psalter alone, that, on the old interpretation, this title is found.⁵³ In this situation little comfort can be taken from the quasi-rehabilitation which the idea of typical Messianism has undergone at the hands of Babylonianizing interpreters such as Gunkel. Calling attention to the fact that in Babylonian and Assyrian documents the reigning king, especially at his accession, was invested by courtiers and court-poets with superhuman or eschatological predicates, they have found this custom back in certain Psalms,

⁵² Cheyne, *Origin*, p. 327.

⁵³ This leaves out of account Dan. ix. 25, 26, of doubtful interpretation. Cheyne, *Origin*, p. 340 and others, can, of course, continue to speak of "Messianic Psalms," since the term "Anointed" is in a more or less technical sense, with eschatological associations, bestowed upon the people. Still, in view of the long traditional usage, it would be better for those adopting such exegesis to avoid the term.

notably Pss. ii., xlv., lxxii, cx.⁵⁴ On this view the users of such language might be said to have seen their present ruler in the mirror of the conception of the great eschatological King, which would involve a certain resemblance to the old typological scheme. Now, if this adaptation of Oriental court-style to the case of an Israelitish king could be taken as sincere and naïve in its intent, something might be made out of it, in connection with the fact, that at first no one knew which of the Davidic descendants would fulfill the promises, each new accession being capable of giving rise to new hopes. We are not allowed, however, to impose such a meaning upon the custom. These phrases formed a regular court-style; they were no more than "loyal hyperboles" to which no one, least of all those who flatteringly spoke them, attached any real significance. The only useful purpose which the discovery of this ancient ceremonial may serve to the conservative exegete consists in this, that it may prove the early existence of eschatological belief and eschatological interest in these pagan circles and so furnish an argument against the theory of a late emergence of such belief and interest among Israel.⁵⁵ If, refusing to assume such a style in the Psalter, and finding here not the insincerities of court-life, but a solid typical groundwork in-

⁵⁴ Cfr. Gunkel, *Ausgewählte Psalmen*, under the head of Pss. ii., xlv., cx. He does not discuss Ps. lxxii.

⁵⁵ According to Gressmann, *Ursprung*, p. 252, note 4, Gunkel is mistaken in assuming a transfer of Messianic-eschatological language to the human king. The extravagant language, then, would have nothing to do with eschatology. It would be court-style pure and simple: "Der Messias hat hier nichts zu suchen." We do not see how this is to be reconciled with the later statements on pp. 286-293 where we read that "the contemporaneous prince or dynasty is celebrated as the introducer of the golden age, as once the first King. This explains the chief activity of the Messiah, etc." According to this "mythical-paradise elements" have been received into the court-style. Gressmann further believes that the ceremonial must have originated in the great empires of the East, the kingdom of Israel having been too small for aught else than snobbish imitation. He compares the reproduction of the customs of the court of Louis XIV. in the courts of the little principalities of that period. This would emphasize the utter emptiness of the custom in Israel.

wrought by the Spirit of God in the religious experience of David and others, it will be obvious how significant this is for the nearness and intimacy which the figure of the Messiah had acquired for the religious consciousness. No matter what peculiar philosophy or psychology of the typical relation be adopted, this much will be common to all, that the thought of the Messiah must have had a vital existence in the hearts of the Psalmists in order to make this prefiguration of him in themselves more than an empty, unreal show. The David, who could speak of himself in Messianic terms, must have held the Messianic concept in a warm religious embrace.

So much for the typical side of the matter. The other question had reference to the directly-Messianic element in the Psalter. Here the phenomena are so peculiar that modern criticism, though obviously shrinking and moving away from the old, solid Messianic ground, has not succeeded in finding a satisfactory substitute. The chief peculiarity of the passages in question is, that they speak of the King or the Anointed as a present, existing figure.⁵⁶ To account for this three possibilities offer themselves. If one, with Gunkel and Gressmann, applies the court-style hypothesis, the King spoken of or addressed is simply a contemporary ruler and has nothing to do with the Messiah.⁵⁷ Or, if one has recourse to the collectivistic theory,

⁵⁶ The Psalms constituting this group of so-called "King-Psalms" are the following: ii; xviii. 50; xx; xxi; xxviii. 8; xlv; lxi. 6, 7; lxiii. ii; lxxii; lxxxiv. 10; lxxxix. 38. 51; cx; cxxxii. Cfr. Buchanan Gray, *The references to the King in the Psalter in their Bearing on Questions of Date and Messianic Belief in Jewish Quarterly Review*, vii. pp. 658-686.

The only exception to the above statement about the present existence of the King or Messiah is Ps. ii., on the view that this Psalm from beginning to end, with all the speakers in it, the writer included, is projected into that point of the future, when the last great attack of the nations against Zion takes place. In that case, of course, the existence of the King at the actual time of writing would not be necessarily implied.

⁵⁷ Here what was once supposed to be directly-Messianic is turned into the quasi-typical, *i.e.* into the embellishment of the character

the King or Messiah fades away into the figure of Israel. Again, if one is prepared to attach the extraordinary language employed in such Psalms as ii. and cx. to one or the other of the Maccabaeian rulers, he may yet save the directly-Messianic character at the expense of having it connected with an unworthy figure. But on all three views the present existence of the "King" is explained. It would require, however, a combination of at least two of them to cover all the facts. In the case of Pss. xlv.; lxxii. and cx. the collectivistic exegesis is, of course, excluded, and the attempt to carry it through in Ps. ii. is open to most serious objections.⁵⁸ Here then it will be necessary to fall back upon either the one or the other or both of the two other proposals. We believe orthodox exegetes will find it difficult to get rid of the feeling, that neither of these two is in keeping with the dignity of revelation. Subjectively the insincerities of a court-ceremonial, and objectively the character of an existing king with originally eschatological traits. Gunkel admits that, contrary to the intent of the writers, very early readers of such Psalms found in them a direct-Messianic import, *Ausgewählte Psalmen*, p. 18. "So ist also dieser Stoff, der ursprünglich eschatologisch war, schliesslich auch wieder eschatologisch verstanden worden."

⁵⁸ The subject of the equation Israel=the Messiah is a most interesting one, but too large to be handled in the present connection. There can be no *a priori* objection to the investment of Israel not only with the predicate of "anointed," but even with the title of "The Anointed One." The anointed king and the people are closely related, and the parallel case of the attribution of sonship to both, suggests a common possession by both of the anointing. In the New Testament the anointing is bestowed upon both Christ and believers. Besides, the anointing was not strictly confined to the kings. It is quite plausible, therefore, to understand the term of Israel in such passages as Hab. iii. 13; Ps. xxviii. 8, where the *parallelismus membrorum* favors it. The serious objection to the theory arises from the concrete way in which it is applied, viz. that the Messianizing of the nation shall have been an intentional substitute for the hope of a Davidic individual Messiah. Usually Isa. lv. 3 is cited as furnishing either an instance, or the original precedent of the replacement of the Messiah by Israel. But the passage does not require this interpretation, and in view of the fact that it calls the mercies of David "sure" i.e. unalterable, reliable, it is absurd to find in a statement emphasizing this very thing the idea of their abrogation or even transfer.

acter and life of the later Maccabaeen leaders seem unfit to be the bearers of such a high and sacred conception.⁵⁹ As compared with these, there is at least a kernel of attractive truth in the collectivistic idea. Not as if the Messiahship of the Davidic prince could have been abrogated and the Messiahship of Israel substituted for it, but in this way that in certain Psalms a strong sense of the close appurtenance of the Messiah to Israel and of Israel to the Messiah reveals itself. It is not identity, but identification of life that creates the appearance as if Israel were the real Messiah to the exclusion of the personal figure. These Psalmists, when they call Israel the Anointed of Jehovah, do so because they realize the significance of the Messiah's office for the religious life of Israel. Even Wellhausen observes that in a representation, like that of Ps. ii. the Messiah and Israel can be scarcely distinguished.⁶⁰ Such a close identification is after all what may and must be expected, if the root-idea of the Messiahship is taken into account. The deepest motivation of the Messianic conception lies in the absolute, concrete, palpable assurance it affords of Jehovah's permanent presence among his people as the supreme bliss of the future.⁶¹ He is sacramental in the profoundest sense of the word. Consequently it cannot be indifferent which

⁵⁹ The Maccabaeen reference is, even in the case of Ps. cx. where it might seem to be most plausible, rejected by Gunkel, *Ausgewählte Psalmen*, p. 223. Cfr. Sellin, *Der Alttestamentliche Prophetismus*, pp. 168, 169.

⁶⁰ *The Book of Psalms in Sacred Books of the Old and New Testaments*, 1898, p. 164: "The Messiah is the speaker, and the whole Psalm is composed in his name . . . the Messiah is the incarnation of Israel's universal rule. He and Israel are almost identical, and it matters little whether we say, that Israel *has* or *is* the Messiah." But we cannot agree with the clause "It matters little," for, as above stated, the Messiah has his whole significance in this, that he stands as the God-given pledge of Israel's religious privilege and salvation. Israel become itself the Messiah would be thrown back upon itself, and the whole concept would be useless. Baethgen, *Die Psalmen*,³ p. 4 well observes that while the name "son" might fittingly apply to Israel this can not be said of the title "king (over Zion)."

⁶¹ Cfr. Cheyne, *Origin*, pp. 338, 340.

of the two is considered the prius, the Messiahship of the people, or that of the eschatological King. There is in this respect a difference between the joint-application of the idea of sonship to Israel and the coming King, and the joint-application of the idea of Messiahship to the same two subjects. In regard to the sonship, the sonship of Israel comes first in order of revelation; in regard to the Messiahship the anointed character of the Davidic heir has the precedence. Israel has its anointing because of the Messiah.⁶² The question involuntarily occurs whether such a close religious embrace as seems indicated by the facts is conceivable with regard to a mere concept, a person purely seen through the medium of futurity. To speak of the pre-existence of the Messiah in the Psalms may sound preposterous in many critical ears, but there is no escape from the force that draws in that direction, once the actual occurrence of the individual Messianic figure in the Psalter is recognized. The Messiah leads, as it were, a mysterious life, that is somehow woven into the life of his people. After all those who place the Psalter in so late a period, have least reason to ridicule such a view. Will it not be necessary to assign to a date older than most of the Psalms the mysterious statement of Micah according to which the "goings forth" of the great coming ruler in Israel, are "from of old, from everlasting"?⁶³ If we might assume that in this way the Messiah, apprehended as a present reality, played a vital part in the piety of the Psalmists, this would furnish another illustration of the penetrating sub-

⁶² The analogy of the collective "Servant of Jehovah" in Isaiah is often quoted to support the collective Messiahship of Israel. But this would be an analogy only if the individual idea of the Servant were entirely absent from these prophecies, as Giesebrecht and others contend. Criticism, however, seems to be well on the way of receding from this extreme position. And, if "the Servant of Jehovah" be both individual and collective, and the two closely united, the individual Messiah will have to be recognized in the Psalter also, and that in close union with the people in order to make a true parallel with Isaiah. Cfr. Sellin, *Das Rätsel des deuteromesianischen Buches*, 1908. Gressmann, *Ursprung*, pp. 301, 333.

⁶³ Mic. v. 2.

jectivity with which the truth of revelation is appropriated here and enable us to feel more strongly than at any other point, how profoundly at one the Christian's Messianic orientation of faith is with that of those who could say: "Behold O God our shield, and look upon the face of thine Anointed."⁶⁴

In concluding our rapid survey of the eschatology of the Psalter, a few words may be added in regard to its practical bearing on present-day conditions in the religious and social world. Perhaps our study of the Psalms can be of some help to us in taking our bearings in the midst of the loud and universal demand for what is called "reconstruction." It cannot be denied that the eschatological teaching of the Psalms, and Old Testament eschatology in general, bear a certain striking resemblance to the desires and ideals of this eminently modern drift of life. In the Psalter we meet not only with the conception of a reconstruction of things on the grandest of scales, but this is actually projected on the stage of earthly existence. Here, then, an opportunity is afforded for testing, and, if necessary, correcting the ends and methods with which the modern movement for world-reconstruction occupies itself. This is all the more timely, since the Church herself is invited to lend a helping hand in the making over of things, and to let herself be registered as one of several coëqual and coöperative forces making ready for this gigantic enterprise. Now it is plain from the eschatological teaching of Scripture in general and from the Psalms in particular, that the Church has already in advance an outlook and a program towards an absolute and ideal future, which is governed by certain distinct and definite principles, to such a degree bound up with her very essence of belief, that to ignore these principles or to cease insisting upon them in any line of altruistic work, would mean self-abdication and disloyalty to her charter as the Church of God. The foremost of these principles is that the end of existence for all things lies in

⁶⁴ Ps. lxxxiv. 9.

God, and that, therefore, to religion must be assigned the highest place in every ideal condition contemplated as a goal. It is the special function of the Church to speak unceasingly and unfalteringly for this one supreme aspect of the future world, to insist in season and out of season that in it God and the service of God are to the highest good and satisfaction of mankind, that without which all other desirable things will lose their value and abiding significance. To work for the amelioration of the world without putting at the top of its program the bestowal upon this world of the baptism of religion as the primal requisite, should be impossible for the Church so long as she retains a clear consciousness of her own specific calling. Nor is this merely one or the foremost of the tasks of the Church, it is in such a unique sense her "business," that every other activity in order to legitimize itself as a church-function should be able to prove its vital connection, direct or indirect, with the service of God and of religion as her one unique mission in the world. For the Church to indulge in the advocacy of social and economic programs, without taking the time or the trouble of deriving these from her religious root-consciousness, and subordinating them to the glory of God, is a precarious undertaking, not only because in so doing the Church would speak without authority, but also because by every form of experimentizing in such a field she endangers the authority, which within the sphere of strictly-religious principles is properly hers. Undoubtedly the Church even so, will do her royal share in making the world better, and that more effectually than she could possibly do in any other way. The by-product of the genuinely-religious activity will be more abundant and more valuable, than any scheme to substitute it for the main product could possibly make it. For the Church, to keep this in mind is not to be indifferent to the lesser and secondary needs and distresses of mankind; it is in reality to obey the conviction that in no other way her deep solicitude for the sinful world, and the resources she carries within herself for its healing, can be successfully

brought to bear upon it. There can be no doubt that the Church owes the success with which in the past she has contributed to the progress of the world in civilization to her fidelity to this fundamental principle and the self-limitation it imposes upon her; through it mainly she has become and remained the *antiqua mater* out of whose blessed womb the liberties and reforms among mankind have been born and reborn. When measured by this standard of a genuinely-religious and God centered consciousness, it will have to be confessed that, taken as a whole, the modern reconstruction-movement is sadly deficient. It appears to be more humanistic than religious, to derive its motives and ideals from man rather than from God. In the vision of the land to be reached there seems to be little of the worship and enjoyment of him who is the center of every hope worth cherishing for man. God is enthroned but seldom in these Eutopian palaces. And the fear is not altogether groundless, that the Church, in her pragmatic desire to accomplish concrete and speedy results, has opportunistically fallen in line with such humanitarian efforts, and for the moment waived the consciousness of her unique and privileged position, as voicing the specific claims of God upon the service of man. A compromise of this kind born from opportunism is serious enough; far more serious would the situation be, if internal doubt as to the reality or primacy and efficacy of the God-ward side of religion within the consciousness of professed Christians should underlie this tendency. That would mean not merely the death of religion as such, but would result in the utter sterility, so far as lasting, deeper results are concerned, of all uplifting work conducted in its name. Christianity can make the world better in the sign of religion; that standard abandoned she will not only fail of success, but face actual defeat.

The second principle with which the biblical prospect of a better order of affairs is inseparably bound up is that of supernaturalism. The Psalter expects the marvelous future from no other source or cause than a God who only

doeth wonders. Whatever there may be in it of teaching and learning and meditating upon the law, these human endeavors or performances are not credited with bringing on the world-change. It is not through evolution from beneath, but through descent and theophany and interposition from above, that the face of the earth is to be renewed. The comparison with and the appeal to the supernatural past is sufficient proof of this. That the help of man is vanity is a conviction deeply inwoven into the consciousness of the Psalmists. Their true help is in the name of Jehovah who made heaven and earth. Here again a sad difference is to be observed between this frame of mind, and that in which much of the reconstructive effort of the present time is being applied. The latter often cherishes a most doctrinaire and tenacious belief in the inherent and endless perfectibility of human nature, a humanistic optimism which manages to thrive, no one knows how, in the face of the most discouraging circumstances. It is a faith and has some of the noble characteristics of faith, its imperviousness to discouragement, its sovereign indifference to obstacles, its resiliency under apparent defeat, but it is after all a faith in man rather than in God, and since faith in the last analysis can be glorified only through its object, it lacks the supreme glory of the faith of Christianity. It cannot overcome the world, because it has its resources in the world itself. Even much of its unshakable confidence in man is due to this that it feels itself shut up within the sphere of the purely-human, and so tied down to man and his natural potentialities, that to doubt of man would mean to despair of itself and its own mission. And unfortunately at this point also there is observable a certain tendency in the procedure of the Church to bend and lend itself to this mode of thinking. Some of its educative and reformatory work does not at least scorn the appeal to it as a motive force, and gives the impression, if not by direct avowal, at least indirectly and through the assent of silence, that much can be made of man, if only his better nature is cultivated and his

environment improved and his evil propensities repressed. True, this may seem a mere matter of temporary accommodation, an innocent shifting of the emphasis. Even as such, however, it is serious enough. The idea of God and his indispensable, all-determining part in the transformation of the world, and central place in the world as transformed, is not a thing that, like some secondary factor, can be for a while ignored or neglected with impunity. The Christian who allows himself to be drawn into this mode of thought, can not escape in the end having his whole religious consciousness deflected by it from its original and proper center. A dualism which reckons with God in the inner life of the soul and takes no account of Him in its outward activities for reclaiming others, is in the long run impossible. Moreover, the tendency in question minimizes and virtually denies the fact of sin as the primal element in the situation to be met. The slighting of the thought of God has for its inevitable correlate the weakening and ultimate loss of the specific consciousness of sin. But, serious as all this may be, there is sometimes reason to fear that the things enumerated are not simply consequences of a drift of thought superficially followed, but are the deeper-lying causes of an inclination to fall in with the drift. The humanitarian movement in its most pronounced and specific form, not seldom has for its background a weakened or tottering faith in the dependableness of God and the supernatural. Where this shows itself the Church should be on her guard, lest by countenancing it she deny herself and her Master and renounce the most precious heritage of power she has received from Him. To withdraw herself from participating in such action is not abandonment of the world to itself; it is the simple refusal to encourage a huge system of quackery, and, that, if for no higher reasons, in the interest of sinful, suffering humanity itself.

Finally the third lesson to be learned from the eschatology of the Psalter is the importance of the strand of other-worldliness in our Christian thought-fabric and love-service

with reference to the future. It might seem, to be sure, as if the Psalter were ill-adapted to instruct us here, because its own outlook is confined to the earthly state, because while expecting another world-order, it postulates no other milieu for this than the terrestrial one already known. And so it might seem as if both the Psalter and Old Testament eschatology in general lent real support to the view that it is this lower earthly sphere, that must be transformed, and that, leaving the question of a higher sphere to itself, the Christian can be contented with directing his reclaiming effort to it alone. But this is only apparently so, and the Psalter is, of all biblical books, the best adapted to correct this impression, because it gives us a glimpse not merely of a higher future world objectively, but gives us a glimpse of the subjective psychological process by which the revelation of such a higher world was carried home to the minds of the Psalmists, and consequently of the depth to which it is rooted in the very heart of the religious consciousness itself. It was because they could not conceive of the communion between themselves and their God as other than endless, that the Psalmists projected it into a future life. It was the challenge of death flung into the face of religion that led to this supreme victory of faith. It was this that opened the gates of brass and broke the iron bars in sunder. Thus religion reached the consciousness of the inadequacy of the present life to meet its most instinctive and deepest desires, and threw its anchor into the greater, eternal beyond. And from that moment onward there could be no more doubt as to where the emphasis in biblical religion would finally lie. The New Testament has, of course, added to this the clearer and more principal knowledge, that not merely will God not withdraw himself from the believer in death, but that first on the other side of death the perfectly normal and satisfying, the true life can begin. It has brought life and immortality to light in their most positive self-evidencing aspect. This revelation is so rich and overwhelming; it shows such a tremendous disproportion be-

tween what religion can mean and bring to us here, and what it will mean and bring to us hereafter, that merely to believe it is bound to make other-worldliness the dominating attitude of the Christian mind. This is so much the case that the slightest shifting of emphasis here may justly be considered the symptom of some religious abnormality. The gauge of health in the Christian is the degree of his gravitation to the future, eternal world. The Christian train of thought in this respect is the reversal of that of the Old Testament: the eternal is not so much a prolongation of the temporal, but the temporal rather an anticipation of the eternal. And what is true of life is true of the ministering and self-propagating function. The Church of Christ in all its complex service to the world can never forget that its primary concern is to call men into and prepare them for the life eternal. Now, if one compares these obvious facts with the spirit in which the modern humanitarian movement estimates this life and the future life in their relative importance, it can not be denied, that the Christian point of view is not only not always consistently maintained, but that sometimes it is openly scorned and rejected. The taunt of the masses, who feel themselves discriminated against in the treasures and comforts of this world, is that religion seeks to reconcile them to their spoiling of the present with the promise of an illusory or at best doubtful future. The temptation is strong to overcome this prejudice through giving greater prominence to the secular advantage connected with the Christian life and promoted by Christian activity. There is some warrant for this, for we are taught that godliness is profitable unto all things, having promise of the life that now is and of that which is to come. At the same time the danger should not be underestimated that out of this strategic concession to the demand of the age, may spring an actual compromise with the spirit that would secularize and terrestrialize Christianity as to its essence. Leaving for a moment higher things out of account, it is obvious that from the Christian standpoint no

greater injury can be done to the true progress and healing of humanity in this present evil world than to make it promises and offer it remedies which have no vital connection with the hope of eternal life. For this hope alone can in the long run feed and keep flowing every stream of altruistic activity that deserves the name of religion. The life of this earth as a mere passing episode in time is not worth the aeonian toil expended upon it. Precisely because the Christian other-worldliness is inspired by the thought of God and not of self, it involves no danger of monastic withdrawal from or indifference to the present world. The same thirst for the divine glory which is the root of all heavenly-mindedness, also compels the consecration of all earthly existence to the promotion of God's kingdom. Here also the by-product cannot continue, if the main object of pursuit is lost sight of or neglected. But, what is most serious of all, the vanishing of the belief in the transcendent importance of the world to come would most surely spell the death of the Christian religion itself. Whatever may have been possible under Old Testament conditions, in the beginnings of revelation, it is absolutely impossible now with the New Testament behind us to construe a religious relationship between God and man on the basis of and within the limits of the present life alone. A religion which touched only the little span of consciousness between birth and death would be a pseudo-religion and its God a pseudo-God. A God who treated the fugitive generations of the race as so many passing acquaintances, content to see them afloat in and float out of the luminous circle of his own immortal life, could not continue to evoke the worship of his creatures. Pagan cult He might receive, but Christian service not. Men would become, and in a far more tragic sense than the Psalmist meant it, strangers and sojourners with Him. The Psalter bears eloquent witness to the truth that a hope of indefinite perpetuation for the collective body is not enough. It requires the assurance of the eternity of religion in the individual soul to

secure the permanence of religion as such. The Psalmists had their faces set towards this and through wrestlings of prayer with Jehovah won their way to the light. The modern, humanistic movement prefers to cultivate the secular and earthly in part because it has come to doubt the heavenly and eternal; its zeal for the improvement of the world often springs not from faith, but from scepticism. The Church by compromising and affiliating with this would sign her own death-warrant as a distinct institution. When religion submerges itself in the concerns of time and becomes a mere servant of these, it thereby renders itself subject to the inexorable flux of time. Kronos has eaten all his children and he will not spare even this noblest of his offspring, once it passes wholly into his realm and closes behind itself the doors of eternity. On the other hand, in a pure and firm eschatological conviction, which keeps eternal hopes and interests well to the front, lies the safeguard and pledge of the perpetual vigor of Christianity. It cannot lose its youth here, because it knows eternal youth is promised in the hereafter. Through faith in this promise alone it defies the attrition of time and history. Its eschatology is its greatest religious glory, for in this the Church expresses her faith in a future when all the accidents and externals of religion shall drop away, a great purging of the world-stage, which shall leave only the perfect and ripe fruitage of all God's intercourse with man from the beginning. The Gospel of the life to come is the Gospel of a Church sure of herself and her own endless destiny. No other creed can bring it, and the Christian Church can bring nothing less. In it lies the believer's own portion and it is the only portion he should think it worth while to offer to a spiritually impoverished and starving world. It is moreover the portion which has the promise that all other things shall be added to it.

Princeton.

GEERHARDUS VOS.

ALBRECHT RITSCHL AND HIS DOCTRINE OF CHRISTIAN PERFECTION

II. RITSCHL THE PERFECTIONIST

It lies in the very nature of a naturalistic system that it should lay all its stress on the activities of the Christian life. There is nothing else on which it could lay its stress. What man himself does, the influences by which he is brought to do it, and the issue of his activities—this is the circle of topics in which what, by a strange transmutation of meaning, is still called Theology, moves. Ritschl continues to employ the terms reconciliation, justification, forgiveness, adoption, regeneration, sanctification; but they one and all denote in his hands human, not divine, acts; and his whole discussion is devoted to the elaboration of the influences under which man is brought to the performance of them, their nature, and their effects.

According to Ritschl all the influences under which man is brought to the performance of these acts are gathered up, as in their focus, in the person of Jesus Christ; or rather in the great discovery which Christ made of the real relation in which man stands to God, the effective transmission of which to His followers constituted the one object of His life.¹ This great discovery is comprehended in the one declaration that God is love and nothing but love, and therefore man has nothing to fear from Him. We do not rest under the Divine condemnation; the Divine wrath does not hang over us; God intends us nothing but good; God will do us nothing but good. This is what Jesus would have us understand and act upon; and this it is by which, if we understand and act upon it, we become Christians with all that that involves. Of course what we are assured of here is

¹ P. 386: "Beyond doubt Jesus experienced and declared to his disciples a religious relation to God not before known, and purposed to bring His disciples into the same religious world-view and self-estimate, and under this condition into the universal task of the Kingdom of God which He knew to be set for His disciples as for Himself."

that sin has no significance in the sight of God; and what we are exhorted is to treat it as without significance. Bringing us to this attitude to sin and God is the reconciling work of Jesus; our assumption of this attitude is our justification. For when we assume this attitude our distrust of God, the product of our feeling of guilt, passes away; we take our place happily by God's side; and, assured that He means us only good, we make His end our end and work with Him for its attainment.

We are obviously entangled here in a perfect network of illusions.

There is no such thing as sin. What we call sin is merely ignorance. Our feeling of guilt is therefore an illusion.² It is really not a sense of ill-desert for sins committed so much as a mere anticipation of the displeasure of God. We are not oppressed by the consciousness that we have done wrong; we are depressed by anxiety lest we shall receive harm. It is less regret than fear which gives it its form. This fear, however, is wholly misplaced. God feels no displeasure towards us and has no intention whatever of punishing our sin. He never has had. He experiences no movement of indignation against us; His whole emotional reaction towards us is love. Our sense of forgiveness is therefore also an illusion. There is nothing to forgive; and God has never been ill-disposed toward us. "If there is no truth in the consciousness of sin, as guilt causing alienation from God," writes Pfeiderer in an illuminating page,³ "neither can there be any truth in the consciousness of the annulment of guilt and alienation from God. A guilt which does not exist except in man's illusory notion cannot be forgiven; a relation which has never really been interrupted cannot be restored, cannot be reconciled. The

² To be perfectly accurate we should note here that Ritschl is willing to allow that sin may become witting—in the case of the finally reprobate. As Pfeiderer (as cited, p. 69) puts it: "All sin, with the exception of the always only problematical definitive hardening, is in God's judgment only ignorance."

³ As cited, p. 61.

conclusion necessarily follows from the estimate of sin as an ignorance which is not deserving of wrath and does not interrupt our relation to God, that the consciousness of reconciliation or of a change from an interrupted to a peaceable relation is an illusion. There cannot occur here a change in the actual relation between man and God; the change lies only in man's conception of his relation to God so far as he is relieved from his former illusory notion of this relation or is enlightened as to the absolute erroneousness of his sense of guilt and fear of the angry God."

In a word, Ritschl's whole doctrine of sin, guilt, forgiveness, reconciliation moves, not in the realm of realities, but in that of the subjective consciousness. Man feels himself under the Divine condemnation. He is wrong. All he needs is to be assured that he is wrong, and all is well. That is in effect Ritschl's doctrine of justification. Continuing his searching criticism Pfeleiderer points out⁴ that Ritschl can assign no ground for justification and that the reason is that nothing has really happened in justification. "There is no such essential difference for God between sinners and righteous that the one stands in an entirely different relation to Him from the other." "In point of fact," says he, "the key to Ritschl's doctrine of justification lies here: there is no need for a ground for the justification of the sinner simply because the sinner has never been the object of God's disfavor, but his sin has been esteemed by God only as the stage of his ignorance. Justification is therefore really nothing but the historical notification, brought about by Jesus, that God is only love and as such is not angry with sinners, and they may therefore lay aside their fear and distrust of Him. It is no doubt assumed along with this, that those who, as members of the communion of Christ, hear this proclamation and profit by it, will be led by it to adopt the end of God in His Kingdom. How, however, if this assumption be too optimistic? How if it should rather be found that the proclamation of the God whose

⁴ As cited, p. 75.

forgiveness of sins is not accorded on distinct conditions, but whom rather sin does not in the least offend, is understood and utilized by the mass of the members of the community as meaning that they need not make too much of their sin and can exercise their freedom over the world in joyous mastery of the world and enjoyment of the world, undeterred by old-fashioned scruples of conscience? Of course the Ritschlian theologians have no such meaning and purpose. But the danger of a practical consequence of this sort lies so uncommonly close in this theology that it certainly needs to be earnestly considered."

There can be no sort of question that Ritschl makes the sense which the sinner has of resting under the displeasure of God, the sense which the believer has of having been forgiven by God, illusions. "All reflections about God's wrath and pity, His long-suffering and patience, His severity and mercy," he says,⁵ "are based on the religious adjustment of our individual situation with God in the form of time." A. E. Garvie⁶ rightly expounds this to mean, that "subjective changes in our own spiritual state, which is conditioned on the lapse of time, are experienced by us as due to objective changes in God's relation to us, although God is not Himself subject to the condition of time." But this is not all that it means. Ritschl is really employing the idea of the eternity of God to ground the denial of the presence in Him of any such emotion as wrath or any such quality as vindictory justice, it being a maxim with him that wrath and love cannot co-exist in the same mind. However indispensable the judgments which he enumerates "may be in the context of our religious experiences," therefore, he immediately adds, "they are out of all relation to the theological determination of the whole under the viewpoint of eternity. Under the theological point of view, therefore, the wrath of God and His curse on sinners yet to be reconciled, finds no validity." God's actual attitude to us is,

⁵ P. 322.

⁶ P. 307.

and therefore His eternal attitude has always been, just that of pure love. He feels no anger towards us, and has never felt any, and it is absurd therefore to speak of reconciling Him to us, and even more absurd to speak of reconciling His love and anger in Himself. It is true that under His own sense of guilt a sinner may imagine that God is angry with him, and, under this obsession, may even look upon the evils which befall him in the course of his life, as so many punitive inflictions. But all this is illusion. "Here," says Garvie rightly,⁷ "we are concerned with a subjective representation, not an objective reality." There being no such thing as "the wrath of God revealed from heaven against every doer of iniquity," it is our sense of guilt only, not the fact of the case, which leads us to interpret the evils of life as punitive. Paul is wrong when he connects death, for example with sin.⁸ The only evil which is a real consequence of sin, is that estrangement from God which results from our sense of guilt. This experience of estrangement from God—the result of our sense of guilt—is therefore in a true sense the only "punishment" of sin.⁹ "The unremoved sense of guilt is not a penal state along with others, but this is the thing itself to which all external penal evils are related only as accompanying circumstances."¹⁰ Thus the whole of the evil of sin is swallowed up into the sense of guilt, which itself is—not the subjective reflection of an objective separation from God wrought by sin itself—but a subjective illusion as to the attitude of God

⁷ As cited, p. 310.

⁸ P. 358 f.

⁹ Cf. Orr, *The Ritschlian Theology*, p. 147: "It is this experience of separation from God which, on Ritschl's showing, is the real core or essence of the punishment of sin, so far as, *ex concessis*, the punitive idea (which rests on the rejected theory of 'rights') is to be admitted to Christianity at all." In Ritschl's system there is no place for real punishment of sin. "If there is no wrath of God against sin," expounds Garvie (as cited, p. 310). "there can be no punishment by God of sin. This conclusion Ritschl expressly draws."

¹⁰ P. 365.

towards sin, creating the feeling of a separation from God which has no existence except in our own imagination.

This being true, reconciliation naturally is to Ritschl, as Friedrich Nippold phrases it,¹¹ "at bottom, nothing but a change of mind, though no doubt, this change of mind is made possible only by the knowledge and appreciation of the divine will of love declared by Christ." And all that happens in justification—which is only a synonym of reconciliation—is, as Garvie points out,¹² "the restoration of the sinner to communion with God," or, otherwise expressed, "the removal of the sinner's separation from God," though to be perfectly accurate we must take the nouns "restoration," "removal," not actively, but passively. The separation here spoken of is expressed, or we would better say, consists, in a "sense of guilt"; it is therefore, this "sense of guilt" which is removed. "This, however," remarks Garvie now, "would be no benefit but an injury, unless with the sense of guilt there is also taken away the guilt, which is a real contradiction by man of God, and of his own moral destiny. As this contradiction is real, else man's sense of guilt were an illusion, so the removal is real, else man's feeling of forgiveness were a deception." This reasoning is formally sound; but as the results it ostensibly reaches are the precise contradictions of Ritschl's actual teachings, it serves only to show how completely the conceptions of sin and its removal drop out of Ritschl's teaching. Man's sense of guilt does appear in Ritschl's system as an illusion and his feeling of forgiveness does appear in it as deceptive. The guilt and forgiveness which these illusory feelings fallaciously presuppose share, of course, in their illusoriness. Ritschl knows nothing of either guilt or its removal, in the proper sense of the word guilt, in which it includes along with subjective ill-desert, also obnoxiousness to punishment.¹³ The "sense of guilt" is represented by Ritschl as real-

¹¹ As cited, p. 265.

¹² As cited, p. 325 f.

¹³ Orr has made the matter perfectly plain, *The Christian View of*

ly just distrust of God, and there is no ground for distrusting God. God does not really forgive our sins; He merely takes no account of them—His whole reaction towards us being love. He loves us continuously, with a love unconditioned by the intrusion of wrath. He experiences no change of attitude towards us, or of action toward us. We simply come to know that this is His attitude towards us; and our distrust of Him, the product of our unjustified sense of guilt, passes away. It passes away precisely because it has no ground in reality. We feel forgiven but we are not forgiven; we have merely learned that God is not "separated" from us—we have only been "separated" from Him.

What we receive through Christ according to Ritschl would be somewhat more accurately expressed therefore if we spoke of it as not forgiveness but the assurance of forgiveness.¹⁴ Our sins are already forgiven, that is to say, overlooked: what we obtain through Christ is only knowledge of this fact.^{14a} We remain guilty of these sins, of

God, etc. p. 179, *The Ritschlian Theology*, pp. 146 ff, 269 f, and especially *Ritschlianism*, pp. 99 ff. The strictures on Orr's representations made by A. T. Swing, *The Theology of Albrecht Ritschl*, 1901, pp. 125ff, Orr has himself dealt with adequately. Those by J. T. Mozley, *Ritschlianism*, 1909, pp. 218 ff are no more successful.

¹⁴ On the technical subject of "assurance" Ritschl speaks at large p. 652. He who manifests the characteristic features of the believer—faith in God's providence, humility, patience, prayer, "combined as they are in normal fashion with the disposition to obey the moral law and with good action in one's calling"—has sufficient evidence that he is in a state of salvation. This admits of no other meaning than that our assurance of reconciliation is an inference from the observed fruits of reconciliation—including our moral state. Accordingly Ritschl tells us in the summary statement (p. 670) that "the believer expresses his personal assurance of reconciliation" in the exercise of the Christian virtues. This is a position, however, which he does not seem always to preserve.

^{14a} There is a certain analogy between Ritschl's representation that men are not under the wrath of God, but need only to lay aside their distrust of God and realize that they have nothing to fear from Him to be "saved," and a wide-spread type of preaching which declares all men by nature "sons of God," and "salvation" to consist in coming to understand and live according to this high character. "It is the true philosophy of history," says Phillips Brooks, "that man is the child

course, in the sense in which Ritschl speaks of "moral guiltiness"—that is to say, we remain subjectively ill-deserving,—and we do not lose consciousness of this guilt. It would be contrary to God's truth to pronounce us no longer guilty, and our own conscience witnesses to us that we are guilty.¹⁵ Our sense of guilt may even be intensified.¹⁶ Only we are made to feel that all this makes no difference in God's treatment of us, and so we are encouraged no longer to hold aloof from God in distrust of His purpose towards us. What "forgiveness removes is not the sense of guilt for past sins, but only its effect in separating from God, or the distrust of God which attaches to it."¹⁷ It "merely makes inoperative that effect of guilt and the consciousness of guilt, which would appear in the abolition of the moral communion between God and man, in their separation or mutual alienation."¹⁸ "When God forgives or pardons sins," Ritschl now immediately continues, "He brings His will into operation in the direction of not permitting the contradiction—expressed in guilt—in which sinners stand to Him, to hinder that fellowship of men with Him which He intends on higher ground." Forgiveness of sins thus means for Ritschl that, on God's part, God having ends of His own to serve, will not permit man's sin to stand in the way of fellowship with

of God, forever drawn to his Father, beaten back by base waves of passion, sure to come to Him in the end." The analogy is not completely destroyed when a universal redemption is thought of as the ground of man's favorable condition as already forgiven and requiring only subjectively to realize this forgiveness,—which constitutes his salvation. It is unnecessary to point out how wide-spread this notion is: it is intrinsic in all doctrines of a "universal atonement" where the atoning fact is found in the work of Christ and not in an act of man's. A curious example of it is mentioned by L. Ihmels, *Die tägliche Vergebung der Sünden*, 1901, pp. 39 f in "the Bornholm movement," for which see also Herzog-Hauck *sub nom.*

¹⁵ P. 60. "The removal of guilt and the consciousness of guilt would be in contradiction to the validity of the law of truth for God, as also for the conscience of the sinner."

¹⁶ P. 544.

¹⁷ P. 545.

¹⁸ P. 64.

Him; and on man's part, man, being assured of this, lays aside his distrust of God, the natural result of his sense of guilt ("that mistrust which as an affection of the consciousness of guilt naturally separates the offender from the offended one"), and commits himself in full trust to God's providential care. To put the matter bluntly, God proposes on His part to take man just as He finds him; and man agrees on his part, that being done, no longer to distrust and hold aloof from God, but to trust himself to His keeping. Having no longer to look for evil from God, according to his desert, he will accept the good, which, despite his unworthiness of it, God (for ends of His own) is willing to give him. This is really Ritschl's doctrine of justification; and obviously, it is a profoundly immoral doctrine. It amounts at bottom simply to an understanding between man and God that by-gones shall be by-gones, and no questions will be asked.

Even C. von K gelgen¹⁹ allows that Ritschl deals too lightly with the forgiveness of sins. "That, not indeed the idea of sin, but the idea of the forgiveness of sin, is (of course unintentionally) attenuated by Ritschl on theological grounds, seem to us easily shown. Frank says²⁰ accordingly

¹⁹ As cited, p. 44.

²⁰ The reference is to Fr. H. R. Frank, *Ueber die kirchliche Bedeutung der Theologie A. Ritschls*², 1888, p. 14: "It corresponds with Ritschl's conception of sin, that in order to the reconciliation of man with God there is no need of an atonement by propitiation. 'When God forgives or pardons sin, He exerts His will in the direction that the contradiction, expressed in guilt, in which sinners stand to Him, shall not prevent that communion of man with Him which He purposes on higher grounds' (p. 64). 'On higher grounds'—because the establishment of the Kingdom of God is His self-end and forgiveness of sins is needed for it." Pursuing his theme Frank points out that in Ritschl's conception of God, no less than of sin, nothing else than this could be expected of him. "Now then," asks Frank a few pages later (p. 18), "how are we to comfort a soul that has fallen into sin and is burdened in his conscience in the presence of God? We must say to him: Dear friend, you have a wrong idea of God. God has no need of punishment and atonement. On higher grounds, namely, that He may realize the purpose of the world, which is at the same time His own purpose, He pardons sin. Be at peace, dear soul, and do not disturb yourself with such mediaeval (cf. Ritschl, *Drei akad. Reden*, p. 28) notions."

with justice that according to Ritschl God forgives sin 'on higher grounds,' because the establishment of the Kingdom of God is His self-end, and forgiveness of sins is needed for that. Thus forgiveness of sins becomes for Ritschl at bottom a means to an end . . . " These remarks do not, however, go to the root of the matter. What is difficult to credit is not that God has a high end in view in forgiving sins and that it is this high end which determines His action—any doctrine of forgiveness must come in the end to that; but that this forgiveness is grounded solely in this high end. Not only is God's ultimate motive in forgiving sin made to be His desire to establish a Kingdom of God; but His sole proximate justification in forgiving sins is supplied by this one motive. His forgiveness of sins is made thus a purely arbitrary act, performed for no other reason and with no other justification, than that He needs forgiven sinners for ends of His own. This, we say, is a profoundly immoral doctrine; it represents God as treating sin as no sin, which is as much as to say, failing to react to moral evil, perceived as such, as every moral being, by virtue of his very nature as a moral being, must react to it—with abhorrence and indignation. Nevertheless as we have already seen, this representation falls in with Ritschl's actual teaching with respect to God, to whom he denies any other attribute than love and from whom he withholds specifically the attribute of vindictory justice. It is also alone consonant with his teaching with regard to the work of Christ, to which he will not permit to be ascribed any expiatory or sin-bearing character. If he was to teach any forgiveness of sins at all, Ritschl was shut up to representing it as done by God in that purely arbitrary way in which alone, he tells us, it would be becoming for God's will to act.

An attempt is made to mitigate the immorality of the transaction, as it concerns man, by representing it as the reception by man of "eternal life" or "blessedness," and the source of great encouragement to him to undertake good works. Assured of acceptance with God, despite his sins,

he, in trust in God's providence, rises, as a spiritual being, above the world, makes God's self-end his end, and, as a fellow-worker with God, labors for the building up of the Kingdom of God in the world. Having been given a new chance, he takes it. We have already seen Pfleiderer, with justified cynicism, questioning whether the proclamation of totally ungrounded forgiveness, open unconditionally to all, would naturally have this happy effect. With a similar implication Frank reminds us in this connection of Claus Harms' comment that in the sixteenth century the forgiveness of sins cost at least money; now, it seems, we are to have it for nothing at all—we are just to take it for ourselves.²¹ Certainly to represent forgiveness of sins as costing absolutely nothing—either to God or to us—will scarcely gird our loins to avoid at all costs such negligible foibles. In any event, however, we are given here but a poor substitute for the Holy Spirit, making His people holy by His creative action on and in them. Yet this is what Ritschl offers us instead of that. Readers of Ritschl are struck by nothing more strongly than by his embarrassment in dealing with the topic of sanctification. With his passionate repulsion of all "mysticism,"—that is, of all immediate working of God upon man—he has no instrument of sanctification but the human will, acting "freely" under the inducement of motives.²² Man must sanctify himself. With his equally determined representation of justification as purely a change of relation—it would be better said, of attitude—to God, he repels all implication of sanctification in justification, however that implication may be conceived. Sanctification is an independent work of man, taking place in a different sphere of operation. The most that he can allow when swayed by this point of view, is that it is so far

²¹ Fr. H. R. Frank, *Ueber die kirchliche Bedeutung der Theologie A. Ritschls*, Ed. 2, 1888, p. 31.

²² Hence Fr. Luther (*Neue kirchliche Zeitschrift*, 1891, p. 479) very properly says that "according to Ritschl it is nature and not grace which is the source of the moral activities of life."

furthered by justification that the new attitude to God assumed in justification predisposes men to make God's self-end his own end, and enheartens him in its prosecution. Justification may be thus, he says, the fundamental condition of the Christian life,²³ apart from which the new life would not be undertaken or vigorously prosecuted.²⁴ But it is not the direct means of sanctification nor is sanctification its direct end. Such a representation would be to institute a "wholly apocryphal" connection between the two.²⁵

The dualism between the religious and the ethical aspects of the Christian life thus brought to expression, runs through the whole of Ritschl's exposition of the Christian life and is never quite resolved. It is embodied in the famous comparison in which he pictures Christianity "not as a circle described from a single center, but an ellipse which is determined by two *foci*";²⁶ and it determines the form of his definition of Christianity, which is modified from Schleiermacher's precisely in its interests. "Christianity," says he,²⁷ "is the monotheistic, completely spiritual and ethical religion which, on the ground of the redeeming and Kingdom-founding life of its Originator, consists in the freedom of childship to God, includes in itself the motive to conduct out of love, aims at the moral organization of humanity, and grounds blessedness in childship to God *as well as* in the Kingdom of God." He is thinking here obviously in terms of religion and ethics set in a parallel relation to one another, with no vivid sense, at least, of their integration into a single notion. He is determined that Christianity shall not be to him "either merely a doctrine of redemption, or merely a system of morality." He insists that it is both;

²³ P. 535, paragraph 2.

²⁴ P. 546. When von K gelgen, as cited, p. 94, declares that the reproach that with Ritschl "justification has no telic relation (*Abzweckung*) to the production of morally good conduct or of works"—as Lipsius represents—is unjust, he can be justified only so far as this.

²⁵ P. 495 ff.

²⁶ P. 11.

²⁷ P. 13.

and in order that it may be both he continually emphasizes the two as two. He says,²⁸ it is true, that "dogmatics must be worked out, not purely from the idea of redemption; nor ethics purely from the idea of the Kingdom of God; each must be kept under the constitutive influence of both ideas." "Effectuation by God" supplies the form of the one; "personal self-activity" of the other. Neither can do without the other; they interact on one another. But their unity continually escapes his grasp. In the end, no doubt, the two are integrated under the scheme of means and end. Redemption is in order to the Kingdom of God; the ethical activities of the Kingdom of God manifest childship to God. But this mode of representation is reached with difficulty and is not consistently maintained.

Means are of course always subordinate to their end. As redemption through Jesus has the Kingdom of God for its end, that means accordingly that religion is in order to morality, or, to use a parallel mode of expression, employed by Ritschl, "religious dependence" is in order to "moral freedom." And that means in turn that Ritschl's system (conceiving of religion and ethics as it actually does) is at bottom less a system of theology than a system of ethics; and it is the idea of "moral freedom," which gives its form to ethics, that dominates his thought. He does indeed remind us²⁹ that Christianity is in the first instance a religion, and only in its specific character among religions, the ethical religion by way of eminence. Therefore, he argues, "the religious functions—trust in God, humility, patience, thanksgiving and prayer to God—in which according to Luther's teaching, the believer takes his position against the world—have precedence of the series of moral functions in which we devote ourselves directly to man." But this avails nothing; for in Ritschl's view, these "religious" functions are at most only a parallel product of man's free action, in the religious sphere, to his independent mo-

²⁸ P. 14.

²⁹ P. 527.

rality; and in reality only a means to his moral activity, supplying the "mood" in which alone it can be, or can be successfully, prosecuted. It is his naturalism which is determining his conceptions here. He is not talking of what God works in man in and through justification; but of how the new attitude which man assumes in what he calls justification affects him in his relations God-ward and man-ward. What he presents as the religious results arising out of justification are therefore merely the motives to moral action which spring from his change of attitude. The vacillation, in which Ritschl now presents the religious aspects of the Christian life as merely the means to the moral, and now keeps the two apart as independent parallel phenomena of it,³⁰ may possibly be, Henri Schoen suspects,³¹ if not exactly due to, yet facilitated by, a double inheritance. There is Schleiermacher, after whom it was difficult to present a purely ethical theory of redemption. But there is also Kant. And if, in spite of Schleiermacher, the ethical element dominates in Ritschl's doctrine, "that is because, consciously or unconsciously, he remains more under the influence of Kant than of Schleiermacher. It is because he feared above everything to see the mystical element predominate over the will to do good, which appeared to him to be the essential factor of all religion."

We perceive that Ritschl's conception of the Christian life amounts briefly to just this: free ethical life inspired by a sense of well-pleasingness to God. Justification is viewed as the assumption of a new attitude of trust towards God and entrance, in this trust, into participation in God's aim to found an ethical Kingdom; and this Kingdom of God is viewed as the society of those animated by this motive and sharing in this endeavor. Justification thus prepares for the ethical effort; the Kingdom of God is its sphere. This free ethical life under this inspiration constitutes now Christian

³⁰ P. 521. "What we gain is not a simple subsumption of the ethical under the religious aspect of Christianity."

³¹ As cited, p. 138; cf. p. 136.

perfection, in Ritschl's nomenclature; that is to say, it is all that it is necessary to have in order to be a Christian—it makes us perfectly Christian though it may not make us perfect Christians.³² Ritschl, however, is not content to leave his conception of the essence of Christianity, or Christian perfection, in this simple brevity of statement. He analyzes it, and he elaborates it. He divides, first of all between those elements of it which are, in his view, the direct and immediate effects of justification, and those elements of it which proceed from justification only indirectly and mediately, namely, through the mediation of the former. The former are, as we have seen, the religious, the latter the ethical elements; and we note here again that the Christian life is conceived as essentially conduct to which its religious aspect serves as means. The religious elements—Ritschl calls them religious functions—are enumerated as we have seen, as faith in the divine providence, humility, patience, prayer. They form, in their necessary unity,³³ the temper of mind or mood of the Christian, the temper of mind or

³² William Adams Brown is quite right therefore when he tells us (*Christian Theology in Outline*, p. 413) that "perfection" "as understood by Ritschl is a name which describes the qualities which enter into the Christian ideal, however incomplete may be their quantitative realization." "Thus," Brown illustrates, "a man whose life is characterized by the qualities of faith, humility, patience and fidelity to his calling is perfect in Ritschl's sense of the term; since he is living in the right relation to God, however conscious he may be of occasional lapses from his own standard." And then he adds: "So defined, Christian perfection is only a name for that assurance which should characterize all true Christian living, and which is possible in any walk of life. It is the rejection of the Catholic doctrine of a double standard by which the possibility of perfection is confined to men who give themselves to the monastic life." We shall see subsequently that there is more to be said: Ritschl was not satisfied with a perfection of relation or a *perfectio partium*.

³³ The religious elements of Christian perfection all go together and cannot exist except in their combination. Ritschl says (*Die christl. Vollkommenheit*, Rae's translation p. 148) that "they are so constituted that none of them can come up without the other; they are the various reflections shed by the religious certainty of reconciliation with God, through Christ."

mood by virtue of which he is a Christian, and because of which he becomes a worker along with God in the moralization of the world, through love.

There is nothing arbitrary in this construction. It is merely the expression in terms of the Christian life of the fundamental contents of Ritschl's doctrine of justification. He identifies justification with the forgiveness of sins, which is, positively expressed, entrance into fellowship with God. This entrance into fellowship with God involves, however, deliverance from the sense of guilt so far as the sense of guilt produces mistrust of God and separation from Him. It is necessarily accompanied therefore with peace of heart and joy. Ritschl calls this experience indifferently "blessedness" and "eternal life." And this naturally carries with it on the positive side a trust in God, which takes the place of the mistrust from which deliverance has been had. In this trust we not only accept God's providence as well for us and for the world, but are impelled to adopt God's end as our end, and to work along with Him to its accomplishment. This is all of the very essence of the experience of justification as a fact. And it is not a very complicated conception, but on the contrary, at once very simple and quite unitary. It would not be doing serious injustice to it if we said brusquely that it is comprehended in the idea of putting ourselves by the side of God and accepting His end as our end. We put ourselves by the side of God when we not only acquiesce in the course of things which He has in His providence established for His world, but recognize it as the best course of things and best for us. This carries with it what Ritschl calls "dominion over the world," that is superiority to its changes and chances and the subordination of it to our spiritual life. It carries with it also humility and patience and thanksgiving to God: these are the tones of mind which acquiescence in, acceptance of, and rejoicing in God's providence bring with them. Putting ourselves by the side of God in this attitude of mind, we

naturally make His end our own and live for the purposes for which He has created and is now governing the world. This double attitude of believers, religious and ethical, constitutes their specific quality as believers: this is what Christianity is. In other words, this double attitude constitutes the perfection of Christians, which accordingly Ritschl defines in one of his briefer statements as consisting in "humility, faith in, and submission to God's providence, invocation and thanksgiving to God in prayer, and fidelity in the moral vocation which is useful to the community."³⁴ Or again:³⁵ "Faith in the Fatherly providence of God, which maintains a right feeling with God through humility, and with the world through patience, and which expresses and confirms itself through prayer,"—to which is to be added, on the ethical side, the faithful pursuit of our vocation.

Bearing such a relation to his doctrine of justification, Ritschl's doctrine of Christian perfection obviously embodies the essence of his religious teaching, in which his whole system culminates and into which it flows out as its issue. He himself so regarded it. He speaks of it³⁶ as "the practically religious proceeds (*Ertrag*) of the doctrine of reconciliation." In it is depicted what in his view Christianity actually is, the tangible, palpable, concrete Christianity of reality. Whatever else may be theory, this is the fact, the whole fact, of Christianity. He did not easily win to its full apprehension. We are given to understand that it was only at the end of his long toil in the composition of his chief treatise, that he reached perfect clearness in his understanding and statement of at least the details. In January 1874, while the great book was in process of going through the press, he was called upon to deliver a lecture for the benefit of the Göttingen Woman's Club.³⁷ He chose the

³⁴ Cited by Garvie, as cited, p. 356.

³⁵ P. 652.

³⁶ Letter to Marcus, January 16, 1874, *Leben*, II, p. 156.

³⁷ This lecture was of course, *Die christliche Vollkommenheit: ein Vortrag*, 1874.

subject of Christian Perfection and, drawing out of the fulness of his thought what was the result of long years of labor, "he found that certain ideas which form the web of the great book, became to him for the first time, completely clear."³⁸ He at once set himself to adjusting the text of his book to his new lucidity of insight, so that in it as well as in the lecture of 1874 we have his complete thought on the subject. Ritschl does not mean, of course, to say that the general conception which only thus late reached its final form was new to him. He tells us on the contrary that its fundamental elements had been for years in his mind.³⁹ For long, however, he had employed them only in his Theological Ethics and it was apparently not until 1873 that he discovered that they had as important a place in Dogmatics as in Ethics.⁴⁰ Perhaps it may be not without its significance that the special element of his doctrine which he himself looked upon as embodying its real significance was thus carried over from his ethical to his dogmatic system. Once carried over into the dogmatic system, it was made the most of. It is not merely the issue of the system; it pervades it. We do not have to wait to see it expounded, in its substance at least, until we read the end of the dogmatic volume, where the Christian life comes up for formal treatment. Its fundamental elements are already—as is natural since they are merely the effects of justification—presented in the discussion of the subjective side of justification.⁴¹ They are even more fully presented—as again is natural—as the opposite over against which the conception of sin is adjusted.⁴² They are suggested again—as again is natural, since He is the pattern of His people—when the character of Christ comes up for discussion.⁴³ Ritschl did not

³⁸ *Leben*, II, p. 156.

³⁹ *Leben*, II, p. 125.

⁴⁰ *Leben*, II, p. 148.

⁴¹ Pp. 168 ff (177).

⁴² P. 335.

⁴³ Pp. 389, 463, 551, 574; and see especially the letter to Diestel of May 24, 1873, printed in the *Leben*.

make little of his doctrine of Christian perfection, or thrust it into a corner.

Ritschl is very eager, as elsewhere, so especially here, to attach to himself the teaching of the Reformers. Nowhere else does he do so with less right. He adduces especially a passage from the Augsburg Confession, which, he intimates, can with a little interchange of what he represents as equivalent statements, be made to teach about Christian perfection precisely what he teaches.⁴⁴ The Confession is very much concerned to repel the elevation of the monastic life in contrast with that of ordinary citizens into a "state of perfection." No, it says, "the good and perfect kind of life is the kind of life which has the mandate of God," not that which has been invented by man without any commandment from God. The perfection which the Gospel teaches does not consist in a pretence of poverty and humility and celibacy, but in the fear of God and faith. It is—and this is the passage adduced by Ritschl,⁴⁵ "to fear God sincerely and again to conceive great faith, and to be assured for Christ's sake that we have a placated God; to ask from God, and confidently to expect, help in all our undertakings, according to our calling; meanwhile diligently to do good works outwardly and to attend to our calling." "In these things," it is added with emphasis, "there is true perfection and the true worship of God; it is not in celibacy, or mendicancy, or dirty clothing." Here, says Ritschl,⁴⁶ there is as-

⁴⁴ We have only, he says, (*Lecture on Christian Perfection*, E. T. *Bibliotheca Sacra*, October 1878, p. 665) to "group the thoughts a little more systematically, and to combine 'reverence for God' and 'trust in Him' into the one idea of 'humility'"; to "substitute 'faith in God and submission to His providence' for 'the expectation of God's help and the contempt of God and the world'"; and "add to these supplications and thanks to God in prayer; and lastly faithfulness to the public demands of morality." That is to say, we have only to rewrite the statement from a fundamentally different point of view and to make it witness to a completely different conception.

⁴⁵ *Confessio Augustana* XXVIII, 49 (Schaff's *Creeds of Christendom*, III, p. 57).

⁴⁶ P. 647.

served just what he teaches,—“not merely that faith in God’s fatherly providence and prayer are the expression of our consciousness of reconciliation, but also that these functions, together with humility and the moral activity proper to one’s vocation are the expressions of Christian perfection.” It may repay us to observe just how far this amazing assertion is justified, and precisely where the two statements part company.

This at least the Confessional statement obviously has in common with Ritschl’s—it is speaking, as he ostensibly is, merely of the *perfectio partium*; of what is necessary to be a true Christian; of what enters into the idea of Christianity as essential constituent elements; of *Christianismus totus* as it itself expresses it: not of the perfect embodiment of this perfect and entire Christianity in the individual. It is in these things alone, it says, that the perfection of Christianity is to be found; we are not to seek it elsewhere. But it is not said that these things are embodied in any given life in their perfect manifestation (the *perfectio graduum*). On the contrary the Reformers very explicitly assert that they are not.⁴⁷ Another thing in which the Confessional statement resembles Ritschl’s is that in enumerating the characteristics of true Christianity it includes both religious and ethical elements and places them merely side by side. Christianity embraces, it says, both a religious attitude and ethical activities—and it adds nothing as to the relation of the two to one another. For all that is said here, that relation might be one of mere adjacency. This, Ritschl would have us believe, is the characteristic attitude of the Re-

⁴⁷ It is a characteristic phrase of Luther’s (Erlangen Ed. of *Works*, XI. 185): *Christianus non est in facto sed in fieri*. Similarly Calvin (on Eph. 1.16, 1548), “The knowledge of the faithful is never so clear that their eyes are without blurring and free from all obscurity.” Our warfare, says Calvin (*Inst.* I. XIV. 13) “is terminated only by death”; then only (§18) is our victory perfected, “our flesh having been put off, according to which we are yet subject to infirmity.” So Luther (*Lectures on Romans* of 1515) declares of the truly righteous that “they sigh, until they are completely cured of concupiscence, a release which takes place at death.”

formers.⁴⁸ In this, however, he is wrong and he has himself incidentally adduced some of the evidence that he is wrong.⁴⁹ The whole nature of the relation of religion to morality in the Christian system—or to speak more narrowly of the relation of justification to sanctification—may have required some time to be brought out into clear light, and may even yet in wide circles be imperfectly apprehended. But the necessary connection of the two has never been doubted in evangelical circles, and Ritschl's tendency to conceive of them in separation is only one of the results of his lapse from the evangelical position. The simple collocation of the two in the passage adduced from the Augsburg Confession means nothing more than that Melancthon at the moment was not concerned with a closer definition of their relation. In a third matter the similarity of the passage adduced from the Augsburg Confession and Ritschl's doctrine of Christian perfection is more striking and more significant. This lies in the prominence given in the definition of Christianity on the ethical side to the great Protestant conception of vocation.⁵⁰ It is the most satisfying and the most fruitful element in Ritschl's treatment of the Christian life that he organizes its ethical side around the idea of vocation, although, of course, the conception itself cannot, in the presence of his antisupernaturalistic point of view, come

⁴⁸ Cf. the discussion, pp. 487 ff. He discusses Luther's and Melancthon's views in vol. I, pp. 167 ff, and Calvin's, pp. 189 ff. They all, he says, were clear that both justification and sanctification follow on saving faith, but not clear as to the exact relation in which they stand to one another.

⁴⁹ Cf. p. 147 where he recognizes that both Melancthon and Calvin teach that the believer "sees in his ability to perform good works an evidence of God's special pardon"—which certainly connects sanctification with justification.

⁵⁰ This is the way Doumergue speaks of it (*La Réformation et la Révolution*, 1919, p. 35): "Then Luther, and with more logic still, Calvin, proclaimed the great idea of 'vocation'—an idea and a word which are found in all the languages of the Protestant peoples, and which are lacking in the languages of the peoples of antiquity and in the culture of the middle ages."

fully to its rights.⁵¹ It is a matter of course that the idea appears even in the brief allusion to the moral life of Christians in the Confession. It was a living influence in all the thought of the Reformers regarding conduct.

So soon however as we rise from the ethical to the religious aspect of the Christian life all similarity of the description of it given in the Augsburg Confession to Ritschl's conception of it completely vanishes. According to the Confession the Christian life receives its form from three fundamental reactions. These are sincere fear of God, assurance of His reconciliation through Christ, and confidence that He will answer the prayers of his people. Ritschl allows no place in the Christian life for any one of three, and thus set himself in diametrical opposition to the Confession's conception of the substance of Christianity. As in his system God is love and nothing but love, there is no propriety in speaking in it of a "fear," of a "serious fear," of God; phraseology which conveys, no doubt, particularly the ideas of awe, reverence, veneration, but from which the sentiment of dread—we still speak of God as a "Dread Being"—cannot be eliminated.⁵² It is precisely every idea which can be expressed by "dread" that Ritschl discards from his conception of God. Consequently in adjusting the Confessional statement to his own view, Ritschl passes lightly

⁵¹ For example, the immediately divine appointment of each man's calling; cf. Doumergue as cited: "Vocation is the call of God addressed to each man, whoever he may be, to charge him with a special work, no matter what. And the calls, and consequently those called, are equal among themselves. The burgomaster is God's burgomaster, the physician God's physician, the merchant God's merchant, the laborer God's laborer. Every vocation, liberal as we say, or manual, the most humble, the most lowly, or the most noble, the most glorious, according to appearances, is of divine right." Among all the wise things which Ritschl says about our vocation (cf. pp. 444, 666), he cannot quite rise to this wisest of all.

⁵² Young, *Centaur*¹ (*Works*, 1757, IV. 108): "That dread Being we dare oppose." Cf. O. W. Holmes, *Army Hymn*: "God of all nations! Sovereign Lord! In Thy dread name we draw the sword."

over the phrase "serious fear of God," rendering it—not of course in essence wrongly—"reverence (*Ehrfurcht*) for God," and combining it—quite unwarrantably—with part of the next clause—"trust in God"—"into," he says,⁵³ "humility." A "placated God" (*Deus placatus*) is of course equally abhorrent to him as a "dread God," and for the same reason. A God who is all love needs no placating: He has no wrath toward sinners; and the whole of "salvation" consists in the discovery of this fact by the sinner. Christ has not appeased God, and the essence of his work consists, indeed, in persuading men that God needs no appeasing. Ritschl therefore simply sums up the entire declaration, the key declaration in the Confession, in the idea of "trust," and considers it, in combination with the "fear of God," as we have already noted, to be absorbed in the one notion of "humility." As little as a "placated God" does Ritschl believe in a prayer-answering God. In his watchful zeal against all "mysticism," he will not permit God to act directly on the human heart, and his conception of God's relation to the universe is rather deistic than theistic. There is no way then for God to answer prayer, and prayer is reduced accordingly to the forms of adoration and especially thanksgiving—although, it seems, that Ritschl, quite inconsistently, does not venture to reject petition altogether.⁵⁴ Accordingly he again divides the Con-

⁵³ *Die christliche Vollkommenheit*, 1889, p. 8 (E. T. *Bibliotheca Sacra*, Oct. 1878, p. 665).

⁵⁴ Pp. 647 ff; *Instruction*: §§ 54, 55, 78 ff. Orr (*The Ritschlian Theology*, p. 177) says: "Petitionary prayer is generally excluded and we are taught to regard prayer as chiefly thanksgiving." That expresses the fact. Ecke (as cited, p. 303) Haug, Lamm, omit the qualifications. Von Kügelgen (as cited, p. 127) comes to Ritschl's defense but without effect. From all that appears, the answer to our petitions is "limited by the reservation that the petition must accord with God's providence over us" (*Instruction*, § 55); which appears to mean that we receive nothing we ask for which we would not have received had we not asked. Even Garvie (as cited, p. 354) allows this. He condemns Ritschl's "limitation of prayer to thanksgiving" or the "practical exclusion of petition from it," and adds that in these circumstances that "faith in God's providence of which Ritschl makes too much" means

fessional statement and gravely bids us "to substitute for 'the expectation of God's help and contempt of death and the world' "—the latter phrase being derived from a passage of Luther's which he couples with the Confession—"faith in and resignation to God's providence"; to which he adds as a new item "invocation of and thanks to God in prayer." "Faith in and resignation to God's providence" are, however, not in the least the same thing as "petitioning from God and certainly expecting aid." The personal relation is gone altogether, and with it the postulation of personal action *ad rem*.⁵⁵

The difference between the Confessional and Ritschl's conception of the Christian life, thus, is polar. In the one we have a life instinct with the sense of God in His majesty, passed in His presence as the ever present and active ruler of the universe, who is nevertheless accessible to us in our weakness, to whom therefore as to a personal supporter and helper we can go in every time of need, with full expectation of aid, because, though we are sinners, He has been reconciled to us in the blood of Jesus Christ; a life "little more than acceptance of whatever God may choose to send us, without any expectation whatever that our desires will in any way be taken into account." Garvie is writing from a standpoint which would subject God to man; but he recognizes here that Ritschl's doctrine of prayer renders specific answers to petitions impossible.

⁵⁵ George Macdonald, who is not often right, is right when he says (*Robert Falconer*, p. 193): "She had taught him to look up—that there was a God. He would put it to the test. Not that he doubted it yet; he only doubted whether there was a hearing God. But was not that worse? It was, I think. For it is of far more consequence what kind of a God, then whether a God or not." Of course Ritschl does not represent his far-off, silent God as a direct object of human affection. What believers love is their fellow-believers, and it is only in them that they love God, or, we may add, the exalted Christ. "For," says Otto Ritschl, describing his father's ethical teaching (*Leben*, II. p. 354), "in the Johannean declarations it is the suppressed mediating thought that God as the unseen cannot be the immediate object of human action. Accordingly neither can Christ, as the Lord who has become unseen, be the direct object of love-expression." So in the *Instruction*, § 6, Ritschl says: "Love to God has no sphere of activity outside of love to one's brother."

therefore suffused with the hope, the confidence, the joy which comes from the consciousness of pardoned sin. In the other we have a life of submission—no doubt humble, patient, even grateful, or even joyful submission—to the course of things, in the belief that it is a good God that has ordained this course of things and that it must therefore be working for good. The former conception is the Christian conception. The latter—must we not call it merely pagan?

It is desirable to go somewhat more into the details of Ritschl's doctrine. Ritschl represents the sole direct effect, as it is the single proper end, of justification to be what he calls "eternal life,"⁵⁶ a conception which he empties of both its eschatological⁵⁷ and its ethical content, and thinks of in terms of pure "blessedness." Its quality is given to this blessedness by the experience of what Ritschl calls "dominion" (*Herrschaft*) over the world, or, in other words, the sense of superiority to the changes and chances of the world which is proper to a spiritual being—or just "freedom." "The positive aim of forgiveness or justification, or reconciliation," says Ritschl,⁵⁸ is "that freedom of believers in communion with God which consists in dominion over the world, and is to be regarded as eternal life." And von Kügelgen expounds the meaning of his master thus:⁵⁹ "Eternal life, in the sense of Christianity, is the Christian independence . . . which in harmony with God's providence subjects all things to itself, so that they become the means to blessedness, even though, from the external point of view, they run athwart it." This "lordship over

⁵⁶ Pp. 495 ff. Maerker subjects Ritschl's doctrine of "eternal life" to a careful examination in an article in the *Neue kirchliche Zeitschrift* for 1898 (14 pp. 116-138) entitled "Lehrt Albrecht Ritschl ein ewiges Leben?"

⁵⁷ Von Kügelgen (as cited, p. 94) points out that Ritschl identified "eternal life" not with an extramundane consummation (*Vollendung*) but with intramundane Christian perfection (*Vollkommenheit*).

⁵⁸ P. 556. Cf. the phrases on p. 518: "reconciliation with God, or liberation from the world, or eternal life." These phrases are synonymous.

⁵⁹ As cited, p. 131.

the world," which is identical with "eternal life," and "blessedness," we see, is identical also with what Ritschl calls "faith in God's providence." We are told accordingly ⁶⁰ that "the aim of reconciliation with God in the Christian sense" is "lordship over the world," and then again⁶¹ that "in general the form in which religious lordship over the world is exercised, is faith in God's providence." The aim of reconciliation "which does not differ in substance from justification or regeneration" is then, in this intensely this-world religion, "faith in God's providence." Thus, "faith in God's providence" becomes the substance of the Christian life, the thing that makes it a really Christian life. The other elements entering into Ritschl's conception of the Christian life which are subsequently mentioned—humility, patience, thankfulness—are merely qualifications of mode, not additional constituents, of the Christian life, as thus defined. Now, we are told⁶² that this "faith in divine providence" is "normally a tone of feeling." That is to say reconciliation, justification, regeneration, have as their aim, and issue into, a purely subjective change, that and that only. We need not, because of them, find ourselves in any objectively different situation from that occupied before; we in point of fact, do not. There has come about a change only in our "tone of feeling."

Let us endeavor to make clear to ourselves precisely what this means. When it is said that Ritschl uses the phrase "eternal life" not in an eschatological sense, but of a "tone of feeling" acquired in this life, it is of course not meant merely that he teaches that the Christian does not wait until death to receive the blessings obtained through Christ, but enters into them at once on believing. What is meant is that Ritschl conceives "eternal life" after a fashion which adjusts it entirely to this life; it is in its essence in his view an attitude towards the actual course of this world. If

⁶⁰ P. 609.

⁶¹ P. 617.

⁶² P. 622.

there is anything beyond, it does not appear. "Salvation," with him, if we can speak of "salvation" with reference to his theories, is an entirely "this-world salvation." "Saving faith" is a phrase as little consonant with Ritschl's system as "salvation," and the relation of faith to justification gives him a great deal of trouble. He wishes to speak in the terms of Reformation doctrine, but he does not find it easy to determine whether faith should be represented as antecedent to justification—its condition, he would say—or as consequent on it; the best he can do is to call it its "concomitant." In point of fact, faith in his system is the substance of justification. All that justification is, is the passage from distrust to trust: this is not the way justification is obtained—this is itself justification. Justification thus is identified with faith; and the faith with which it is identified is not faith in Christ our Redeemer, nor even faith in a redeeming God, but just faith in the divine providence. The sinner having been persuaded that he can safely draw near to God despite his guilt, lays aside his distrust and draws near to God in trust. He is sure now that God, admitting him despite his guilt into fellowship with Him, will deal well with him. That is to say, he commits himself to God as Father and trusts to His fatherly love that all things will work for good to him. This is nothing more than faith in God's providence. And this faith in God's providence is declared to be itself justification, reconciliation, adoption, eternal life, all of which are synonyms.

This being so, it is astonishing to learn, as we quickly learn, that by the providence of God Ritschl has not at all in mind what that phrase would naturally suggest to the average Christian, the ever present watchful care of God; but just the established course of things, conceived of as the general ordinance of God. The world is governed by law; and God is not to be expected to interfere in any way with the working of that law, which He himself has made

the governing power of the world. To trust in the providence of God, as Leonhard Stählin points out,⁶³ does not mean then confidence that God will "really intervene in the course of nature, at individual junctures, for the benefit of believers," but confidence that the actually existent order of things is not accidental, but has been ordained by God, who is our Father; and acquiescence in it as such. The established course of events is not modified by special divine action to adjust it to our needs, but we adjust ourselves to it, because, knowing it to be ordained of God, we know its ordering is for the best. "It is our duty to see in the existing order of things the result and sway of divine providence," and to accept it in humble and patient thankfulness. There is no providence which "extends one whit farther than the order of things as it actually exists." "Faith in the fatherly providence of God," therefore "resolves itself, in this view of the matter, into the assured confidence that reason is immanent in the actually existent order of things, and that accordingly nature is a means subordinate to spirit." No change takes place in the course of events in our behalf; the only change that takes place takes place in us. When we lay aside our distrust of God and trust in His providence, we merely assume a different attitude towards the course of events. The same things happen to us which would have happened had we not made this change of attitude towards God. But what we looked upon as against us, we now look upon as for us: what we looked upon at best as but the grinding out of blind law, at worst as the caprice of a malevolent deity, we now look upon as the expression of the will of a Father. After all is said, however, what is meant when Ritschl speaks of trusting in divine providence is nothing more than that it is the mark of the Christian that he trusts in law: he acquires a new attitude toward the actual course of things and humbly, patiently and thankfully accepts his lot in life.

Garvie, it is true, registers a somewhat sharp dissent.

⁶³ As cited, pp. 228 ff; cf. Orr, *The Ritschlian Theology*, p. 177 f.

"When Ritschl speaks of God's Providence," he declares,⁶⁴ "he means what he says. He does not believe in an inevitable course of nature, independent of a Personal Will, which does not do its worst with us, because we make the best we can of it. He does not give a stern fact, submission to fate, a sweet name, faith in God's Providence, by a 'poetic license,'"—and so on. This passionate language, however, is quite futile, and only betrays the confusion in its author's mind. Of course Ritschl is not supposed to be teaching a doctrine of "fate." He looks upon the course of things as having been determined by a Personal Will, and represents therefore this course of things as expressing a personal choice, the choice of a person whom he declares to be love and nothing but love. But he does not allow that this course of things is ever modified (no matter when the modification has been determined upon) for the individual's benefit, according to his emerging needs. It has been once for all established for the benefit of the Kingdom of God and we, for our part, are to look on it as our Father's will and understand that it is working as a whole for our good. Our trust in divine providence does not mean with Ritschl then, that we are sure that God adjusts the course of events to meet our varying individual needs. But it does mean the assurance that our loving Father has ordered the established course of things for the best, and it does mean that we, now become one with Him, have learned that that is true, and therefore accept every event as it befalls us as from His hands. This amounts to saying, when taken at its height, that we see the hand of God in all that comes to pass, the hand of our Father in everything that befalls us—whether in itself good or grievous: that in a word we look through nature in all its happenings to nature's God, even though we may see Him only far off. When taken thus at its height, faith in divine providence is no small religious achievement. It is the fundamental religious attitude towards the world: and it must enter into every worthy conception of the

⁶⁴ As cited, p. 350 f. Cf. the words cited in note 54.

Christian life. It is nevertheless, as here expressed, being deistic in its tendency, a fatally inadequate conception of the nature of divine providence, and it certainly, however taken, can never be accepted as Ritschl represents it as a complete account of the essence of Christianity. "Faith in the fatherly providence of God," says Ritschl,⁶⁵ "which maintains a right feeling with God through humility, and with the world through patience, and which expresses and confirms itself through prayer, is, in general, the content of the religious life which grows out of reconciliation with God, through Christ." That is to reduce Christianity to a merely natural religion.

From the point of view here brought to expression, Ritschl is obviously right in speaking of Christianity as consisting in a "tone of feeling." And it is natural that we should wish to ascertain somewhat closely the particular feeling which it is. We think first of all of the feeling of submission, and there does not lack phraseology in Ritschl's discussions which justifies this. But it quickly becomes evident that he does not think of the Christian's attitude towards the course of things, conceived of as the providential appointment of God, as one of bare, negative submission. It is an attitude of positive acquiescence, acceptance, adoption: the Christian makes God's appointment his own. No doubt his attitude toward the course of events conceived as God's appointment is characterized by humility with reference to God and patience with reference to the course of events itself, but it is characterized also by thankfulness. And Ritschl pours into the notion not only satisfaction, but joy. The tone of feeling which he makes Christianity consist in, is distinctly an optimistic one. In the discussion which he devotes to this matter,⁶⁶ indeed, he goes far toward making it

⁶⁵ P. 652. On January 1, 1874, Diestel, endeavoring to make a forecast from as yet incomplete materials of what would be the upshot of Ritschl's great work, suggests that it will be that the essence of Christianity consists in faith in God's providence. Ritschl agrees. See *Leben*, II. p. 154.

⁶⁶ Pp. 618 ff.

indistinguishable from the instinctive optimism of exuberant vitality, the care-free temper of the man of action prosecuting his work in the world. We are told, for example, that we have this faith in divine providence not on empirical grounds—observation does not produce it and would not confirm it,⁶⁷—but as a conviction drawn by each man from the complex of his own experiences. And yet not as a reasoned conclusion based on an analysis of our experiences; but as an instinctive conviction. It has no necessary conceptional content; it is normally a “tone of feeling” which is the expression of our “spiritual energy.”⁶⁸ It may, no doubt, develop into clear ideas and judgments; but only if the conflicts so far inhibit action as to compel mental analysis of our struggling spiritual energy. It is, normally, just our feeling of well-being and of courage in the face of our circumstances. It may easily, therefore, be confused with the mere natural courage of man in facing the evils of life.⁶⁹ It is specifically different from this, however, because it is not merely courage in facing the evils of life but acceptance or rather adoption of the whole course of things, including the evils, into our own scheme of life, because it is God’s will. That is to say, it is not merely self-assertion, but confidence in providence. And that is an attitude, says Ritschl, which is peculiarly Christian. It is an attitude not to be found in any who have not derived it from Christ. It was

⁶⁷ P. 618: “For observation of the fortunes of others would afford just as much, or even more, ground for shaking as for supporting our own conviction.”

⁶⁸ Pp. 622, 623.

⁶⁹ It is rather a pungent question which J. L. Schultze raises (*Neue kirchliche Zeitschrift*, 1898, p. 238) when he asks: Do all Christians actually show the characteristics here depicted? How many possess the energy of will here made characteristic of all? Paul himself seemed able to live on such a plane only through Divine help. “If, however, this direct converse with God is replaced, as with Ritschl, by a mere conviction mediated by the Christian community—if thus then the possibility of continual renewal from the source is cut off—why then, this feeling of perfection becomes nothing but an artificial fiction. Energetic characters may persuade themselves that they possess it”—but the generality?—

precisely this, in fact—identical as it is with the assertion that God is love—in which Christ's discovery consisted.⁷⁰ Thus Ritschl, having abased Christianity to a merely natural religion, by reducing it in its essence to "trust in the divine providence," seeks to restore it again to its uniqueness as the only "revealed" religion by declaring "trust in the divine providence" to be solely the product of the "revelation" in Christ. This does not in any way affect the poverty of his conception of Christianity. It merely recalls us sharply to the realization of the extreme destitution of the religions men have made for themselves.⁷¹

It is, now, this general point of view or "tone of feeling" (*Gesinnung*) which constitutes, on the religious side, what Ritschl calls Christian Perfection. He who is of this way of thinking and feeling is a Christian, and is all that he need be, from the religious point of view, in order to be all that a Christian is. But in accordance with Ritschl's dualistic conception of Christianity, there is an ethical side to Christianity also. And the ethical is so related to the religious element in Christianity that the ethical task cannot be undertaken or accomplished save under the impulse derived from the religious attitude. It constitutes, nevertheless, as the end to which the religious attitude is the means, the real substance of the Christian life, which is as much as to say the precise thing in which Christian perfection consists. How the two elements are related in the whole made up of their union, is made quite clear in an excellent summary statement of Johannes Wendland's, in the opening page of his description of Ritschl's type of piety. "With him," says he, ⁷² "all religion originates in man's estimate of himself as something more than a fragment of dead nature. Christianity is to him the perfected religion because man is qualified by it to become a spiritual personality, a whole in his kind. It delivers man from violent oscillations of mood between

⁷⁰ Pp. 181, 625.

⁷¹ Von K  gelgen, as cited, pp. 121 ff, defends Ritschl's attitude.

⁷² As cited, p. 8.

pleasure and displeasure. In the certainty that all things work for good to those who take them from the hand of God, the Christian knows how to prevail over even the evils of life in trust in God, humility and patience. Conscientious work in his calling, whether it be a spiritual one, or one of manual labor, of low esteem among men, is for man at once the best remedy against distress, and also the way to secure that perfection which is obtainable for the Christian. Thus the personal life of the individual takes its place in the general life-purpose of the whole, which consists in erecting the Kingdom of God in the world. Man coöperates in building up God's kingdom in every true vocational work in his appointed place. For the Kingdom of God is advanced not only by domestic and foreign missions, but marriage, family, civil society, national state are fellowships in which it is to be realized. It is through righteous conduct and neighborly love that the Kingdom of God is established." Let us see now, in more detail, how Ritschl presents Christianity on its ethical side and how he relates the idea of Christian perfection to it.

The ethical task of the Christian, he teaches, is determined fundamentally by his adoption of God's self-end as his own. God's self-end is the Kingdom of God.⁷³ This conception is not to be confounded with that of the Church. The Church is the people of God organized for the particular purpose of worship.⁷⁴ The Kingdom of God is the people of God conceived in the totality of their ethical activities, under the impulse of love.⁷⁵ The breadth of the conception

⁷³ See especially on Ritschl's conception of the Kingdom of God the very clear and satisfactory summary statement of Orr, *The Ritschlian Theology*, pp. 119 ff.

⁷⁴ P. 284: "In order to preserve the true articulation of the Christian view of the world, it is necessary clearly to distinguish between viewing the followers of Christ, first under the conception of the Kingdom of God, and secondly under the conception of the *worshiping community*, or the Church. This distinction depends on the difference which exists between moral and devotional action."

⁷⁵ Pp. 610 ff. Cf. p. 285: "The same believers in Christ constitute the Kingdom of God, in so far as, forgetting distinctions of sex, rank, or

enables Ritschl to subsume under it every activity of man viewed in its ethical aspect. He utilizes here, as has already been intimated, however, the Reformation conception of vocation, and thus is able to present the primary ethical task of the Christian under the rubric of faithfulness in his vocation.⁷⁶ He that is faithful in his vocation has performed his whole ethical duty in the Kingdom of God, and, being thus a whole in himself, is perfect. No doubt we may think of many other moral acts which, in the abstract, we might lay upon him as duties. But, lying outside the circle of duties belonging to him in the faithful discharge of his vocation, they do not enter into the whole which it behooves him to be in his own kind; and his failure to perform them therefore cannot be imputed to him as fault. No man can be more than one kind of a man; or if by reason of strength he may embrace in his task more than one vocation, or if, as needs must be, a penumbra of secondary duties may gather around the governing vocation which is his special task, nevertheless the center about which the whole circle of his duties revolves remains his vocation, and it is faithfulness to this vocation and to whatever is inseparably connected with it that determines his ethical character.

We perceive that the chief concern which Ritschl shows in developing his doctrine of vocation is to utilize it so to limit the range of duty as to make it possible for the Christian man to be ethically as well as religiously perfect. The motive on which he acts here is derived from the consideration which he advances with confidence to the effect that hope of attainment supplies the only adequate spur to endeavor. "If in any activity," says he,⁷⁷ "we know ourselves beforehand unconditionally condemned to imperfection, then

nationality, they act reciprocally from love, and thus call into existence that fellowship of moral disposition and moral blessings which extends through all possible gradations, to the limits of the human race."

⁷⁶ Cf. p. 163: "The Reformation principle that justification becomes matter of experience through the discharge of moral tasks, while these are to be discharged in the labors of one's vocation. . . ."

⁷⁷ P. 662.

impulse to it is paralysed. The possibility of perfection must be held in prospect if we are to use diligence in any department of activity." On this ground, sufficiently dubious in itself—though not on this ground alone—he repels the Evangelical doctrine that even in the state of grace we must always be mindful of the imperfection of our moral conduct, so that we may never be tempted to depend for our salvation on our own works, which never meet the demands of the law, but only on Christ received by faith alone. It is a contradiction, he says,⁷⁸ in any case, to tell us in one breath that we are to look away from our works to Christ because they are too imperfect to put any dependence on, and in the next that despite this their imperfection we are to depend on them as proof that we are under the action of grace. The ultimate conclusion to which he would drive us is that the Christian man's works are not subject to the judgment of the law. Before following him to this conclusion, however, we wish to point out briefly the fallacy of the reasoning from which it is drawn and the consequences of the rejection which it involves of the evangelical doctrine of the Christian's unbroken sense of imperfection. The justification of this digression lies in the importance of the matter for the understanding of Ritschl's point of view. There is involved in it in one way or another, indeed, a very large part of his system; and, we may add, also the fundamental error of every form of perfectionism.

Robert Mackintosh⁷⁹ observes that one of the leading motives of Ritschl in his dogmatic volume is his "desire to find a remedy for the Protestant perplexity regarding the assurance of salvation." And then he posits the dilemma which we have just cited from Ritschl, in somewhat different words. "Is it logical," he asks, "to bid us discover defects in all our works in order that we may rest upon God's grace, and yet to insist that we must have good works to submit lest we be moral impostors?" Why "perplexity" should be

⁷⁸ P. 661.

⁷⁹ *The Theology of Albrecht Ritschl*, 1915 p. 132.

caused by such a question is inexplicable. The answer is simple. Certainly it is logical—provided salvation be a process. To find salvation in progress is as sound evidence of salvation as to find it completed—provided salvation be a supernatural work. The writers of the New Testament and the Reformers and their evangelical successors, agree in these two things—that salvation is a process and that it is a divine work. They recommend us therefore to recognize it as always here incomplete; to discover imperfection in all our works. And they recommend us equally to perceive in its discovery in us, in any stage of incompleteness whatever, the incontrovertible evidence that we are in God's hands. There can be no assurance derived from any other source than evidence that we are in God's hands; and that assurance is as firm and as vivid when the evidence is derived from the discovery that God is working, as it could be were it derived from the discovery that He had already worked, our salvation.

We are not dealing here, however, with merely an *apex logicus*. We are dealing with the very essence of Protestantism. The progressive character of salvation lies at the very heart of Protestantism's heart, because (among other things) the Protestant doctrine of justification and its effects takes to a considerable extent its form from it. A large part of the religious value of the Protestant doctrine of justification, in its distinction from sanctification, is lost, if sanctification be not a process, the completion of which occupies the whole of life; if, that is, the injunction, "Work out your own salvation" does not apply to the whole of the Christian's walk on earth, but ought to be addressed to men only at some particular stage of their Christian experience—say, only at its beginning. For a large part of the religious value of this distinction turns on this—that the Christian's hope of salvation (his assurance) does not depend on the stage of sanctification to which he has already attained. Sanctification being a process, and a process which reaches its completion only when this life is over, the discovery of

sin remaining in him at any point of his earthly life is no proof that the Christian may not nevertheless be in Christ. In proportion as it is made the Christian's duty not so much to work out his salvation continuously but to enjoy it at once in its completeness, the believer, conscious of sin, loses his confidence that he is a believer at all. If this attainment of complete salvation is made coincident with justification, all sense of continued sinfulness is a clear disproof of present salvation. The matter is only mitigated, not changed, by separating the attainment of complete sanctification in time from justification. Salvation involving taking this second step, the continued sense of sinfulness becomes evidence of failure of such portentousness as to shatter our peace and assurance. If it belongs to the Christian to be without sin, and to be without sense of sin,—in this sense of the statement—then the fact of experience that we are not without sin and not without the sense of sin is pretty clear proof that we are not Christians. It is not a matter of little importance, then, that we should settle it with ourselves whether the characteristic of the Christian walk in the world is constant advance towards sinlessness, or complete present enjoyment of sinlessness. If the latter, then, gloss it as we will, no one is entitled to think of himself as a Christian, no one is justified in regarding himself as saved, unless he is in the possession of complete sinlessness. In that case the whole religious gain of the Reformation doctrine of justification in distinction from sanctification is lost, and we are thrown back again into the despairing task of determining our religious state and our future hope on the ground of our own merits.

It is no accident, therefore, that the Reformers presented the Christian life as a life of continuous dissatisfaction with self and of continuous looking afresh to Christ as the ground of all our hope. The effort of Ritschl to present the Christian life rather as a life of complete satisfaction with self tends not only altogether to undermine the entire evangelical system, but to strike a direct blow at that peace and

joy of the Christian which it is his professed object to secure. For the Christian's peace and joy are not and cannot be grounded in himself, but in Christ alone. He rejoices in the sufficiency of Christ's saving work for him; his exultation is in a salvation made his despite his unworthiness of it. This joy obtains its peculiarity precisely from the coëxistence of dissatisfaction with self and satisfaction with Christ. The dissatisfaction with self does not mar it; it enhances it rather—because the more dissatisfaction we feel with ourselves the more the greatness of Christ's salvation is manifest to us, and the more our delight in it waxes. Transfer the ground of our satisfaction from Christ to ourselves, and all satisfaction becomes at once impossible—except for the shallow souls who can find satisfaction in their own hearts and in the works which proceed from them. We have returned to medieval work-salvation: the very essence of Luther's revolt turned on his inability to find satisfaction in self. We are not preaching, and Luther did not preach, a lugubrious Christianity, which is always and only preoccupied with shortcomings and failures. Of course the Christian delights in his salvation. Of course he has no impulse to depreciate what he has already received. Of course his joy is unbounded, and his peace supreme. But this only because—and only on the condition that he understands that—he has not yet "attained"; that what he has received is but the earnest of what is to come; that what he has already done or is now doing is not the ground, and what he already is is not the extent, of his hope. It belongs to the very essence of Christianity that we have not "attained"; and that is the same as saying that sanctification is in progress and there is more to come. The Christian who has stopped growing is dead; or to put it better, the Christian does not stop growing because he is not dead. Luther rightly says the Christian is not made but is in the making.

Precisely what Ritschl emphasizes, nevertheless, is that the satisfaction of the Christian has its ground in himself.⁸⁰

⁸⁰ Cf. p. 651: "The destination of men for perfection in Christianity

We gather, however, that it does not take much to satisfy a Christian: a very imperfect perfection is perfection enough to make him perfect. We have observed how Ritschl sets his main contention in direct contradiction to the Evangelical doctrine of the continuous dissatisfaction of the Christian with his attainments during this life. He does not admit, however, that he is also in conflict with Scripture. In this matter at least, he contends, the Reformers were at odds with the Scriptures. The exegetical justification of this contention he seeks to supply in a passage in the closing pages of the second volume of his main work which has become famous and which has exerted a greater influence than any other portion of his discussion of the perfection of the Christian.⁸¹ In this passage Ritschl declares that the relation in which the Reformers place the believer's supposed consciousness of continued imperfection to justification was wholly unknown to Paul. Paul, of course, knew that Christians sinned; his epistles are full of the proofs of it. But he did not at all bring these sins into relation with justification. Moreover he had a very healthful sense of his own faithfulness in his vocational activity, and asserts it against all gainsayers. Nor was his self satisfaction official alone. We cannot do otherwise than infer, Ritschl sums up,⁸² that "alongside of the conviction of justification through faith, a consciousness of personal moral perfection, especially of perfect faithfulness in our vocation, is possible, which is disturbed by no twinges of conscience" Paul accordingly arrogates to himself in this matter nothing which he does not accord to others. He distinctly presupposes that Christians as such possess not indeed a multiplicity of good works but a connected life-work which may properly be called good. Only John⁸³ among the New Testa-

may be seen in the exhortation to rejoice amid all the changes of life which, in the New Testament, accompanies instruction in the Christian faith (Vol. II, pp. 344-350). For joy is the sense of perfection."

⁸¹ *Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung*.³ II, 1899, § 39, pp. 365 ff.

⁸² P. 370.

⁸³ This, of course, can be said even by Ritschl only after he has

ment writers strikes a different note; and the note he strikes is not fundamentally different. He teaches, it is true, that believers continue to sin and need to have continued recourse to the Forgiver of sins (I John 1:8, 9.) But it does not follow that even in his teaching the self-consciousness of the Christian is to receive from this its dominant tone. Rather in this teaching also this is determined by the possibility of moral perfection. "From the pessimism with which Luther emphasized the constant imperfection and worthlessness of the moral activity of Christians, John is far removed. The sinful was to him still always only the exception in the Christian life, not the rule and an inevitable destiny."⁸⁴ As a conspectus of New Testament teaching, this representation is, of course, absurd. Nevertheless, Paul Wernle (after certain forerunners) took it up and elaborated it in his maiden book,⁸⁵ thereby opening a controversy which threshed out such questions as whether we may speak of "Paul the 'miserable sinner,'" and whether Paul knew anything of "the daily forgiveness of sins." That, however, is another story.

We may suppose that Ritschl could not have been led to such a representation of New Testament teaching save as a result of his low view of sin as in essence just ignorance. This made it possible for him to imagine that Paul, for example, never reflected on the relation of the abounding sin which he saw in the Christian communities to the justification of these sinners, and cherished in himself a consciousness of moral perfection in conjunction with the very poignant sense of personal unworthiness to which he gives expression. Some such representation was, however, forced on him by the most fundamental elements of his

explained away such passages as Rom. vii. 14-25, Gal. v. 17, not to speak of multitudes of others which he does not notice.

⁸⁴ P. 378.

⁸⁵ *Der Christ und die Sünde bei Paulus*, 1897.

⁸⁶ Wernle growing older and somewhat wiser found it necessary to correct the extremities of his teaching: see the *Theologische Literaturzeitung*, 1909, 20, coll. 586 ff.

system of thought, if he was to preserve for his teaching any semblance of connection with the New Testament. There is his contention, for instance, that it is impossible for God "to love" and "to hate" the same person at the same time, which lies at the very root of his whole system. He had made use of it in framing and developing his remarkable doctrine of the "wrath of God." Because God loves sinners and out of that love has chosen sinners to become sharers in His Kingdom and objects of His "redemption," it is impossible, he says,⁸⁷ to speak of the "wrath" of God with reference to sinners as such. God's wrath is turned against those sinners alone who show themselves irreconcilably enemies of His Kingdom and despisers of His love, that is to say, the finally impenitent,—if there be any finally impenitent. It does not burn against sinners as such, since all are sinners, and in that case none could be the objects of His "redemptive" love; it is a purely eschatological notion. Holding firmly to this irreducible either-or—that there can be no love of God present where His wrath is in any measure active, and no wrath of God where His love is in any measure active—Ritschl could not allow that the reconciled sinner could justly suffer under a continuous sense of guilt. No clouds could be admitted to obscure the Father's countenance. The reconciled believer must not only bask in an unbroken but in an unsullied sense of the divine love. The Reformation doctrine that the Christian life is a continuous repentance, that the believer is conscious of continual shortcomings which, he knows, deserve the wrath of God, and is continually receiving unmerited forgiveness, was not merely repugnant, but impossible to him. He was compelled to develop a conception of the Christian life which inferred perfection. There could be no room in it, we do not say merely for distrust, fear, despondency, but for contrition, repentance, self-abasement. The very essence of the Christian life is for him necessarily freedom from these things. Precisely what "reconciliation" is to him is the discovery

⁸⁷ P. 323.

that God takes no account of sin in us. Not that we are freed from sin. But that it makes no difference whether we sin or not: God closes His eyes to our sin. This is of course an antinomian attitude. All perfectionist doctrines run into antinomianism. It is intrinsic in Ritschl's low view of sin. What is at the moment important for us to note is that it enables us to understand that Ritschl is not willing to have the perfection which he proclaims for Christians measured by the standard of the moral law. Whatever the Christian may actually do, he is no "sinner," and his conscience must not accuse him.

In order to sustain himself in this lamentable position Ritschl develops an unhappy argument designed to show that the moral law is in any event incapable of fulfilment. Not incapable of fulfilment by sinners only, but intrinsically and of its very nature incapable of fulfilment.⁸⁸ This because it is in effect infinite in its demands: it claims the will simultaneously for illimitable requirements spread out through space and the series of claims made by each of these requirements extends illimitably through time. The finite being is capable, however, of only one act at a time. And since it is impossible for him to do at once everything that falls under the category of the good, he is under no obligation to do it. What he is required to do, in point of fact, is not to fulfil the moral law in its abstract completeness, but to make of his life a moral whole, rounding it out in dutiful conduct in accordance with its intrinsic requirements as such a whole. It is the conception of vocation to which Ritschl appeals here to supply the limitation of duty by which it may be rendered capable of performance. "Ev-

⁸⁸ P. 662: "Now the notion of good works, which find their standard in the statutory law, is the expression of a task which not only is impracticable on the presupposition of the continuance of sinfulness, but in and for itself cannot be thought in connection with the characteristic of perfection." "Therefore it is not merely sin, as evil will or as indifference, which thwarts the quantitatively perfect fulfilment of the moral law, but this is in itself impossible in comparison with the statutory form of the law."

everyone," says he,⁸⁹ "is moral in his behavior when he fulfils the universal law in his special vocation or in that combination of vocations which he is able to unite in his conduct of life." Thus, we are told, "there is excluded every moral necessity to good actions on ends which do not fit in with the individual's vocation," and the "apparent obligation is invalidated that we have to act morally at every moment of time in all possible directions."⁹⁰ The situation, however, he perceives not to be relieved in this manner. The spacial infinity is cleared away, indeed, but the temporal remains. We are moving now in one, narrow path, but there is no end to it. "Even when the fulfilment of the moral law is confined to one's own calling and what is analogous thereto, the series of good actions which are incumbent is still illimitable in time."⁹¹ Relief can be found only in discarding all responsibility whatever to "statutory law," that is to externally imposed law. We "find the proximate norm which specifies for every one the morally necessary conduct in our moral vocation" itself, and thus vindicate the "autonomy of moral conduct."⁹² We are under no law but such as is evolved out of our moral disposition in the course of our activities themselves: and we evolve this law, of course, only as it is needed and fulfill it as it is made. Thus, executing the particular judgments of duty as we form them, we preserve steadily, it seems, our perfection. "Under these circumstances," says Ritschl,⁹³ "and in this form the individual produces the moral law out of his freedom, or"—that is, in other words—"lives in the law of freedom." We are therefore under no other law but "the law of freedom" and "the universal statutory law" has no authority over us. Emanipated from all externally imposed law, we are a law to ourselves, and we recognize no other law as having dominion over us.

⁸⁹ P. 666.

⁹⁰ P. 666.

⁹¹ P. 666.

⁹² P. 666.

⁹³ P. 667.

It can occasion no surprise, of course, that Ritschl, with his Kantian inheritance, should proclaim this doctrine of "autonomous morality." Our interest is only in the particular form he gives it, and the use to which he puts it in expounding his views of Christian perfection. The assertion of the doctrine itself pervades the discussions of the dogmatic volume of his chief work.⁹⁴ We turn for example to its very closing sentences;⁹⁵ there all its chief elements are given crisp expression, precisely as we have drawn them out above from an earlier page. Christian perfection, he says, consists (together with the "religious functions") just in "freedom of action." In this freedom of action, the Christian, seeking the final end of the Kingdom of God, imposes on himself,—“gives himself,”—a “law.” He gives himself this law “by the production (*Erzeugung*) of principles and judgments of duty.” Thus the law which he follows, and by following which he manifests himself as what he ought to be, is his own product, developed, as means to its accomplishment, out of the aim (*Endzweck*) which he is pursuing. Not only is no “statutory law” (*statutorisches Gesetz*) imposed on him from without, but no immanent law is written on his heart by the finger of God.⁹⁶ He evolves his own rules

⁹⁴ See especially the discussion on p. 526 where we are told that “the moral law is complete only in the reticulation of those judgments of duty which determine the necessary form of good action in each particular case,” and further that “the principle of autonomy not only holds good within the circle of general moral law as such, but we act autonomously in each particular province of life.” Cf. p. 650: “The saints who strive to act in the fear of God and to follow God’s ways, come to know the duties incumbent on them through their disposition and not through a statutory law.” We must not be misled by the superficial resemblance of language like this to the Christian doctrines of the leading of the Spirit and the writing by Him of the law of God on the heart. Ritschl knows no Holy Spirit, no immediate work of God on the heart, and indeed, no heart for God to work on. What Ritschl is doing is only adapting to his own purposes Kant’s doctrine of autonomous morality, which was Kant’s protest against the view of vulgar Rationalism that sin arises only from the deliberate transgression of known external law.

⁹⁵ P. 670.

⁹⁶ Ritschl strangely thinks these two things inconsistent, and blames

of life—his governing principles and his determinations of duty—out of himself, solely under the guidance of the end he is seeking. In the absolute freedom of his will he chooses his own end; and that end determines his rules of living for him. These are the elements of Ritschl's ethics. God is concerned in them only so far as that He provides, through the "revelation" made by Christ, the end to which, freely adopted by them, the efforts of Christian men are freely directed,—His own self-end, the "Kingdom of God." The "moral law"—we are availing ourselves here of Fr. Luther's exposition⁹⁷—"is deduced by the men who appropriate this end out of themselves; it is a subjective product of the human moral will. It is the law which man in moral freedom gives himself so soon as he has established the advancement of the 'Kingdom of God' for himself as the self-end of his life-practice. He takes this advancement of the Kingdom of God as self-end to himself, however, so far as he has become conscious that thus his personal self-end—which he has already set before himself—is furthered. This self-end is the attainment of that moral, spiritual freedom which maintains itself triumphantly over against all hindrances from the world of nature. In 'carrying through,' this his self-end over against the world consists 'the blessedness of the person.' The Christian is therefore with reference to the establishment of the moral law de-

the Second Helvetic Confession for bringing them together (p. 523). At bottom Ritschl confuses knowledge and power. He speaks as if action cannot be voluntary if directed by law—which would be as much as to say that voluntary action is necessarily lawless. That no doubt, is much his notion of "freedom." The writing of the law on the heart does not abolish the law which is thus written on the heart. No doubt the writing of the law on the heart may be construed to mean the implantation of an independent instinct for what is contained in the law. Something like that is, apart from its "mysticism," what Ritschl supposes, not indeed to have been done to Christians, but fairly to represent what the native powers of Christians, as moral men are capable of. The Christian will, says he (p. 526), "is guided by a free knowledge of the moral law, through which it perpetually produces that law."

⁹⁷ *Neue kirchliche Zeitschrift*, II, 1891, p. 485; cf. also his exposition in his book, *Die Theologie Ritschls*, 1887, pp. 40 f.

pendent on God only in the one respect that the end of the Kingdom of God, morally determining his life, is revealed to him by God through Christ. Otherwise he is morally 'autonomous.' "

With this doctrine of autonomous morality Ritschl certainly seems to have found a basis on which he can pronounce Christian men really perfect. If we create our own moral law and create it in accordance both with our special ends in our particular vocations, and with our particular situation at each moment,⁹⁸ there seems no reason why, measured by that standard, we should not be and remain "perfect." Ritschl felicitates himself especially that with this understanding of the matter, the moral life of the individual becomes "a whole." If duty is limited by the demands of our vocation (together with whatever else is associated with it), and determined by ourselves under our conceptions of those demands, no doubt a certain unity is acquired by our lives which gives them the aspect of "wholes in their kinds." It is not so easy to assure ourselves that the kinds of which they are wholes are good kinds. Ritschl apparently would say that this is secured by the fact that all the vocations pursued by Christian men are pursued in subordination to the one great end of the Kingdom of God, God's self-end communicated to us by Christ and made ours by the new attitude which we have taken to God in our justification. Meanwhile he exhibits a certain uneasiness here. The limitation of duty to the requirements of our vocations no doubt reduces the multiplicity of good works in which conduct manifests itself to an inwardly limited unity, that is, to a "whole." "But," he adds,⁹⁹ "the whole that is so conceived is not yet perceived to be a thing which is also externally limited," and here he reverts to a figure of speech before employed by him: "Even if the spacial unlimitedness of good works as measured by the universal statutory law be set aside, yet the temporal series of actions in our moral

⁹⁸ P. 526.

⁹⁹ P. 667.

vocation appears to be endless." Men's consciences, it seems, are not easy in the facile solution of the question of their moral obligation which Ritschl offers them: they are not so sure that they have no duties which do not lie in the direct line of the prosecution of their callings, and none in this line which they have not yet recognized.

There seems no particular reason why Ritschl should permit himself to be disturbed by such pricks of conscience. To conscience, which to him is only "something picked up in the course of living,"¹⁰⁰ surely no normative authority can be ascribed. He feels bound, however, to seek to quiet its qualms. He admits that his perfect men are disturbed by a sense of shortcoming and guilt. He suggests however that this may be only the result of an undesirable "self-torturing self-scrutiny," which threatens, he complains, "to throw back the discussion on the lines of the idea of good works from which we are trying to escape"—that is, the idea that we are really under moral obligation to do everything that is good. Conscience, the implication appears to be, ought to be kept under better control. And he has suggestions to offer in the way at least of soothing us under its assaults. We shall, no doubt, omit many actions even in the discharge of our calling which we might have performed, and we may impute their omission to ourselves as guilt and thus bring ourselves under an impression of perpetual imperfection. But consider! May we not find later that "the relaxation which we have allowed ourselves to take has served to increase our activity in our calling?" This seems to mean that we ought to have no scruples in omitting duties if it furthers us in our calling; a sentinel, for example, we suppose, is right to sleep on his post if it refreshes him for fighting on the morrow! Moreover—can we say that all omission of useful actions that are possible is wrong? Must we not confine the condemning judgment to

¹⁰⁰ *Etwas im Gemeinschaftsleben erworbenes (Ueber das Gewissen, 1876, p. 20)*. On Ritschl's doctrine of conscience see the illuminating comment of Pfeiderer, *Die Ritschl'sche Theologie*, 1891, pp. 77 ff.

the omission of actions which are morally necessary? Above all, Ritschl continues in an exposition which has fallen into the commendation of a purely negative morality—must we not remember that in order to be the “whole” which constitutes Christian perfection we need not be a very big “whole?” It is not necessary in order to be “perfect” that we shall be the biggest “whole” we can be. We may well content ourselves with being a moderate sized “whole.” If we are a perfect little “whole” we need not bother over the fact that we might have been a bigger whole had we striven harder. The point is not the quantity but the quality. “True, a whole, too, must be a *quantum* . . . But a whole does not require as one of its conditions a quantitative extension *ad infinitum* . . . He who in the moral fulfilment of his vocation is more indefatigable than his neighbor merely makes the whole possibly greater; while he also possibly imperils its existence.”¹⁰¹ The moral seems to be that we perhaps would do well not to try to be too good; economy in goodness may be a good thing; we may overreach ourselves and by excess of goodness become bad.

We shall make no attempt to conceal our conviction that Ritschl's effort to show that we may be “perfect,” by limiting ever more and more the sphere of our moral activities—though it has the element of truth in it that our moral duty is conditioned by our vocation—is not only ineffective but immoral. At the moment, we are more concerned to point out, however, that the attempt itself, and the manner in which it is worked out, combine to make it superabundantly plain that Ritschl's purpose is to represent a real moral perfection as attainable by Christians; or in other words that Ritschl teaches, in the proper sense of the words, a perfectionist doctrine. His method of showing that perfection is attainable is, to be sure, to show that we can be perfect without being all that term strictly connotes. This general method of vindicating the attainability of perfection, however, he shares with all perfectionist teaching. His special

¹⁰¹ Pp. 667, 668.

mode of giving a color of perfection to manifest imperfection is all that is his own. He has the courage of his convictions here too, and separates himself from the modes adopted by others, with some decision. In particular he plumes himself greatly that he is not as other men are in the matter of the relaxation of the law—limiting ability by obligation and confining sin to deliberate transgression of known law. Of course the typical examples of the reprobated teaching are supplied by the relaxed and relaxing teaching of the Illumination, which, says Ritschl,¹⁰² “trifled away the Christian problem of reconciliation by referring men’s obligation toward God’s law to the relative criterion of the internal and external situation.” He adduces Töllner to whom nothing was sin but sins of “set purpose,” and who taught at once that obedience to the strict law of righteousness is impossible and that in the administration of God, therefore, no absolute standard of moral perfection is applied but every man is judged according to his ability. But Ritschl does not confine his condemnation of such conceptions to them as found in the teachers of the Illumination. They are found in orthodox writers too, he says, and wherever found are offensive. They are found, too, he says,¹⁰³ in the Methodist doctrine of perfection, which also he represents as a mere evasion,—“casuistry” is his word—teaching as it does that “not every transgression of the law is sin,” and that “it is possible not to sin even when we actually do wrong to others.” We perceive that Ritschl holds strongly that every transgression of moral law is sin and that there can be no perfection where the whole moral law is not kept. His mode of escape is to deny the validity of all “statutory law.” There is no such thing as a universal moral law imposing duty in all its items on all men alike. Each man secretes for himself his own moral law, and in order to be perfect must fulfill only it in all its requirements.

¹⁰² Vol. I, E. T. p. 387.

¹⁰³ P. 664.

We must confess that we do not see that, on the basis of this general doctrine, Ritschl can escape sharing the reproach of his fellow perfectionists—that they relax the law of God and confine sin to transgression of known law. To explain that not the entire moral law in all its range—in space and in time, he would say—applies as prescription of duty to the individual, but only those moral obligations which arise into consciousness in the process of the faithful prosecution of his vocation, is rather expressly to place himself in the same category with them. For surely this is to make “the internal and external situation,” of the individual the criterion of his duty, and to confine sin in him to the deliberate transgression of moral requirements clearly known to him. There is eliminated from his obligation the whole body of duties which the moral law, considered in its entirety, prescribes outside the special consciousness of duty developed by him in the faithful prosecution of his particular vocation. That this general moral law is a reality and constitutes the general standard of duty can hardly be denied even on the ground of a doctrine of autonomous morality. We surely are not expected to believe that each individual develops in the prosecution of his special calling not so much the section of the moral law applicable to him, but a so-called moral law, peculiarly his own, unrelated to, perhaps contradictory of, those evolved by others. These sections of the moral law, developed by individuals, must therefore in combination constitute a general moral law, the whole of which is authoritative, though it is known only in part to each individual. If this be not admitted, then there is no such thing as morality. What we call morality has become only what in each individual’s case he has discovered by experience to be the most useful “trick of the trade” for him. Ritschl, then, has no advantage in the matter in question over his fellows, and his doctrine of perfection is perceived to be only another attempt to quiet the human conscience in its condemnation of the imperfections of our lives, by persuading it that its duty does not extend beyond our actual

performance; and to betray it into finding satisfaction in our imperfection as if it were, in our "internal and external situation," really perfection.

It does not appear that Ritschl's doctrine of Christian perfection has reproduced itself as a whole very extensively. Its influence can be traced, however, in many quarters. We have already called attention to the controversy aroused by Paul Wernle's book on *The Christian and Sin in Paul*, which took its start from Ritschl's exposition of Paul's doctrine of sin in Christians. In the wake of this controversy, it has become the fashion among a certain school of "liberal" writers to represent Paul as teaching a doctrine of perfection for Christians. David Somerville cannot be classed with these writers; but his description of Paul's relation to sin in his *St. Paul's Conception of Christ*,¹⁰⁴ has derived much from Ritschl's. In H. H. Wendt's *Die christliche Lehre von der menschlichen Vollkommenheit untersucht*, 1882, the whole circle of Ritschl's characteristic ideas reappears, transposed into a lower key. But not only is the entire thought and expression simplified, but the asperities and exaggerations of Ritschl's doctrines are eliminated. What is left is merely the reasonable assertion that man attains in Christianity and in Christianity alone his human perfection, a perfection manifested in its completeness in Christ Himself and in his followers principally and qualitatively here, but not hereafter quantitatively. Strangely enough Paul Lobstein takes from Ritschl's treatment of Christian perfection the mould into which he pours his exposition of Calvin's doctrine of "the goal of the new life," in the last chapter of his *Die Ethik Calvins*, 1877. Perhaps no more striking manifestation of a disciple's zeal could be afforded. "It is Ritschl's service," he says,¹⁰⁵ in explanation of his remarkable procedure, "to have investigated the idea of Christian perfection in a true Evangelical-reformed spirit, and introduced it into Christian ethics."

¹⁰⁴ Pp. 125 f.

¹⁰⁵ P. 131.

Ritschl's commentators naturally often express a favorable opinion of his doctrine of perfection either as a whole or more frequently in one or another of its elements. The element in it which seems most commonly to attract favorable notice is, as it is natural it should be, the emphasis given to the notion of vocation. Garvie says shortly:¹⁰⁶ "This conception of Ritschl's is a very valuable one, and deserves our grateful recognition." When he comes to reproduce, however, what Ritschl's doctrine of Christian perfection is, he rather overdoes an element in it, which is already in Ritschl quite sufficiently exaggerated. "It does not mean," says Garvie, "infallibility of judgment, sinlessness of life, moral completeness; but it does mean that in his relation to God man is conscious of his own worth as a child of God, of his own claims on the grace of God, of his own independence of nature and society." The note of "humility" which is at least formally present in Ritschl's exposition is not heard here. Mozley expresses himself with even more enthusiasm of admiration than Garvie. Ritschl's handling of the subject, he says,¹⁰⁷ "is strikingly illuminating and a real help to piety." He particularly commends the use which Ritschl makes of the idea of vocation. This doctrine, says he, "that a man should try to be faithful to his particular vocation and make his life a whole in its own order, and that therein lies Christian perfection, is exceedingly valuable, since it banishes the hopeless sense of imperfection, or inability even to approach the goal of effort, which must result if any one compares himself with the universal moral law and sees perfection in conformity therewith." The lesser task is no doubt the easier: but we should be sorry to suppose that that fact abolishes the greater.

An earlier English expositor¹⁰⁸—we understand it to be Archibald Duff, Jr.—throws the emphasis of his agreement upon another point. What Ritschl seeks to describe, he says,

¹⁰⁶ As cited, p. 358.

¹⁰⁷ As cited, p. 232.

¹⁰⁸ *Bibliotheca Sacra*, Oct. 1878, pp. 656 ff.

using phraseology of his own, is "what the atonement effects, what are the results of it in men," or otherwise expressed, "what a man is who has been reconciled to God through Jesus." The answer given is that such a man is "perfect." "If," he now adds, "there be men on whom God now looks with full pleasure (for what else does 'reconciled' mean?), if there be men whom God regards as perfect, let us know what are the characteristics of such men." Evangelical Christians, however, are not accustomed to suppose, that the fact that God looks on "reconciled" men "with full pleasure" infers their perfection. They think of Christ, and suppose that the satisfaction of God is with Him as Redeemer, rather than with them, the redeemed. They would by no means agree, therefore, that the faith of the soul "that God and it are reconciled is faith that at that moment God is satisfied with its being what it is." They suppose on the contrary, that God is so little satisfied with what the soul is that He does not intend to leave it in that condition. God cannot be satisfied with any soul in which any depravity whatever remains, nor can that soul—on the hypothesis that it is a "reconciled" soul—be satisfied with itself. The truth is that this feeling of "satisfaction," the characteristic tone of mind which Ritschl demands for the believer, a demand which Duff is here echoing from him, is so far from being the mark of the Christian's life that it would be the signature of his death. Ritschl complains that unless the possibility of attaining perfection be held before Christians all impulse to effort dies in them. He forgets that dissatisfaction with their present condition supplies a much more powerful spur to effort. No doubt the Christian must be animated by hope of improvement if he is to strive with energy to advance in his course. But why this hope should take the specific form of conviction that the supreme goal of this improvement is within his easy reach at any time, if only he will take it, it is difficult to see. And should he once reach out and take it—surely that motive to exertion would at once be lost. He would then be "satisfied" and would have no motive for

further effort. It is a much more powerful incitement to effort that he should know the evil of the case in which he is, the difficulty of the task which lies before him, the always increasing reward of the journey as it goes forward, and the supreme greatness of the final attainment.

We should not pass on without a further word or two suggested by the assumption which underlies Duff's remarks, that to be reconciled with God is to be perfect. There is a sense in which this is Ritschl's doctrine. But this is not the sense in which it is Duff's doctrine. And it is not the sense in which it is the doctrine of many of Ritschl's critics. We have had occasion to point out that in the interests of the "perfection" of his Christians Ritschl was ready to limit the law to which they are responsible, and in that regard cannot escape the charge of "relaxing the law." But his zeal nevertheless was precisely for morality—though a limited "autonomous morality"; and he never dreamed that morality could be had merely by believing, without being conquered, without effort. It is even true, as we have seen, and as Heinrich Münchmeyer, for example, is at pains clearly to point out,¹⁰⁹ that the Christianity of the Christian consists according to Ritschl precisely in his morality, and that whatever religion he is allowed to have is subsidiary and ancillary to his morality.

We find ourselves accordingly in substantial agreement with Münchmeyer when he writes thus:¹¹⁰ "It is now clearer what the real state of the case is with Ritschl. Man is to supplement himself by God, with God's help to attain his destination by dominating as spirit the world and its influences upon him; and to labor as member of the human society at its God-appointed destiny. The first he attains through appropriation of reconciliation, the second through appropriation of the divine world-end which is directed to the Kingdom of God. It follows that for Ritschl commun-

¹⁰⁹ *Zeitschrift für kirchliche Wissenschaft und kirchliches Leben*, 1887, VIII, pp. 95 ff.

¹¹⁰ As cited, p. 109.

ion with God is only a means to an end, to the end that man shall attain his destiny, which, however, does not coincide with the Kingdom of God but is only purposed, that is to say, conditioned by it. I cannot comprehend why Ritschl does not, according to his presuppositions, set forth as the destination of man, to labor, in spiritual freedom from the world, on the moral organization of humanity in the Kingdom of God,—which destination he attains through the relation in which he places himself to God. In that case, the task of Christianity would of course be merely a moral one. But in any case it is not in Ritschl of a religious kind, but a rational and an ethical one, and the character of Christianity as religion is only so far preserved by him that humanity attains its rational and moral destination in dependence on God. This dependence on God would remain preserved, however, even had Ritschl more logically posited only the moral aim for Christianity. I say again, it is simply a self-deception when it is supposed that Ritschl teaches a religious and a moral destination of Christianity; in reality there is question with him only of a rational and moral destination, which however certainly cannot be set in parallelism. In reality there can be only a moral destination of Christianity according to Ritschl."

This criticism is just. Ritschl's system is a one-sided ethical system and in principle reduces Christianity to a morality. But that affords no reason why it should be met by an equally one-sided construction of Christianity as a purely religious system. This is however what is done by Münchmeyer in fellowship with many others, zealous for "faith" as constituting the whole substance of Christianity. Man's destination, he declares, is uniquely "communion with God," though he is forced to add that men have always felt that it was precisely sin which separated them from God, and have accordingly sought after atonement for sin. "When according to this," he asks,¹¹¹ "is man perfect?"

¹¹¹ As cited, p. 110. Similarly E. Cremer, *Ueber die christliche Vollkommenheit*, 1899, p. 23: "Because the forgiveness of sins is God's

And he answers: "When he has found his God in faith, when in faith he knows Him as his Father and himself as His child. Then his heart has peace, he desires no more. That is what the Augsburg Confession means when it places Christian perfection in 'serious fear of God and again the conceiving of great faith and confidence for Christ's sake that we have a reconciled God.' For only by the way of repentance do we come to faith in the grace of God. He who has been brought to this faith—"I have a reconciled God,"—he is perfect. And the more he grows and waxes strong in this faith, the more joyful will his heart be. Joy, however, as Ritschl says, (and in this I agree with him) is the feeling of perfection. And thus it is fully explained why Paul and the Reformers and our theologians place reconciliation so completely in the center; for by it alone is the communion with God which constitutes our perfection, made possible." According to this representation perfection consists entirely in our religious relation; produced directly by reconciliation it is just the reconciled state; and it is realized subjectively in the soul-attitude we call faith. To be "in faith" (*im Glauben*) is to be *ipso facto* "perfect." Good works are only the natural activities of one in communion with God. They have no other significance. When we sin, that is a proof that our faith has failed; and that drives us back to faith. "So soon as the Christian has found in faith His God's heart again, he is perfect." The perfection of the Christian, in a word, consists solely in a relation.

In their conceptions of the nature of Christian perfection, considered in itself, Ritschl and his followers and those of his critics represented by Münchmeyer obviously are

whole salvation, perfect salvation—faith, which apprehends it in Christ, is perfection." "It is intelligible now why faith in Christ is perfection; it is because God's forgiveness of sins is God's whole salvation, in which God's saving work reaches its goal; believers are perfect because Christ's saving work is perfect." "By designating the believer as perfect, it is emphasized that in Christ we have in the forgiveness of sins all that we need from God."

looking, each at one side only of the same shield. Each holds, each denies, half the truth. What is lacking in Münchmeyer's construction is that he has in view only the guilt of sin. It is sin, says he, which separates us from God: when we are relieved from sin we are at one with God and rejoice in communion with Him. He is thinking only of the guilt of sin: what of its pollution? The Reformers did not make that mistake. They knew that the blessedness of the Christian consists not only in abiding in the presence of God but also in partaking of His holiness. They remembered that without holiness no one shall see the Lord. They did not oppose communion with God and holiness to one another: they understood that these are inseparable from one another. Ritschl is not wholly wrong in making morality the end of Christianity: John Wesley is undeniably right when he says that holiness is the substance of salvation. Ritschl was right when he emphasized the moral nature of Christianity as a religion, and saw it advancing to a Kingdom of Righteousness. He rightly wished to relate his so-called religious aspect of Christianity to his so-called ethical aspect; and he was not wholly wrong in looking at this relation under the rubric of means and end. He was wrong, of course, in exalting the moral aspect of Christianity into practically its totality; in reducing the religious aspect from the primary place it occupies in the New Testament to almost a mere name. In his hatred of supernaturalism, he gives us no God to flee to, and no God to visit us. His total discarding of what he calls "mysticism" is really the total discarding of vital religion. His whole labor impresses the reader as a sustained effort to work out a religious system without real religion; or, with respect to our present subject, to make out an issue of justification into sanctification without any real justification to issue into sanctification and without any real sanctification for justification to issue into. The peculiarities of Ritschl's dualistic conception of Christianity and his treatment of the matters which fall under the relations of justification and

sanctification arise from his determination to have only a self-moralization instead of a sanctification for believers. His antisupernaturalism rules everywhere and here, too, as in his system at large, we have only a camouflaged Rationalism. Nevertheless it is a good witness which he bears when he testifies that there is no perfection which is not ethical. And this is the witness of the Augsburg Confession also. For Münchmeyer quotes only a part of its declaration. He omits the concern shown in it for "all our undertakings according to our vocation." And he omits the inclusion in its definition of Christian perfection itself of these words: "meanwhile diligently doing good works and serving our vocation." It is "in these things" as well as in the others "that true perfection and the true worship of God consist." There is no perfection whether *partium* or *graduum* without them in their due relations: without them no man is a Christian and no man, of course, therefore, can without them be called "perfect."¹¹²

Princeton.

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

¹¹² The sources for Ritschl's doctrine of perfection are especially his *Die christliche Lehre von der Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung*, Vol. II, ed. 3, 1887, §§ 39-40, pp. 365 ff; Vol. III, ed. 4, 1895, ch. IX., pp. 575 ff., and E. T. 1900, pp. 609 ff; his lecture *Die christliche Vollkommenheit*, ed. 2, 1889 and English translations in *The British and Foreign Evangelical Review*, 1875, pp. 137 ff. by John Rae, and in the *Bibliotheca Sacra* 1878, pp. 656 ff by E. Craigmile; and his pamphlet *Unterricht in der christliche Religion* 1875, ed. 3, 1886, and E. T. 1901 in *The Theology of Albrecht Ritschl* by Albert T. Swing, pp. 169 ff. See also the relevant passages in O. Ritschl, *Albrecht Ritschl's Leben* 1892, 1896; G. Mielke, *Das System Albrecht Ritschl's dargestellt, nicht kritisirt* 1894, pp. 50 ff; J. Thikötter, *Darstellung und Beurtheilung der Theologie Albrecht Ritschl's*, 1883, pp. 48 ff; C. von Kùgelgen, *Grundriss der Ritschl'schen Dogmatik*, ed. 2, 1903, pp. 120 ff.

The following are some of the more notable discussions of Ritschl's doctrine of perfection:—John Rae, *The Protestant Doctrine of Evangelical Perfection*, in *The British and Foreign Evangelical Review*, 1876, pp. 88-107; R. Tifling, *Ueber christliche Vollkommenheit nach Ritschl*, in the *Mittheilungen und Nachrichten für die evangel. Kirche in Russland*, 1878, pp. 341-362; H. Münchmeyer, *Darstellung und Beleuchtung der Lehre Ritschl's von der christlichen Vollkommenheit*, in

the *Zeitschrift für kirchliche Wissenschaft und kirchliches Leben* 1887, pp. 95 ff; Fr. Luther, *Die Theologie Ritschl's*, 1887, pp. 31 ff, and also Ueber christliche Sittlichkeit nach lutherisch-christliche Lehre und nach die Aufstellungen der neueren Schule, in the *Neue kirchliche Zeitschrift*, 1891, pp. 469 ff, 619 ff, 712 ff; Fr. H. R. Frank, *Ueber die kirchliche Bedeutung der Theologie A. Ritschl's*, Ed. 2, 1888, pp. 21 ff, and also *Geschichte und Kritik der neueren Theologie* (1894), Ed. 4, 1908, pp. 350 ff; H. Weiss, Ueber das Wesen des persönlische Christenstandes in the *Theologische Studien und Kritiken*, 1881, pp. 377 ff; J. Köstlin, Religion nach dem Neuen Testament, in the *Theologische Studien und Kritiken*, 1888, p. 7 ff.; P. Graue, Der Moralismus der Ritschlschen Theologie, in the *Jahrb. für prot. Theologie*, 1889, pp. 321 ff; M. Reischle, *Ein Wort zur Controverse über die Mystik in der Theologie*, 1886; E. Vischer, *Albrecht Ritschl's Anschauung von evangelischem Glauben und Leben*, 1900; R. Wegener, *A. Ritschl's Idee des Reiches Gottes im Licht der Geschichte kritisch untersucht*, 1897, along with J. Weiss, *Die Idee des Reiches Gottes in der Theologie*, 1901, ch. VI. pp. 110 ff, and J. H. Schultze, *Die Ritschlsche Theologie eine Teleologie*, in the *Neue kirchliche Zeitschrift*, 1898, pp. 211 ff; E. Cremer, *Ueber die christliche Vollkommenheit*, 1899, pp. 7 ff; Beyreis, *Die Christliche Vollkommenheit*, in the *Neue kirchliche Zeitschrift*, 1901, pp. 526 ff; Karl Schmidt, *Neue kirchliche Zeitschrift*, 1905, pp. 724 ff.

USE OF THE WORDS FOR GOD IN THE APOCRYPHAL AND PSEUDEPIGRAPHICAL LITERATURE OF THE JEWS

In a note in the number of this REVIEW for October, 1919 there were given lists showing the occurrences of the words "Lord" and "God" in the Koran. In this article are given lists of the names and designations of God that are found in the apocryphal, apocalyptic, and pseudepigraphical literature of the Jews from the year 500 B.C. to 135 A.D. In general, they are derived from the translations given in the *Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha of the Old Testament* by R. H. Charles and other scholars,¹ though in the case of particular works such as Ecclesiasticus and the *Zadokite Fragments*, resort has been made to the original languages. In a second article lists of the names of God in the Old and New Testament will be given, and remarks will be made concerning the bearing of these lists upon the dates of Daniel, Jonah, and other parts of the Old Testament. Since the dates of most of the documents from which the lists are derived cannot be fixed with certainty, the lists are arranged according to the approximate dates as given in the introductions in Charles' work.

The first table gives the total number of times the designations of God occur in these documents; the first column showing the number of times that *Lord* occurs; the second, *God*; the third, combinations with *Lord*; the fourth, combinations with *God*; and the fifth, the number of times that all designations of God that do not contain the words *Lord* or *God* are found. The second table gives the details of which the first table is a summary, and shows where these designations of God occur in each of the documents. It will be noted that in these tables the Arabic numerals are written partly in roman type and partly in italics. In the one case they denote the *place*, in the other the *times* of occurrence. E.g. "*Lord*, x. 10" denotes that Lord occurs

¹ Oxford, 1913.

once in Chap. x, verse 10 of a certain document; "*Lord*, x. 10" on the contrary denotes that in Chap. x, *Lord* occurs ten times.

TABLE I

	Lord	God	Lord+	God+	Other Titles
1. Ahikar	0	2	0	0	0
2. Tobit	0	0	7	7	8
3. 1 Esdras	0	0	18	16	2
4. Epistle of Jeremy.....	1	4	0	0	0
5. Book of Noah	9	2	19	1	7
6. Ecclesiasticus—					
{ Heb.	53	71	0	16	41
{ Gk.	194	11	20	14	
7. 1 Enoch	0	6	4	2	12
8. 2 Enoch	3	1	93	0	46
9. Prayer of Azariah	43	5	0	1	1
10. Sibylline Books (Bk III)	0	41	0	50	37
11. Jubilees	184	73	35	79	15
12. Judith	0	0	14	16	0
13. Bel and the Dragon....	1	1	7	7	0
14. Aristas	1	105	2	11	0
15. XII Patriarchs	229	124	3	119	29
16. 1 Maccabees	0	1(?)	0	0	5
17. 3 Enoch	3	0	3	0	2
18. 5 Enoch (?)	37	1	6	2	1
19. 2 Maccabees	0	0	14	8	17
20. Additions to Esther....	12	12	7	8	0
21. 6 Enoch	2	0	2	0	21
22. Susannah—					
{ LXX	98	77	1	1	1
{ Theod.	83	99	0	1	0
23. Psalms of Solomon	112	105	1	1	9
24. 4 Maccabees	0	41	0	0	4
25. 3 Maccabees	0	0	3	19	14
26. Wisdom	28	52	4	0	6
27. 4 Enoch	0	0	0	0	1
28. Baruch	25	29	17	20	10
29. Pirke Aboth	6	14	0	2	12
30. Assumption of Moses ..	19	16	3	3	1
31. Zadokite Fragments	0	50	0	0	7
32. Odes of Solomon	93	11	6	4	67
33. Martyrdom of Isaiah ..	3	6	0	0	0
34. Adam and Eve	6	3	3	2	0
35. Secrets of Enoch	131	51	12	14	0
36. 2 Baruch	32	3	0	2	74
37. 3 Baruch	38	32	3	3	0

TABLE I (*Continued*)

		Lord	God	Lord+	God+	Other Titles
38. Salathiel Apoc.	} 4 Ezra	23	8	1	1	53
39. Ezra Apoc.		1	0	0	0	7
40. Eagle Vision		1	0	0	0	9
41. S. of M. Vis.		1	0	0	0	7
42. Ezra Piece		2	0	0	0	2
43. Prayer of Manasseh ..		7	3	2	0	0

TABLE II

I. AHIKAR

- A. The original Aramaic fragments.
 1. *God*, 2.
- B. The Syriac versions, A. and B.
 1. *Lord*, i. 4, ii. 19.
 2. *God*, i. 4, 5, 13, ii. 1, 2, 21, 33, 56, 63, 64, iii. 13, v. 9, 18 *bis*, vi. 19, viii. 5, 8, 10 *bis*, 34, 37 *bis*, 40, 41.
 3. *Lord God*, i. 7.
 4. *God of Egypt*, vii. 21.
- C. The Arabic version.
 1. *Lord*, ii. 22, 26, 34, vi. 29, viii. 2 *bis*, 6, 36.
 2. *God*, i. 13, ii. 2, 14, 20, 48, v. 10, 12, 14, 15, vi. 15, vii. 4, 24, viii. 4, 38 *bis*.
 3. *Most High God*, i. 1, 5 *bis*, iii. 7, iv. 17, v. 15, vi. 2, 7, 10, 15, 29, vii. 19.
 4. *Most High God, the Merciful One*, v. 17.
 5. *God of Heaven*, vi. 26.
 6. *God the creator, the living one, the source of reason*, i. 1.
 7. *Creator of the heavens and of the earth*, i. 5.
 8. *Creator of all created things*, i. 5.
- D. The Armenian version.
God, ii. 2, 29 *bis*, 31, 33 *bis*, 35, 38, 39, 41 *bis*, 49, 80, 82, 86, 89 *bis*, 91, 95, iv. 9, v. 8, vi. 15(?), viii. 24, 25, 26 *bis*.
- E. The Ethiopic fragment.
God the High and the Mighty, once.

II. TOBIT

1. *Lord*, Syr. xiii. 8, iii. 11, 14, iv. 11.
 2. *God*, i. 4, 12, xiv. 7 (N). Syr., also, xiv. 14, xiii. 7, iv. 14.
 3. *Lord of heaven*, vii. 11, 17, x. 11.
 4. *Lord of heaven and earth*, x. 13, Syriac, also, for vii. 12, 17, x. 11, viii. 15.
 5. *Lord God*, xiii. 11, xiv. 6, 7, 15.
 6. *Everlasting Lord*, xiii. 13.
 7. *Lord the great King*, xiii. 15.
 8. *God of Israel*, xiii. 18. Syr., also, xiii. 7, xiv. 6.
 9. *God of heaven*, vii. 12 (Syriac, *Lord of heaven and earth*), viii. 15 (N), x. 11 (B)

10. *Lord of righteousness*, xiii. 6 (κ B; Syriac, *God of righteousness*).
11. *Merciful God*, iii. 11 (κ; B and Syr. *Lord my God*).
12. *Master*, iii. 14 (δεσποτα, but B and Syr., *Lord*).
13. *Most High*, i. 13, iv. 11.
14. *God Most High*, Syr. of xiii. 7.
15. *King of heaven*, xiii. 7, 11, 16.
16. *King of the ages*, xiii. 6, 10.

III. I ESDRAS

1. *Lord*, i. 25, ii. 7, iv. 1, v. 7, vi. 15, vii. 2, viii. 34, ix. 4. Total, 95.
2. *God*, i. 1, iv. 1, v. 8, viii. 6. Total, 16.
3. *Only Lord*, viii. 25.
4. *Lord God*, i. 27, viii. 92.
5. *Lord of Israel*, ii. 3, 5, v. 48, viii. 13, 89.
6. *Lord, the God of Israel*, i. 49, v. 67, vi. 1, vii. 4, 9, 15, viii. 65, 72, ix. 39.
7. *Lord of Israel, who is in heaven*, vi. 15.
8. *God of Israel*, v. 48, viii. 3.
9. *God of truth*, iv. 41.
10. *Most High God*, vi. 31, viii. 19, 21.
11. *Most High Lord*, ii. 3.
12. *King of heaven*, iv. 46, 58.
13. *The Lord of Israel, the Most High Lord*, ii. 3.
14. *The Lord which made heaven and earth*, vi. 13.
15. *The only Lord, the God of my fathers*, viii. 25.
16. *The Lord, the Lord of our fathers*, viii. 8.
17. *The Lord, the God of our fathers*, ix. 8.
18. *Lord God Most High, the God of hosts, Almighty*, ix. 46.

IV. EPISTLE OF JEREMY

1. *Lord*, vs. 6.
2. *God*, vss. 1, 2, 51, 62.

V. THE BOOK OF NOAH

1. *Lord*, x. 4, 9, 11, lx. 6, lxvii. 3, lxix. 4, cvi. 13 bis.
2. *God*, lx. 24, lxvii. 1.
3. *Lord of heaven*, cvi. 11.
4. *Lord of spirits*, liv. 5, 6, 7, lv. 4, lx. 6, 8, 25 bis, lxv. 9, 11, lxvi. 2, lxvii. 8, 9, lxviii. 4 bis, lxix. 24 bis.
5. *Lord of righteousness*, cvi. 3.
6. *Lord of the Ages*, ix. 4.
7. *Lord of the lands*, ix. 4.
8. *God of the Ages*, ix. 4.
9. *God of gods*, ix. 4.
10. *God of heaven*, cvi. 5.
11. *God, the Lord of spirits*, lv. 3.

12. *Spirit of the Lord*, lxvii. 10.
13. *Most High*, ix. 3, lx. 1, 22.
14. *Most High, and Great One*, x. 1.
15. *King of kings*, ix. 4.
16. *Head of days*, lv. 1.

VI. ECCLESIASTICUS

1. *Lord*. In the Greek version κύριος occurs alone 198 times and in combinations 15 times. Of the 198 times that κύριος occurs alone, 120 are found in the parts of which the original Hebrew has been recovered. Of the 120 occurrences, 33 are employed to render an original יי (יהוה), 35 for אל, 16 for אלהים, 3 for ערין, and one each for קרוש, נכבר, עשה, בורא, ארון, משל, ארון, מועז; while seven have a doubtful, and nineteen no, original. In the 120 cases where the Greek has κύριος, the Syriac Peshitto has אלהא 46 times, מריא 25 times, and קריש and שליט once each. In 43 cases the Syriac omits, or is doubtful.

The Hebrew ארון, as a title of God, is found only in x. 7 where the Greek renders by κύριος and the Syriac by אלהא. The Greek δεσποτης is found only in xxxiii. 1 where the Syriac has מריא and in xxxiii (xxxvi?). 1 (B א; A —) in the combination Lord God. The Syriac, like A, omits *Lord*. The Hebrew original has אלהים.

Arranged according to chapters κύριος occurs in the Greek version as follows:

i. 14, ii. 11, iii. 5, iv. 3, v. 4, vi. 3, vii. 5, viii. 0, ix. 1, x. 12, xi. 8, xii. 0, xiii. 0, xiv. 1, xv. 6, xvi. 6, xvii. 6, xviii. 6, xix. 1, xx. 0, xxi. 2, xxii. 5, xxiii. 6, xxiv. 1, xxv. 4, xxvi. 4, xxvii. 2, xxviii. 3, xxix. 0, xxx. 2, xxxi. 4, xxxii. 7, xxxiii. 1, xxxiv. 0, xxxv. 3, xxxvi. 6, xxxvii. 1, xxxviii. 5, xxxix. 9, xl. 2, xli. 1, xlii. 6, xliii. 5, xliv. 2, xlv. 4, xlvi. 14, xlvii. 5, xlviii. 4, xlix. 2, 17, li. 5. Total, 214.

2. *God*. Occurs in the Greek eleven times alone and fourteen more in combinations. Of these 25 times, 14 are found in the original Hebrew, where we have אלהים seven times, אל three times, and יי, קרוש, ערין, נכבר once each.

In the Hebrew text אלהים is found in iii. 20, iv. 25?, ix. 16, x. 4, 5, 13, 20, 22, 24, xiv. 16, xv. 14, xxxiii. 1, xxxv. 15, xxxvi. 1, 5, xl. 26, 27, xlii. 15, 17, xlv. 1, 2, li. 1. אלה in xxxv. 13, xlv. 23. אר in iii. 18, iv. 14, v. 1, 3, xi. 22, xii. 6, xiv. 11, xv. 9, 11, 19, xvi. 17, 26, xxxi. 13, 14, xxxii. 5, 12, 13, 18, xxxv. 21, 22, xxxvi. 22, xxxvii. 15, xxxviii. 1, 2, 4, 9, 14, xxxix. 16, 22, xl. 1, xli. 4, xlii. 15, 17, xliii. 9, 10, 12, xlvi. 6, 11, 13, 16?, xlvii. 13, 22, xlviii. 3, 18, 20, xlix. 10. אל ערין in xlvi. 5 bis, xlvii. 5, 8, xlviii. 20. יי (abbreviated for יהוה which never occurs) iv. 12, 13 bis, 28, v. 3, 4, xi. 4, 12, 14, 15 bis, 21 bis, xxx. 20, xxxii. 16, 24, xxxiii. 1, 3, xl. 26, xlii. 16, 17, xliii. 25, 29, 30, 33, xlv. 16, xlv. 19, 21, 22, 25, xlvi. 3, 6, 10, 13, 14?, 17, 19 bis, xlvii. 11, xlviii. 5, l. 13, 20 bis, 25, 29, li. 8, 10, 11, 12 bis, 22, 30 bis.

In the Syriac text אלהא occurs 10 times and מריא 23 times where the Hebrew has יי, and 46 times and 25 times respectively where the Greek has κύριος.

3. *Lord King*, li. 1.
4. *Lord the Highest*, xlvii. 5 (Heb. אל עליון, Syr. אלהא).
5. *Lord, Almighty God, Most High*, l. 17. (Heb., *Before the Most High, before the Holy One of Israel*; Syriac simply, *God*.)
6. *God Most High*, vii. 9, (Heb. —, Syr. מריא, xxiv. 23, xxxii. 13, xxxviii. 15, xxix. 5 (Heb. —), xli. 8 (Heb. עליון, Syr. —), xlv. 13, xlv. 5 bis (twice in Heb., but Gk. has "Highest Dynast" the first time and "Great Lord" the second; the Syr. has Lord for the first and omits the second).
7. *Eternal God*, xxxvi. 17.
8. *Jehovah, God of Israel*, l. 22 (Heb.).
9. *Holy One*, iv. 14, xxiii. 9 (Heb.—), xxxix. 35 (Heb. קרוש, Gk. κύριος, Syr. אלהא), xliii. 10 (AAC Syr.; but Heb. אל), l. 14 Syr. only.
10. *Holy One of Israel*, l. 17 (Heb.; Gk., *the Lord Almighty the Highest God*; Syriac simply, *God*).
11. *Holy Name*, xlvii. 10 (Heb., Gk., but Syr. —).
12. *Most High*, vi. 36 (Heb.; Gk. κύριος; Syr. אלהא), ix. 15 (Gk.; Syr. *Lord*; Heb., —), xvii. 26 (Heb. —, Syr. *Lord*), xix. 17 (Heb., Syr. —), xxiii. 9 (Aac; Heb., Syr. —), xxiii. 18 (Heb., Syr. —), xxiii. 23 (Heb. —, Syr. אלהא), xxiv. 2 (Heb., Syr. —), xxiv. 3 (Heb. —, Syr. = Gk.), xxviii. 7 (Syr. *God*), xxxiv. 6 (Heb. —, Syr. *God*), xxxiv. 19?, xxxix. 1 (Heb. —, Syr. *God*), xxxix. 5 (Heb. —, Syr. *God*), xlii. 2 (Syr. —), xlv. 2 (Heb., but Gk. *Lord*, and Syr. —), xlv. 20 (Heb., Gk., but Syr. —), l. 7 (Heb. המלך, Syr. —), l. 14 (Heb. but Gk. "the Most High, Almighty").
13. *Most High All-Kingly*, l. 15 (Heb., Syr. —).
14. *Mighty One*, xxxv. 18 = גבור. (So Gk. *ms.* 248 and Latin; Syr. —.)
15. *Mighty One of Jacob*, li. 12 אביר יעקב (only in Hebrew).
16. *Most High Almighty*, l. 14 (Heb.—*Almighty*, Syr. *Holy One* (?))—, xlvii. 5 (Heb., but Gk. "Lord Most High" and Syr. *God* only), xlvii. 8 (Heb., but Gk. "Holy Most High One," and Syr. —), xlviii. 20 (Heb., but Gk. "the Merciful Lord," Syr. *Lord*).
17. *Merciful*, l. 19 (Heb. רחום, Gk. ἐλεήμων, Syr. —).
18. *Redeemer of Israel*, li. 12 (5), Heb. only.
19. *The King of kings of kings*, li. 12 (14) Heb. only.
20. *Jeshurun*, (Heb. שרן) xxxvii. 25, (Gk. reads *Israel*, Syr. —).
21. *Righteous Judge*, xxxv. 17?.
22. *Maker*, x. 12, xxxii. 13, xxxviii. 15, xxxix. 5 (Heb. —), xlv. 13.

VII. 1 ENOCH

1. *Lord*, v. 4, xiv. 24, xviii. 15, xxi. 6, xxii. 14, xxv. 5, xxvii. 2.
2. *God*, i. 2, 8(?), v. 2, xviii. 8, xx. 8, xxv. 3.
3. *Lord of heaven*, xiii. 4.
4. *Lord of glory*, xiv. 20.

5. *Lord of Majesty*, xii. 3.
6. *Lord of righteousness*, xxii. 14.
7. *Eternal God*, i. 4.
8. *Eternal King*, xxv. 3, 5, 7, xxvii. 3.
9. *King of the Ages*, xii. 3.
10. *Holy One*, i. 2.
11. *Holy Great One*, i. 3, xiv. 1, xxv. 3.
12. *Great One*, xiv. 2.
13. *Great Glory*, xiv. 20.

VIII. 2 ENOCH

1. *Lord*, xli. 8, lxii. 1, lxiii. 8.
2. *God*, lxi. 10.
3. *Lord of spirits*, xxxvii. 2, 4 *bis*, xxxviii. 2 *bis*, 4, 6, xxxix. 2, 7 *bis*, 8, 9 *bis*, 12, xl. 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 10, xli. 2 *bis*, 6, 7, xliii. 4 *bis*, xlv. 1, 2, xlv. 3 *bis*, 6, 7, 8, xlvii. 1, 2 *ter*, 4, xlviii. 2, 3, 5, 7 *bis*, 10, xlix. 2, 4, 1, 2, 3 *bis*, li. 3, lii. 5, 9, liii. 2, 6, lvii. 1, lviii. 4, 6 *bis*, lix. 1, 2, lxi. 3, 5, 8, 9 *ter*, 11, 13 *bis*, lxii. 2, 10, 12, 14, 16 *bis*, lxiii. 1, 2, 3, 7, 12 *bis*, lxix. 29, lxx. 1, lxxi. 2, 17.
4. *Lord of glory*, xl. 4, 5, lxiii. 2.
5. *Lord of kings*, lxiii. 2.
6. *Lord of the mighty*, lxiii. 2.
7. *Lord of the rich*, lxiii. 2.
8. *Lord of wisdom*, lxiii. 2.
9. *Eternal Lord*, lviii. 4.
10. *Holy One*, xxxvii. 2.
11. *Head of days*, xlv. 2, xlvii. 5, xlviii. 2, lx. 1, 22, lxxi. 10, 13, 14, 17.
12. *King over all kings*, lx. 1.
13. *Most High*, xlv. 7, lxii. 7.

IX. PRAYER OF AZARIAH

1. *Lord*, 43.
2. *God*, vss. 1, 28.
3. *Master*, vs. 14.
4. *Lord, God, sole and glorious over the whole world*, vs. 22.
5. *God of gods*, vs. 68.

X. THE SIBYLLINE ORACLES (BOOK III)

1. *Lord*, never found.
2. *God*, 41; but never between lines 300 and 502.
3. *The Mighty*, line 735.
4. *Mighty God*, 22; but never between lines 306 and 490.
5. *Almighty God*, line 71.
6. *The Mighty, Heavenly God, The World Ruler*, line 19.
7. *The Eternal*, lines 101, 301, 328, 594, 601, 631, 672, 676, 679, 708, 711, 721, 733, 758, 766.
8. *Eternal God*, line 742.

9. *Eternal Creator*, line 10.
10. *Eternal Saviour, who created heaven and earth*, line 35.
11. *Eternal God, the Mighty King*, line 58.
12. *Great Eternal God*, line 698.
13. *God, the great King, the Eternal*, line 616.
14. *Eternal King, Mighty Everlasting God*, line 717.
15. *The Immortal One*, line 882.
16. *Immortal God*, lines 275, 283, 600, 628, 693.
17. *Immortal King over men*, line 48.
18. *Immortal Father of gods and all men*, line 278.
19. *Great Father*, line 296.
20. *Father of all*, lines 550, 604.
21. *God our Father*, line 726.
22. *Great God*, lines 162, 297, 556, 557, 702, 773, 776.
23. *God the Great King*, line 499.
24. *Mighty King*, lines 560, 808.
25. *Holy God*, line 477.
26. *Holy Prince*, line 49.
27. *Holy One*, lines 688, 709.
28. *Most High*, lines 574, 580.
29. *Most High God*, line 719.
30. *Heaven*, line 247.
31. *God of Heaven*, lines 174, 286.
32. *God who dwelleth in the sky*, line 81 (comp. no. 10 above).
33. *Creator of heaven and earth*, line 786.
34. *He that thundereth from on high, the blessed heavenly One who has the cherubim*, line 1.
35. *The Spirit of God*, line 701.
36. *Creator*, line 704.
37. *Judge*, line 704.
38. *The Living One*, line 763.

XI. THE BOOK OF JUBILEES

1. *Lord*, Prolog. i, i. 2, 3, 20, 22, 28, 29, ii. 1.
2. *God*, Prolog. i, i. 1, 2, 4, 17, ii. 8, 9, 19, 25.
1. *Lord*, iii. 4, iv. 4, 12, 15, 21, 26, 28, v. 5, 10, 20, 24.
2. *God*, iii. 1, 17, 18 bis, 23, iv. 7, v. 1, 3.
1. *Lord*, vi. 3, 4, 11, 14, vii. 3, 25, 36 bis, viii. 18, x. 23, 25, 26.
2. *God*, vi. 9, vii. 12 bis, 34, x. 5.
1. *Lord*, vi. 3, 4, 11, 14, vii. 3, 25, 36 bis, viii. 18, x. 23, 25, 26.
2. *God*, xii. 19, 20, 21, 24, xiii. 9, 16, 19.
1. *Lord*, xiv. 1, 2 bis, 6, 7, 8 bis, xv. 2 bis, 3, 11, 26 bis, 30, 34.
2. *God*, xiv. 7, xv. 9, 10, 15, 18, 19, 22, 23.
1. *Lord*, xvi. 5, 12, 13, 18, 22, 23, 27, 29, xvii. 3, 14, 15, 17, 18.
2. *God*, xvi. 6, 7, 18, 31, xvii. 2, 6, 11 bis, 13.

1. *Lord*, xviii. 9, 11, 13 *bis*, 14 *bis*, 15, 18, xix. 5, 18, 23, 28.
2. *God*, xviii. 1, 7 *bis*, xix. 9 *bis*, 27, 28.

1. *Lord*, xx. 2, 3, xxi. 2, 9 *bis*, 11. xxii. 18.
2. *God*, xxi. 4, xxii. 7, 9, 10, 11, 15, 18, 24.

1. *Lord*, xxiii. 10, 16, 22, 30, 31, xxiv. 1, 9, 22, 23, xxv. 13.
2. *God*, xxiv. 28, xxv. 21.

1. *Lord*, xxvi. 22, 23, 24, xxvii. 11, 21, 25, 27 *quad*, xxviii. 6, 12, 24.
2. *God*, xxvi. 15, xxvii. 25, 27 *bis*.

1. *Lord*, xxix. 11, xxx. 6, 8, 15, 26, xxxi. 14, 15 *bis*, 18, 24, 26.
2. *God*.

1. *Lord*, xxxii. 1, 7, 9, 15, 17, 25, xxxiii. 9, 12, xxxv. 2, xxxvi. 3.
2. *God*, xxxii. 4, xxxiii. 11, 13, 19.

1. *Lord*, xxxix. 1, 3, 4 *bis*, 9 *ter*, 11, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 *ter*, 19, 20,
2. *God*, xxxix. 22. [21 *bis*, 22.

1. *Lord*, l. 4, 10 *bis*, 11, 19 *bis*. Total, 184
2. *God*. Total, 73

3. *Lord God*, i. 18, 19, ii. 1, iii. 5, iv. 6, vi. 10, 13, vii. 6, 11, viii. 18, ix. 15, x. 3, 7, 22, xii. 25, xiii. 15, xv. 26, xix. 29, xxv. 12, xxxiii. 19, 20, xlv. 4, xlviii. 14, 17, l. 7, 9, 11, Total, 27.
4. *Lord God of Israel the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac*, xlv. 3.
5. *Lord God of the Fathers*, xlix. 6.
6. *Lord God of Abraham*, xxvii. 22, xxxvi. 6.
7. *Lord God Most High*, xxi. 20.
8. *Lord Creator*, x. 8.
9. *Lord of the world*, xxv. 23.
10. *Lord of righteousness*, xxv. 15.
11. *God Almighty*, xv. 3, xxvii. 11.
12. *God of the Ages*, xxv. 15.
13. *God of Abraham*, xxiv. 22, 23, xxix. 4, xxxi. 25.
14. *God of Isaac*, xxvii. 22, xxix. 4.
15. *God of Israel*, i. 28.
16. *God, God Most High*, xii. 19.
17. *God of All*, xxii. 27, xxx. 19, xxxi. 22.
18. *God of heaven*, xii. 4, xx. 7, xxii. 19.
19. *God of All and Lord of all things*, xxxi. 13.
20. *God of Gods*, viii. 20, xxiii. 1.
21. *God of the spirits of all flesh*, x. 3.
22. *Most High*, xvi. 18, xxii. 27.
23. *Most High God*, vii. 36, xiii. 16, 29, xvi. 28, xx. 9, 12, 23, 25, xxii. 6, 11, 13, 19, 23, 27, xxv. 3, 11, 21, xxvii. 15, xxxii. 1, xxxvi. 16, xxxix. 6.
24. *Creator*, vii. 20, xvi. 26, xxii. 6.
25. *Creator of all*, ii. 31, 32, xi. 17, xvii. 6, xxii. 4, 27, xlv. 5.

26. *Father*, i. 25 *bis*.
27. *Father of all the Children of Jacob*, i. 28.
28. *Living God*, i. 25, xxi. 4.
29. *Eternal God*, xii. 29, xiii. 8.
30. *King on Mount Zion*, i. 28.
31. *God of his fathers, Abraham and Isaac*, xxxi. 31.
32. *God of the father, God of Abraham and Isaac*, xliv. 5.

XII. JUDITH

1. *Lord*, —.
2. *God*, —.
3. *Lord God*, vii. 29, viii. 35, ix. 2, xiii. 18.
4. *Lord God of Israel*, xii. 8, xiii. 7.
5. *Lord God of all power*, xiii. 4.
6. *Lord of the heaven and of the earth*, ix. 12.
7. *Lord God of heaven*, vii. 19.
8. *Lord Almighty*, iv. 13, viii. 13, xv. 10, xvi. 6, 17.
9. *God of Israel*, iv. 12, vii. 21, x. 1, xiv. 10.
10. *God of all power and might*, ix. 12.
11. *God of heaven*, v. 8, xi. 17.
12. *Most High God*, xiii. 18.
13. *King of every creature*, ix. 12.
14. *Creator of the waters*, ix. 12.

XIII. BEL AND THE DRAGON

1. *Lord*, 4 (LXX), 25 (Th.), 34, 35 (Th. Syr.), 36, 39.
2. *God*, 4 (Th. and Syr.), 37 (Th. Syr.), 38 (Th. Syr.), 39 (Th.).
3. *God of Daniel*, 41 (Syr.).
4. *Lord God*, 25 (Syr.), 34 (LXX), 35 (LXX), 37 (LXX), 38 (LXX) *bis*, 41 (LXX).
5. *Lord the God who hath created heaven and earth*, 5 (LXX).
6. *Lord God of Daniel*, 41 (Th. LXX).
7. *Living God*, (Th. 6, 24; Syr. in 6, 24, 25).
8. *Living God who hath created the heaven and the earth*, 5 (Th. Syr.).
9. *Lord, God of gods*, 7 (LXX).
10. *The Lord of all flesh*, 5 (Syr.).
11. *Holy Spirit*, 36 (Syr.).

XIV. THE LETTER OF ARISTEAS

1. *Lord*, § 155 (in citation).
2. *God*, 105 times.
3. *Lord of the Universe*, § 195.
4. *Lord and creator of the Universe*, § 15.
5. *Ruler and lord of the Universe*, § 16.
6. *Lord of all reputation*, § 269.
7. *Almighty God*, §§ 18, 19, 45, 139, 168, 184.

8. *Supreme God*, §§ 19, 37.
9. *Great God*, § 96.
10. *True God*, § 140.

XV. THE XII PATRIARCHS

	Reuben	Simeon	Levi	Judah	Issachar	Zebulon	
1. <i>Lord</i>	13	12	49	23	15	16	
2. <i>God</i> ,	7	11	13	18	4	3	
	Dan	Naphtali	Gad	Asher	Joseph	Benjamin	Total
1. <i>Lord</i> ,	16	19	6	12	29	19	229
2. <i>God</i> ,	7	9	6	9	21	16	124

3. *Lord God*, Simeon 2, Levi 1.
4. *Lord God of heaven and earth*, Benjamin 1.
5. *God of Jacob*, Dan 1.
6. *God of the fathers*, Dan 1.
7. *God of heaven*, Reuben 1.
8. *God of heaven and earth*, Iss. 1.
9. *Spirit of God*, Benjamin 1.
10. *Lamb of God*, Joseph 1, Benjamin 1.
11. *King of heaven*, Benjamin 1.
12. *Holy One of Israel*, Zeb. 1.
13. *Holy Father*, Jud. 1.
14. *Mighty One of Israel*, Sim. 1.
15. *Savior of the Gentiles*, Dan 1.
16. *Savior of the World, Christ*, Levi 1.
17. *Savior of the world*, Levi 1.
18. *Salvation of Israel*, Jos. 1.
19. *Most High*, Sim. 2, Levi 6, Iss. 1, Asher 3, Jos. 4, Benj. 2.
20. *God Most High*, Judah 1.

XVI. I MACCABEES

1. *Lord*, —.
2. *God*, xiv. 28.
3. *Savior of Israel*, iv. 30.
4. *Heaven*, iii. 18, 19, iv. 24(?), xiii. 3.

XVII. 3 ENOCH

1. *Lord*, lxii. 36, lxxxix. 3, 5.
2. *God*, —.
3. *Lord of glory*, lxxv. 3.
4. *Lord of the world*, lxxxix. 10.
5. *Great Lord, King of glory*, lxxxix. 3.
6. *Holy One*, xciii. 11.
7. *Most High*, lxxvii. 1.

XVIII. 5 ENOCH

1. *Lord*, lxxxiii. 2, lxxxiv. 6 *bis*, lxxxix. 14, 15, 16 *bis*, 20, 22, 24, 26, 28, 29, 30, 31, 33, 36, 42, 45, 50 *bis*, 52, 54, 70, 71, 75, 76, xc. 14, 15, 17 *bis*, 18, 20, 21, 29, 33, 34.
2. *God*, lxxiv. 1.
3. *Lord of glory*, lxxxiii. 8.
4. *Lord of judgment*, lxxxiii. 11.
5. *Lord of righteousness*, xc. 42.
6. *God and Lord and Great King*, lxxxiv. 5.
7. *Lord, King, Lord of the whole creation of the heavenly King of kings, and God of the whole world*, lxxxiv. 2.
8. *Holy and Great One*, lxxxiv. 1.

XIX. 2 MACCABEES

1. *Lord*, —.
2. *God*, —.
3. *Lord God*, i. 24, vii. 6.
4. *Lord of mercy*, viii. 29.
5. *Sovereign Lord*, v. 17, vi. 14, xv. 22, 29.
6. *All-powerful Lord*, iii. 22, 30.
7. *All-seeing Lord, God of Israel* ix. 5.
8. *Merciful Lord*, xiii. 12.
9. *Holy Lord*, xiv. 36.
10. *Living Lord, sovereign in heaven*, xv. 4.
11. *Lord of spirits*, iii. 23.
12. *Merciful God*, xi. 9.
13. *Mighty God*, xi. 13.
14. *God, the righteous judge*, xii. 5.
15. *Most High*, iii. 31.
16. *Almighty God*, vii. 35, viii. 18.
18. *Sovereign of spirits*, iii. 23.
19. *Great Sovereign*, v. 20.
20. *Heavenly sovereign*, xv. 23.
21. *Great sovereign of the world*, xii. 15.
22. *Sovereign who crusheth forcibly the strength of his enemies*, xii. 28.
23. *King of kings*, xiii. 4.
24. *King of the world*, vii. 9.
25. *Creator of the world*, vii. 23, xiii. 14.
26. *Heaven*, vii. 11, ix. 20.

XX. ADDITIONS TO ESTHER

- A. Dream of Mordecai. *God*, twice.
- B. Discovery of Plot. No title.
- C. Letter of Artaxerxes. No title.
- D. Prayer of Mordecai.
 1. *Lord*, xiii. 1, 4, 5, 7, 10, 12, 16, 18, 22, 23, 25.

2. *God*, xiii. 7, 30.
3. *Lord God of Israel*, xiii. 14.
4. *Lord God of Abraham*, xiii. 29.
5. *Lord over all dominion*, xiii. 23
6. *Lord King*, xiii. 14.
7. *Lord God and King*, xiii. 8.
8. *Lord of all*, xiii. 4.
9. *Lord Lord King*, xiii. 2.
10. *Lord of Abraham*, xiii. 8.
11. *King of the gods*, xiii. 13.

E. Esther before the King.

1. *God*, xv. 8, 13.
2. *All-seeing God and Savior*, xv. 2.

F. Decree of Artaxerxes.

1. *God that ruleth over all*, xvi. 18, 21.
2. *All-surveying God*, xvi. 4.
3. *Most High, Most Mighty, Living God*, xvi. 16.

G. Interpretation of the dream of Mordecai.

1. *Lord*, x. 6 *ter*.
2. *God*, x, 1, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10.

XXI. 6 ENOCH

1. *Lord*, xcv. 3, xcvi. 5.
2. *God*, —.
3. *Lord, the Most High*, xcvi. 11.
4. *Holy Lord*, xcii. 7.
5. *Holy Great One*, xcvi. 6, civ. 9.
6. *Holy and Great One*, xcii. 2.
7. *Holy One*, xciii. 11.
8. *Great One*, ciii. 4, civ. 1 *bis*.
9. *Great Holy One*, xcvi. 5.
10. *Great King*, xci. 13.
11. *Great Glory*, cii. 3.
12. *Great and honored and mighty one in dominion*, ciii. 1.
13. *Creator*, xciv. 10.
14. *Most High*, xciv. 8, xcvi. 2, xcvi. 7, xcix. 3, 10, c. 4, ci. 1, 6, 9.

XXII. SUSANNAH

1. *Lord*, LXX, 98; Theod., 83.
2. *God*, LXX, 77; Theod., 99.
3. *Heaven*, vs. 9.
4. *Lord, the eternal God*, LXX, vs. 35.
5. *Everlasting God*, Theod., vs. 42.

XXIII. PSALMS OF SOLOMON

1. *Lord*, i. 2, ii. 8, iii. 9, iv. 9, v. 6, vi. 9, vii. 0, viii. 6, ix. 8, x. 9, xi. 4, xii. 8, xiii. 6, xiv. 4, xv. 4, xvi. 4, xvii. 15, xviii. 4. Total, 105.
2. *God*, i. 1, ii. 11, iii. 4, iv. 9, v. 6, vi. 3, vii. 2, viii. 16, ix. 6, x. 2, xi. 5, xii. 1, xiii. 0, xiv. 2, xv. 6, xvi. 5, xvii. 16, xviii. 8. Total, 112.
3. *Lord God*, v. 1.

XXIV. 4 MACCABEES

1. *Lord*, —.
2. *God*, 40.
3. *Creator*, 2.
4. *Providence*, 2.

XXV. 3 MACCABEES

1. *Lord*, —.
2. *God*, —.
3. *Lord God*, v. 35.
4. *Lord, King of heaven*, ii. 2.
5. *Almighty Lord and ruler of all power*, v. 7.
6. *Great God*, vii. 2, 22.
7. *God of heaven*, vii. 6.
8. *Merciful God*, v. 7.
9. *Holy God*, v. 13, vi. 1, vii. 10.
10. *God, ruler of all*, v. 28.
11. *Almighty God*, vi. 2.
12. *Most High God*, i. 9, 16, iii. 12, iv. 16, v. 25, vii. 9.
13. *Almighty, living God of heaven*, vi. 28.
14. *God the Savior of Israel and doer of wonders*, vi. 32.
15. *Greatly glorious, almighty, and true God*, vi. 18.
16. *The Most High*, vi. 2.
17. *Almighty*, ii. 2.
18. *King*, ii. 9.
19. *King of kings*, v. 35.
20. *King of great power*, vi. 2.
21. *Holy King*, ii. 13.
22. *The Eternal*, vi. 12.
23. *Eternal Saviour*, vii. 16.
24. *Deliverer of Israel*, vii. 23.
25. *Saviour of all creation*, ii. 2.
26. *Holy among the holy*, ii. 2.
27. *Father*, vi. 4, 8.
28. *Father of all the holy among the holy ones*, ii. 21.

XXVI. WISDOM

1. *Lord*, 28 (= κύριος), xiii. 3, 9 (= δεσπότης).
2. *God*, 52.
3. *Lord* (δεσπότης) of all, vi. 7, viii. 3.

4. *Almighty*, vii. 25.
5. *Most High*, vi. 3.
6. *Saviour of all*, xvi. 7.
7. *The Power*, i. 3.
8. *Father*, xiv. 3.
9. *The incommunicable Name*, xiv. 21.

XXVII. 4 ENOCH

Great King, xci. 13.

XXVIII. FIRST BARUCH

1. *Lord*, i. 5, 8, 12, 13, 14, 18, 19, 20, ii. 1, 4, 7, 8, 9, *ter*, 10, 14.
2. *God*.
 1. *Lord*, ii. 16 bis., 18, 21, 22, 33, iii. 2, 6.
 2. *God*, ii. 35, iii. 13, 24, 27, 35, iv. 1, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9 *bis*, 12, 13, 21, 23, 27, 28, 36, 37, v. 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7 *bis*, 8, 9.
 3. *Lord God*, i. 10, 13 *bis*, 15, 18, 21, 22, ii. 5, 6, 12, 15, 19, 27, 30, iii. 6, 8.
 4. *Lord Almighty*, iii. 1, 81.
 5. *God of Israel*, iii. 1, 4.
 6. *Merciful God*, iii. 2.
 7. *The Everlasting*, iv. 10, 14, 20, 22, 35, v. 2.
 8. *Holy One*, iv. 22, 37 (Gk., but Syr. "Lord the holy God"), v. 5.
 9. *Everlasting Saviour*, iv. 22.

XXIX. PIRKE ABOOTH

1. " (for Jehovah), iii. 3 *ter*, 5, 8 *bis*, iv. 24, v. 21 (all citations from O. T.).
2. אלהים iii. 8, 10, v. 22, 24 (v. 24, a citation).
3. אל, iii. 8 (a citation).
4. *The Name*, v. 11.
5. *Shekinah*, iii. 3, 8.
6. *The Place* (המקום), iii. 5 *bis*, 14 *bis*, 19, vi. 1 *bis*.
7. *Heaven*, i. 3, iv. 14 *bis*, v. 20 *ter*.
8. *Name of heaven*, i. 11, ii. 2, 16, iv. 5.
9. *The Holy*, iii. 1, 4, v. 6, 7.²
10. *Spirit of the place* (המקום) = *Spirit of God*, iii. 14 *bis*.
11. *The Holy King of the kings of the kings*, iii. 1, iv. 29.
12. *Father who is in heaven*, v. 23.
13. *God of the fathers*, v. 24.

² Mr. Hereford's generally excellent translation of the *Pirke Aboth* must be used with caution in its rendering of the names for God. Thus, he renders הקדוש by the Holy One in iii. 1, 4, x. 6; but in x. 7, by God; he translates שמים always by *heaven* (nine times in all), but renders המקום by *God* every time that it occurs (seven times). Of course, he could not distinguish in an English version between אל and אלהים.

XXX. THE ASSUMPTION OF MOSES

1. *Lord*, i. 6, 11, 18, ii. 2, 7 *bis*, 9, iii. 2, 5, 8, iv. —, v. 5, 6.
2. *God*, i. 11, ii. —, iii. 9 *bis*, iv. 2, 5, v. 4.
1. *Lord*, ix. 3, x. —, xi. 16, 17 *ter*, xii. 5, 6.
2. *God*, ix. 4, 6, x. 9, 15, xi. 16, xii. 4, 9, 10, 13.
3. *Lord of heaven*, iv. 4.
4. *Lord of the world*, i. 11.
5. *Lord of Lords*, ix. 6.
6. *God of heaven*, ii. 4.
7. *Most High God*, vi. 1.
8. *Most High*, x. 7.
9. *Eternal God*, x. 7.
10. *Heavenly One*, x. 3.

XXXI. THE ZADOKITE FRAGMENTS

1. יהוה and ארון are both wanting.
2. ארונה and אלהים are both wanting; but אל is found 57 times.
3. *Maker*, iii. 7, iv. 7.
4. *Teacher*, iv. 7, זרה (?).
5. *The Only Teacher*, ix. 29, מורה היחיד.
6. *Teacher of righteousness*, vii. 10.
7. *Messiah*, ii. 10, ix. 10.
8. *Holy Spirit*, ii. 10.
9. *Holy Messiah*, viii. 2.
10. *Most High* (עליון), ix. 33.

XXXII. ODES OF SOLOMON

1. *Lord*, i. 1, (ii. is lost), iii. 1, iv. 1, v. 4, vi. 2, vii. 6, viii. 3, ix. 3, x. 1, xi. 7, xii. 2, xiii. 1, xiv. 5, xv. 2, xvi. 6, xvii. 1, xviii. 3, xix. 1, xx. 3, xxi. 3, xxii. 0, xxiii. 0, xxiv. 4, xxv. 1, xxvi. 3, xxvii. 1, xxviii. 0, xxix. 3, xxx. 4, xxxi. 2, xxxii. 0, xxxiii. 0, xxxiv. 0, xxxv. 3, xxxvi. 2, xxxvii. 2, xxxviii. 2, xxxix. 4, xl. 1, xli. 4, xlii. 1. Total, 98.
2. *God*, iv. 3, xi. 2, xvii. 1, xviii. 1, xxiii. 1, xxv. 1, xxviii. 1, xl. 1 = 11.
3. *Most High*, iv. 1, vi. 1, vii. 1, viii. 1, ix. 1, x. 1, xi. 1, xii. 2, xvii. 1, xviii. 2, xxi. 1, xxiii. 1, xxv. 1, xxviii. 1, xxix. 1, xxx. 1, xxxii. 1, xxxv. 1, xxxvi. 1, xxxvii. 1, xxxix. 1. Total, 23.
4. *Lord Most High and Merciful*, iii. 1.
5. *Most High God*, xi. 1.
6. *Most High Father*, xxiii. 1.
7. *Son of the Most High*, xli. 1.
8. *Son of God*, xlii. 1.
9. *Son*, iii. 1, vii. 1, xix. 1, xxiii. 1.
10. *Son of Truth*, xxiii. 1.
11. *The illuminate* (נהירא), the son of God, xxxvi. 1.
12. *Son of the Father*, ix. 1.
13. *Spirit of the Lord*, iii. 1, vi. 1, xxxvi. 1.

14. *Holy Spirit*, vi. 1, xi. 1, xix. 2, xxiii. 1.
15. *Spirit*, xxv. 1, xxviii. 1.
16. *Father*, viii. 1, xix. 2.
17. *Father of truth*, xli. 1.
18. *Father of knowledge*, vii. 1.
19. *God the Father*, ix. 1, x. 1.
20. *Holy Father*, xxxi. 1.
21. *Living God*, iii. 1.
22. *Righteous One*, xlii. 1.
23. *Saviour* (פרוקא), xli. 1.
24. *Redeemer* (פרוקא), xlii. 1.
25. *Messiah*, ix. 1, xxiv. 1, xli. 2.
26. *Lord Messiah*, xvii. 1, xxxix. 1.
27. *Lord's Messiah*, xxix. 1.
28. *Beloved*, ii. 2.
29. *The fulness of the Ages and the Father of them*, vii. 1.
30. *Word*, xii. 5, xxxviii. 6.
32. *Son of truth*, xxiii. 1.

XXXIII. MARTYRDOM OF ISAIAH

1. *Lord*, i. 7 bis, v. 7.
2. *God*, ii. 2, 3, 14, iii. 9, 10, v. 13.

XXXIV. ADAM AND EVE

1. *Lord*, iv. 2, 3, xxxi. 2, 3, xxxiii. 1.
2. *God*, iii. 2, iv. 3, xxix. 1.
3. *Lord God*, ii. 1.
4. *God the Lord*, iii. 2.
5. *Lord Creator*, xxiii. 2, xxxi. 2.

XXXV. THE SECRETS OF ENOCH

1. *Lord*, Preface. 3, i. 9, ii. 2, 3, 4, vii. 3 bis, 4, viii. 3.
2. *God*, i. 8, ii. 2, vii. 3 bis, 4, viii. 3, x. 4.

1. *Lord*, xii. 1, xiv. 2, xv. 1, xvii. 1, xviii. 3, 4, 6, 7, 8 ter, 9, xix. 5, 6.
2. *God*, xii. 2, xviii. 6.

1. *Lord*, xx. 3 ter, xxi. 1 bis, 3 ter, 4 bis, 5, xxii. 1 ter, 2 bis, 4 bis,
2. *God*, xx. 3, xxii. 6. [6 bis.

1. *Lord*, xxii. 7, 8, 9, 11 bis, 12, xxiv. 1 ter.
2. *God*, xxiii. 6 bis, xxiv. 5, xxv. 5, xxvi. 3.

1. *Lord*.
2. *God*, xxvii. 4, xxx. 18, xxxi. 8, xxxii. 2, xxxiii. 8, 10, xxxiv. 1, 3.

1. *Lord*, xxxvii. 1 bis, 2, xxxviii. 1, xxxix. 1, 2.
2. *God*, xxxv. 3, xxxvi. 2.

1. *Lord*, 3 bis, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, xl. 1, xli. 2A, xlii. 6B, 14 AB.
2. *God*, xli. 2B, xlii. 6B, 14A, xliii. 3.

1. *Lord*, xlv. 1A (four times), 2, 3, (xlv. 1B bis, 2), xlv. 1 bis,
2. *God*, xlv. 5, xlv. 3A bis. [2 bis, 3.

1. *Lord*, xlv. 3, xlvii. 1, 2, 3 bis, 4, xlviii. 8, xlix. 1.
2. *God*, xlv. 3, xlviii. 7, 8, 9, xlix. 1, 2.

1. *Lord*, l. 3, 4, li. 3, 4, lii. 1, 4, 5, 6, liii. 3, liv. 1A.
2. *God*, l. 5, li. 4B, 5A, lii. 2, 3, 15, liii. 1, liv. 1B bis.

1. *Lord*, lv. 3, lvi. 1A, 2, lviii. 1, 2, 3 bis, 4, 6, lxi. 1, 2B, 4A bis.
2. *God*, lv. 1B, lxi. 1A.

1. *Lord*, lxii. 1, 2B, lxiii. 4, lxiv. 1A bis, 3, 5 bis.
2. *God*, lxii. 3B bis, lxiii. 1A.

1. *Lord*, lxv. 1, 3, 5A, 6AB, 7B, 8A, 10AB, lxvi. 1, 2 bis, 3 bis, 4 bis, 8A.
2. *God*, lxv. 10, lxvi. 2.

1. *Lord*, lxvii. 1, 2A, lxviii. 2, 6. Total, 146.
2. *God*, lxvii. 3 bis, lxviii. 7. Total, 63.

3. *Lord God*, xxii. 4, xlii. 14B, xlv. 1B, xlv. 3B, lviii. 1, 2, lxiv. 1B.
4. *Eternal Lord*, i. 8B.
5. *Eternal God*, i. 8A.
6. *God Almighty*, Preface 1.
7. *God of Sabaoth*, lii. 1A.

XXXVI. 2 BARUCH

1. *God*, x. 1, liv. 12, lxxxii. 9.

2. *Lord*, i. 1, iii. 1 bis, 2, 4, iv. 1, v. 2, x. 4, 18, xi. 3.
3. *Most High*.
4. *Mighty One*.

2. *Lord*, xiv. 8 bis, 16 bis, xv. 1, xvi. 1 bis, xvii. 1.
3. *Most High*, xvii. 1.
4. *Mighty One*, xxi. 3.

2. *Lord*, xxiii. 1 bis, xxiv. 3, xxviii. 6.
3. *Most High*, xxiv. 2, xxv. 1.
4. *Mighty One*, xxv. 4, xxxii. 1, 6.

2. *Lord*, xxxviii. 1 bis.
3. *Most High*.
4. *Mighty One*, xxxiv. 1, xlv. 6, xlvi. 1, 4, xlvii. 1.

2. *Lord*, xlviii. 1, 45 bis, liv. 1, 20.
3. *Most High*, liv. 9, 17, lvi. 1.
4. *Mighty One*, xlviii. 38, xlix. 1, liv. 1, 11, lv. 6, lvi. 2, 3.

2. *Lord*, lxi. 7.
3. *Most High*, lxiv. 6, 8.
4. *Mighty One*, lix. 3, lxi. 6, lxiii. 3, 5, 6, 8, 10, lxiv. 3, 4.

2. *Lord*.
3. *Most High*, lxvii. 3, 7, lxix. 2, lxx. 7, lxxi. 3.
4. *Mighty One*, lxv. 1, lxvi. 5, 6, lxvii. 2, lxx. 2.

2. *Lord*, lxxv. 1, lxxvii. 3.
 3. *Most High*, lxxvi. 1, lxxvii. 4, 21, lxxx. 1, 3, lxxxi. 2, 4.
 4. *Mighty One*, lxxvii. 11, 26, lxxxi. 4.
2. *Lord*. Total, 32.
 3. *Most High*, lxxxii. 2, 6, lxxxiii. 1, lxxxv. 8, 12. Total, 25.
 4. *Mighty One*, lxxxii. 5, lxxxiv. 1, 6, 7, 10, lxxxv. 2, 3. Total, 40.
5. *Mighty God*, vi. 8, vii. 2, xiii. 2, 4.
 6. *Lofty One*, xiii. 8.
 7. *Creator*, xiv. 15, xlv. 4, xlviii. 46.
 8. *Messiah*, xxiv. 3, xxx. 7, xxxix. 7, xl. 1, lxx. 9, lxxii. 2.
 9. *One*, xlvii. 24.
 10. *Maker*, lxxii. 2.
 11. *Lord Most High*, vi. 6.

XXXVII. 3 BARUCH

1. *Lord*, Prologue 1, i. 2 *bis*, 3, ii. 7, iii. 1, 4, 6.
 2. *God*, Prologue 1, 2, i. 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, ii. 1, 7, iii. 8.
1. *Lord*, iv. 1 *bis*, 14, 15, v. 1.
 2. *God*, iv. 9, 10, 13 *bis*, 15, 16 *bis*.
1. *Lord*, vi. 4, 9, 13, 15, viii. 3, 4, ix. 2, 4.
 2. *God*, vi. 7, 12, vii. 2, viii. 5, ix. 6, 7.
1. *Lord*, x. 7 *bis*, 8, xi. 2, 3, 9, xii. 2, xiii. 1, 5.
 2. *God*, xi. 2.
1. *Lord*, xv. 4 *bis*. Total, 32.
 2. *God*, xiv. 2, xvii. 3, 4. Total, 28.
3. *Lord God*, i. 5, 7, iv. 7, 8.
 4. *Lord God Almighty*, i. 3.
 5. *Heavenly God*, xi. 9.
 6. *Jesus Christ the Immanuel*, iv. 15.

XXXVIII. 4 EZRA: A. THE SALATHIEL APOCALYPSE

1. *God*, vii. 19, 29, 21, 38, 79, 112, viii. 58, x. 16.
 2. *Lord*, iii. 4, iv. 3, 5, 22, 39, 41.
 3. *Most High*, iii. 3, iv. 11 *bis*, 34.
2. *Lord*, v. 23, 28, 35, 38, 41, 56, vi. 38, 55, 57.
 3. *Most High*, v. 22, 34, vi. 32, 36.
2. *Lord*, vii. 17, 45, 53, 58, 75, 132.
 3. *Most High*, vii. 19, 23, 50, 70, 74, 77, 78, 79 *bis*, 81.
2. *Lord*.
 3. *Most High*, (vii.) 83, 87, 88, 89, 102, 122, 132.

2. *Lord*, viii. 6, ix. 29.
3. *Most High*, viii. 1, 36, 48, 55, 59, ix. 25, 28.

2. *Lord*, x. —.
3. *Most High*, x. 24, 38, 50, 52, 54, 57, 58, 59.

2. *Lord*. Total, 23.
3. *Most High*, xii. 47, xiii. 17, xiv. 31, 42, 45. Total, 46.

4. *Lord God*, viii. 45.
5. *Mighty One*, vi. 32, ix. 45, x. 24, xii. 47.
6. *Gracious One*, viii. 32.
7. *Exalted One*, iv. 34.
8. *Incorruptible One*, iv. 11.
9. *Fashioner*, vii. 94.

XXXIX. 4 EZRA: THE EZRA APOCALYPSE

1. *Lord*, viii. 63.
2. *Most High*, v. 4, vii. 33, 37, 42, ix. 2, 4, 6.

XL. 4 EZRA: THE EAGLE VISION

1. *Lord*, xii. 7.
2. *Most High*, xi. 38, 43 *bis*, 44, xii. 4, 6, 23, 30, 36.

XLI. 4 EZRA: THE SON OF MAN VISION

1. *Lord*, xiii. 51 *bis*.
2. *Most High*, xiii. 13, 23, 26, 29, 44, 47.
3. *Mighty One*, xiii. 23.

XLII. 4 EZRA: THE EZRA PIECE

1. *Lord*, xiv. 2, 18.
2. *Most High*, xiv. 42, 45.

XLIII. PRAYER OF MANASSEH

1. *Lord*, 7, 8, 9 *bis*, 12, 13 *bis*.
2. *God*, 1, 8, 14.
3. *Lord Almighty*, 1.
4. *Lord Most High*, 1.

Princeton.

ROBERT DICK WILSON.

PROBLEMS OF PEACE

THE SUPREME PROBLEM.

And now what child is this upon thy lap,
Born in the red glow of re-lighted war? . . .
Young Century, born to hear
The cannon talking in its infant ear—
The Twentieth of Time's loins, since that
Which in the quiet snows of Bethlehem he begat,
Ah! With forth-bringing such and so ill-starred,
After the day of blood and night of fate,
Shall it survive with brow no longer marred,
Lip no more wry with hate;
With all thou hadst of good,
But from its blood,
Washed thine hereditary ill,
And thy child still?

Venturing to alter one word of the last line, in the magnificent apostrophe to the Nineteenth Century, of Francis Thompson, shall we not say that the problem of Peace is this,—Shall the Twentieth Century be God's child still?

THE PROBLEM OF IDEAS, IDEALS, PRINCIPLES. Since Plato's day, we know that the natures of things are found in their embodied ideas, or principles. Also, we know from his profound insight, that all ideas are to be sought for their essential forms, in the higher ideas to which any may relate as species to genus. Nothing is to be known in itself,—there are no "Sinn Fein" ideas,—but all in relation to the rest. This leads the mind on a perpetually upward search, seeking not only the true nature of that with which it is dealing, but also to attain higher conceptions of truth, till, if one follow Plato, he reaches the supreme triad of ideas, the True, the Beautiful, the Good; or if he follow a greater than Plato he reaches Him who is the Way, the Truth, the Life.

The converse, that the idea, the ideal, the principle, shapes the thing is perhaps of more practical importance. Nothing is undertaken, that is not finally given actual shape by what-

ever principle it embodies. Frame social organizations, states, machinery, plans, what not; the idea may be hidden, may be misunderstood, but whatever it really be, such will be the resultant form. Sign treaties essentially unjust, frame compacts seeking fair play, make agreements with secret evil in view, undertake business or engineering with correct or mistaken notions; in all and every case, the result will be good or ill, fair or foul, in exact accord with the real ideas employed. In the end, the idea always triumphs over matter, the thing grows under our astonished eyes into different shape than we had expected, and the power of these hidden forces, irresistible, formative, constructive or destructive, as it may be, is always demonstrated.

To no spiritual truth does the Bible give more emphasis than to this. Readily recognized as one would think that it would be, yet endless proposals are in the air, on all sorts of topics, which dispute or ignore this central fact. In the sphere of religion, assertions that "doctrine" is unimportant, that religion is a "life" not a "doctrine," and demands for easy, compromising "unions" of denominations, are examples. In education, the frequent assertion that one subject is as good "discipline" as another, that "cultural" themes do not cultivate more than "vocational," that universities need not concern themselves about the morals of their students; demands for academic freedom, often make this mistake. In other lines, such as the defense of the immoral in Art, and much of the support of the "new" Art and Literature (happily, not all), this fundamental error is committed.

To this principle Lincoln appealed, when he asserted "Nothing is ever settled till it is settled *right*." To this is Wilson appealing, in proposing basal "principles" as a foundation for lasting and successful, because righteous, peace. To this have Lloyd-George, Asquith, Clemenceau and others brought the tribute of their support, in voicing as urgently as Wilson, the need for "principles" as foundation for the world's future peace. This lay beneath the

proposals of the late Czar for the Hague Tribunal,—that disputes be adjudicated by “principles” rather than by appeal to arms.

The above is by now almost a commonplace of thinking, at least, on the surface and in our words. But danger of no small moment threatens lest we stop short of the highest source, Jesus Christ, or, the Bible. That some of the men who sat at Versailles were governed in their innermost thinking by its truths, is probable, if not certain. The status of things, alas, prevents that it be made the openly recognized courts of appeals. But none the less certainly, if the problems of peace are dismissed with any lower standard in their adjudication than those of Christ, disaster must result, greater or less, sooner or later, as the case may be, but absolutely sure. No source of moral truth has ever urged so strenuously as the Bible that nations live or die, as they recognize or defy the laws of God. No other setting forth of moral teachings has ever stated so purely, so rigidly, laws of exact justice,—nay more, of love and charity, in dealings between man and man. Should these ideals, too well known to need more than suggestion, be not consciously dominant in the hearts of those who settle our present problems, should any other aim than the realization of them here on earth be controlling,—in other words, if any lower end be sought than *to do the Will of God*, in it all, certain disaster will result. It may be less or more, it may be soon or late, it may be averted in part, by later reform, but the definite acceptance of standards recognizedly less perfect than those of the Bible, which means the definite acceptance of selfishness, of hate, of greed, will inevitably produce evil in consequence.

THE PROBLEM OF PROGRESS. The outstanding fact concerning progress is man's lack of “progress.” The search for “primitive” man is useless. The lowest races existing are as aged as the most advanced. And while no word is more frequent than “progress,” yet the vast majority of men, now and as far back as we can trace them, have ex-

isted in the savage, barbarous, or, at best, the semi-barbarous condition. Practically, all of those "lower" forms of social structures, even the "lowest," when intelligently and thoroughly studied, exhibit a bewildering complexity of social arrangements, a multiplicity of forms and beliefs, which seem to be the outgrowth of ages of past history. Many, if not all of them, show every evidence of having not only long ceased all "progress," but of having definitely degenerated.

But this arresting feature in human history is hidden from most observers, because we are obsessed with the idea of "evolution," intoxicated with the whirl of what we deem our own "progress," and fondly cling to the belief, in the face of inexorable facts, that all humanity is on the upward road. The truth is that the great majority of human communities are in a state of "arrested development,"—bound fast in old beliefs which they are unable to exchange, tied by old customs which they are unable to alter, moulded in forms of iron stiffness which they are unable to unloose, decaying from old sins which they are unwilling to repent of and unable to reform from,—suffering from all this unspeakable sorrows, which they are unable to assuage. Witness the cold storage condition of China, the centuries-enduring sameness of Old Japan and Korea, the caste system of India, the long eras of Africa's stagnation, the abiding life of Arabia, the Abrahamic life of the present Orient, the untold years of the American Indian, the who knows how aged and hoary drear existence of the natives of Australia and the Islands of the Sea,—not to speak of other instances in all lands and continents. The tendency of all social forms to crystallize, and, instead of being as they were at their beginning, steps forward, to become hindrances to further movement,—this is a commonplace of sociology. But it is not "common" in the sense that it is ever to be overlooked. It is the most arresting *fact* in history. If another fact of history can challenge attention equally with

this, it is, that in a sufficient number of cases to establish it as at least a general law, when communities break their ancient fetters, *the impulse comes from without*. The shock of invasion, the impact of immigration, contact with a new form of thought, the inflow of a new philosophy or a new religion,—these may suffice to furnish the needed awakening which shall set free a nation's long imprisoned powers, and stimulate to new activity.

One would think that "progress" would set man increasingly free, that once started on the upward path, he need never halt, (why should he?), that centuries of experience in the solution of problems would enable a nation to go on with increasing momentum to higher and still higher planes, so that heights hitherto undreamed of would long ago have been attained. But the truth seems to be that the solution of problems only brings us face to face with still more difficult problems, that progress only increases the difficulties and complexities of life, till the task of further advance is too difficult for the nation in its then mental and moral state of capacity. Only decay, stagnation, decline, ages of existence bound in fetters of old customs and beliefs, can then result. And from this condition no nation seems able to break away save by *some impulse from outside*.

If, now, our modern European-American civilization seems to have escaped this fate so far, shall we not find the explanation if we can somewhere find the origin of that *inflowing* current of energy, the source of that impulse to higher ideals which seems to be present in this civilization, as an ever urgent force? But it requires no long search. Historic Christianity has been to Europe and America this source of the *power from the outside*. Through it, there has come to its adherents the tremendous but invisible power of the Grace of God, awakening its converts from sin, beginning in them the "new life," opening their eyes to undreamed heights of moral perfection. It has supplied the tremendous urge of moral ideals sufficiently lofty and de-

sirable to be a perpetual incentive to strive for the still better; it has spoken the discontent of God with man's sloth and ignorance and sin, and saved from moral stagnation; it has steadily preached His Law, and by its pure perfection, its absolute righteousness, its holiness, has dispelled the chill of cold and imperfect morality; and it has preached the truth in many lines, social and intellectual, as well as purely religious, and thereby given man standards by which to frame many a social measure, and build many a vast philosophy, for its truth has far outrun all human capacity to fathom. We are but beginning to realize that in the teachings of Jesus Christ is truth whose scope covers principles which if but understood and applied, will supply guidance for the wise and secure settlement of all human problems.

"Therefore take no thought, saying, What shall we eat? or, What shall we drink? or, Wherewithal shall we be clothed? (For after all these things do the Gentiles seek:) for your heavenly Father knoweth that ye have need of all these things. But seek ye first the kingdom of God and his righteousness; and all these things shall be added unto you." Ponder these profound words as a guide in all human difficulties, as indicating what we should seek *first* in all problems. Suppose this *were* the guiding rule, the end, the aim, of all men in all their difficulties. How wise would be the history of man as compared with his past folly! How noble his achievements as compared with his past shame! How happy his life as compared with his past and present misery! Colonies, trade, manufactures, improvements, cities, wealth,—after all these things do the Gentiles seek. "But seek ye *first* the Kingdom of God and his righteousness, and all these things shall be added unto you." "Added,"—to what extent? "Your heavenly Father knoweth that ye have need of all these things." Added to such an extent as He knoweth that ye have need.

As long as men fix their aims lower than the seeking *first* the Kingdom of God and His Righteousness, so long

must we look for recurring ills. Palliated for a time by efforts, noble, perhaps, high-minded, unselfish (judged by the human standard and in comparison with past efforts and treaties), yet, sincere as all may be, still,—“Nothing is ever settled till it is settled *right*.” And nothing is ever settled “right” till it is settled in accord with the highest possible principles, to attain the highest possible ends, all with the highest possible motives. The world has never heard before nor ever will hear spoken again in its reluctant ears, words as simple as these of Jesus, yet as divine in revelation of the only path to “peace,”—“World Peace.”

THE PROBLEM OF MAN’S DOMINION. “Be fruitful and multiply and replenish the earth, and subdue it; and have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth on the face of the earth.” Amazing task! In one all-embracing word, removing man from all kinship to the lower animals, denying fetichism, animism, witchcraft, and all that sad list of wild fears and errors which have cursed those who have forgotten their origin and their primal duty. Nor has this primal command ever been revoked. Nor has its deep implication—the essential superiority of man over the lower animals, for whom such a task would be wholly impossible—ever been modified. Deep planted in man’s nature are the constitutional principles which make his task possible. His laws of thought coordinate with the laws of things, else his knowledge would be delusion. His emotions and desires drive him unsatisfiedly toward the perfect ideal, else his end would be disappointed misery. His will applies the needed motive power, else his career would be failure.

And he has always sought “dominion.” Over the fields of unexplored truth, ranging into pure mathematics, science, philosophy, into every field, his unsatisfied thirst thrusts him on, tired, strained, but striving. That what we call “science” is but another name for his warfare for “world dominion” in the accomplishment of his vast duty,—though,

perhaps, he realize it not,—is evident. His recent swift subjection of material forces is due to his “advance in scientific investigation.” His “dominion” over every living thing,—is it incredible that this includes microbes, germs, radium, electricity, “TNT,” airplanes, wireless,—are not all included? But this victory is not for the sake of mere *power*. It gives man power, but for a definite aim. Let him forget or ignore the principles of Divine guidance, let him forget or ignore for *what* he was given these capacities, and *why* his inner urge drives him unceasingly on, and then, as in the problem of progress, with which this is intimately connected,—if, indeed, it is not the same,—advancement but increases his dangers and difficulties, till the condition is too awful for him to wisely master, and he ends this or that situation with slaughter and destruction. His invention of machines, be they stone arrows or machine guns, but gives him added power to kill. His lust for conquest sends him ravaging the helpless beasts no less than his weaker brethren. His hardly-won stores of knowledge but make him a more efficient despot. His piled-up wealth but increases his greed and covetousness.

Think for a moment of:

Chemistry and Physics. Their triumphs have given to his manipulation forces of undreamed destructive capacity. Explosives and poisons are perhaps first in dread terror. Combined in exploring assistance, sources of even yet unimaginable potency are sure to be traced. To face the certainty that man is speedily to know of power which he can wield for terrific and unescapable destruction is to face a problem of desperate moment. “The veriest clown with a hammer can destroy in a half hour, works of Art in the Vatican which have cost Genius the slow labor of centuries.” The German with his long-range cannon could and did destroy in one campaign works of art which cost genius the slow labor of centuries. High explosives touched off from across the world,—Radium

with its as yet unexplored but death-dealing secrets, its capacity to transmute the hitherto unchangeable elements, its apparently inexhaustible supplies of heat and energy, stored in the tiniest compass,—wireless electricity, spanning the earth in the twinkling of an eye, carrying its unseen ethereal waves where none can escape,—or the secrets of the stars, far-flung across the voids,—or that mightiest force of all, which swings the planets as lightly as one plays with a toy, *gravity*—what if their dread and awful strength should be discovered and subdued to the Mind of Man, and wielded for man's destruction, as recently lesser forces have been so used.

The Destruction of Space. As consequence of these discoveries, former safeguards against the inroads of an enemy no longer avail to protect. Defensible mountain passes, river floods, deserts, forests, oceans, distances,—even fleets and armies are being set at naught by these instruments which laugh at space, which girdle the earth quicker than Puck,—which do not even have to “girdle” it, but can contemptuously ignore it. What protection is to avail against foes armed with these coming agencies? For come they will, some being already here, and these, of no mean destructive capacity. Not idle dreams, these, but swiftly approaching realities of grim and deadly mien. It is useless to attempt to stay their arrival,—nothing short of a reversion to barbarism can hinder their speedy presence. It may be too wild a fancy to foresee a future, when man, gathering into his hands the potencies with which Nature has wrought in her laboratories, discoverer of deep and dark secrets, having pryed his way at last into the hidden chambers “where the pulse-like hammers of creation beat,” may emerge armed with power like an ancient Titan or a Greek god; when like Apollo, he may send his destructive darts aimed with plague, on the hosts of his despisers, or like the Titans, pile Ossa on Pelion in wild frenzy of unchecked rage. Yet short of creation it is scarce possible for us to set a definite limit to his progress. And nations are

not too wise or too good to destroy their hindering opponents. Remember the furious and awful schemes of Germany of but a few years ago, checked, we hope, but yesterday. Not merely armed arrays, but cities, mines, forests, orchards, the very land itself, would have been permanently wrecked if this could have accomplished her fell end,—yes, even all the inhabitants of the land, gladly had they even been swept from the earth. Nor will many years elapse till the easy means of doing all this, or worse, may be the fatal plaything of the Child, Man.

The penetrating genius of Tennyson, farthest seer of the Nineteenth Century, feared this and saw the sole hope.

Let knowledge grow from more to more,
But more of reverence in us dwell;
That mind and heart according well
May make one music, as before,

But vaster. We are fools and slight;
We mock Thee when we do not fear;
But help Thy foolish ones to bear;
Help thy vain worlds to bear Thy Light.

Yes, we are fools and slight. We do need help to bear His Light. For the Truth which we discover,—Light as it truly is, doubtless,—is His Light, though we think it ours, and name it science, philosophy, democracy, reform, sociology, religion, what not. We *must* seek His help so that reverence shall grow equal-paced with knowledge, else shall discord, fury, destruction, irreverence, rage and destroy the world. For hitherto man's weapons were feebler than his sinful will. Now and soon they will arm him with means of annihilating torment at which even a demon might laugh with content. This leads us to

THE PROBLEM OF POWER. In whose hands is power, —*any* power—safe for the rest of mankind? No man is free if he is in another's power. Yet it is not safe for the "other" that the "one" be entirely free to do absolutely as he may please. It is probably not safe to trust any man, not even the best, with unlimited "freedom." We have congratulated ourselves on the spread

of "freedom," calling this the "land of the free," yet there are many kinds of power to which we submit other than that of kings. Plutocrats, customs, popes, democratic majorities, Jacobin mobs, not to speak of constituted authority which we self-impose, limit our volitions. And there are many sorts of all these powers, not always so named openly or organized as powers, yet existent and powerful. And of whatever sort or source it be, *in whose hands is any power safe for others?* But, particularly, irresponsible power, wherever seized—in whose "hands," nay, rather, in whose mind, is power safe?

Paul, inspired of more than human wisdom, wrote "And though I have prophecy, and understand all mysteries, and all knowledge,—and have not love, I am nothing." All the future readable, no enemy's plans hidden; all mysteries open before the gaze; all knowledge at one's command;—gifted with all this, what beneficent undertakings might one so dowered share with mankind? But unless the heart sang with love to his fellows, of what profit to himself or others? Self used, to end with self, such power cankering with the sour of selfishness,—such an one is "nothing." Only the will to use it all for one's fellows would make it worth the trouble of gaining. "And have not *love*, I am nothing." The fame which one would win who gained such heights for cruel ambition would shame all the Caesars of the past, but Paul, scorning all such shams, sees such an one in his true littleness,—*"I am nothing."* Germany's vast gains of scholarship and scientific progress,—her huge possibilities,—empty of love, have left her revealed in her true light,—*"She is nothing."*

And again we are driven to the source of love,—love divine. Only from its upwelling fount is supplied to the heart of man the motive which makes his conquest of the earth's powers an infinite profit, rather than an abysmal danger. "What shall it profit a man if he gain the whole world, and lose his own soul?" What shall it profit Man, if he subdue the whole earth, and gain but self-destruction?

THE PROBLEM OF EMPIRE. Let it be granted that the days of empires founded on force, ambition, greed, are nearing their end. Whether their day is really over waits the disclosure of time. But, at least, it seems the popular demand that they shall cease. But another imperial problem abides. Isolation of peoples is swiftly nearing its close. But closer association is not always desirable. Contact with ignorance, cruelty, dishonesty, lust, is at least risky. Trade, to whose account so many ills are charged, nevertheless one of man's best blessings, must be immensely extended, its knitting bands woven still more intimately between all parts of the earth. And in present discussions of these inter-linkings of international life, much is said of the right of "self-determination," always in behalf of the weaker nations.

But there is another side which will urge its claims with still more strenuous vehemence in proportion as the empire of power withdraws its rule. The larger peoples have as many rights as the smaller, doubtless they have more, for their responsibilities are heavier, their usefulness, potentially greater. The small peoples can be as dishonest, as wicked, as oppressive of those still weaker, as deadly a source of moral ill and infection, as any larger community. Indeed, the "dark places" of the earth, the "habitations of wickedness," are among the quite inferior races. But what right has a small but degraded people,—what right has *any* barbaric community,—to stand in the way of civilization? What right has a lower tribe to withhold fair gifts of God from higher and better uses? Had the whites of the United States any right to seize their fair domain from the Indian? (Query:—So long as the Indian occupied, was it truly "fair?") Press the right of "self-determination" to its fullest extent, and the Indian, owner by *his* sort of possession, would still people the Mississippi valley with his teepees. But if there be any betterment in civilization over savagery, if the Twentieth Century be at all preferable to the Stone Age, perhaps the plans of God are nearer fulfillment when one supplants the other. And one can say this

with full recognition of the noble qualities of the Indian, as to which, there are probably but few whose estimate of him is higher than that of the writer.

Yet, adopt this view of world relations and age conditions, and then take, for example, India,—home of horrible superstitions, land of the most terrible tyranny the world has ever known, the tyranny of caste, under which more men have groaned, under which the suffering of the debased is more horrible and more helpless, than under any other tyranny recorded in history; India, such a land, has no right to “self-determination” for her “self-determination” is to determine to continue this evil course, to do evil and evil only continually. And there are other places,—abodes of such unspeakable villainies, houses of ill-fame so monstrous, prisons of tortures so dreadful, that the incoming of a nobler conqueror, whose rule brings at least some surcease of age-enduring cruelties, some measure of freedom to the oppressed, some “power from the outside” to inaugurate the uplift to freer and happier conditions, is certainly a movement to be applauded. England’s rule in Egypt, her dominion in India, her settlement of Australia, her influence in Africa, her control of Papua, are bringing righteousness and justice, such as these lands had never known in all their hard past. She is bringing these gifts, too, such as they could not possibly have attained of themselves, for these lands are conspicuous instances of the truth of our first paragraphs,—of peoples whose social forms had crystallized into means of unbreakable oppression. So with the Empire of France in Africa, that of the United States in the Philippines,—shall these be withdrawn, because they are established against the will of their inhabitants? Shall their unquestionably beneficent work be undone?

For former conditions can not abide. The destruction of space, if there were no other factor, has forced Christian civilization into contact with other societies, in such relations as must make or mar each. Isolation can not be

maintained. Christianity cannot rest enclosed in its present limits, neither can civilization ignore all lower peoples, else shall each suffer the stagnation emphasized above. Their very essence, if Christianity is to *be* Christianity, if civilization is to truly *be* civilization, is to uplift, aid, help,—this means expansion. It means that other social forms are to be invaded by these,—altered, helped, “conquered.” There must be no blinking this situation. And no League of Nations, no Universal Arbitration, no Hague Tribunal, can prevent the march of empire,—the inevitable subjection of lower faiths and lower social structures to the higher. And it ought not to be stayed. All progress depends on its forward triumph. Yes, infinitely more, for if it be stayed, then decline, and stagnation,—hopeless and lasting,—will be the sure fate of those who have made former progress. That law, emphasized above, is *primal*. There is but one solution,—to establish empires of truth and love. The tremendous genius of Napoleon uttered no greater truth than when he said, “Alexander, Caesar, Charlemagne and myself have founded empires, but upon what did the creations of our genius depend? Upon Force. Jesus, alone, founded His Empire upon Love, and to this very day, millions would die for Him.”

And while the lower uncivilized races may profit if their self-determination be limited, and a beneficent type of life be compelled upon them, yet in this process, much painful injury is inevitable. There remains the Conquest of the Truth. They may be uplifted by the Truth, spoken in Love.

And, here, again, the only hope of the world is in Christianity. Brahminism and Buddhism are senile, unable to reform of themselves. Mohammedanism is in its essence a movement of force, wholly alien to all that is best in present-day ideals. Shintoism is but a form, hollow, empty of any lofty power. No other form of faith need be considered. *But who could face with equanimity the prospect*

of their universal triumph? What fate would wait the world if *all* men were believers in *these* faiths?

The only other vigorous re-making organizations are those many-sided, many-faced, more or less vague ideas and ideals and hidden selfishnesses which masquerade under the name of Socialism. I say "masquerade," for under this noble name, under the unquestionably honest and noble ideals of many members, hides the secret envy of others,—envy against those who have (in whatever way it be) gained the more of wealth, springing from the hearts of those who, from whatever cause it be (and often it is wholly sinful), have gained the less.

In place of war, and empires and social structures, founded upon force and wrongly-gained privilege, it is proposed to substitute the world over, law and organizations embodying, it is claimed, justice and righteousness, wherein will lie their claim for adoption. Yet no one hopes for their success, from the power of their embodied ideas, alone,—the world being what it is now. They are to be backed by force. The League of Nations must have its international army. And in regard to all proposed forms of socialism, it is not to be for an instant overlooked that they are all embodiments of force of a peculiarly deadly and dangerous kind. However they may gloss it over, they, in essence, propose to compel "near-equality" by force. And socialistic force will not be exerted in *holding* down the lower classes but in *dragging* down the higher. They may free all below, they will enslave all above. They may remove the hovel, they will destroy the mansion. They may break some wise fetters on lower passions, they will impose weights on flight and uplift. And they propose to *compel* this.

Final success will come, true freedom and justice will be gained, only when the ideals embodied are supported by that which will bring obedience by their spiritual strength, alone. Men must be left to rise to their noblest height, on condition that they uplift others who are willing. The low

are not to be set free on condition that all shall be low. This is socialism; and nothing deadlier to humanity has ever been suggested, for it contemplates the murder of all that is best in humanity. But the low are to be set free from all that hinders their also rising. Nor will this ever be attained as we said above, till ideas shall be so embodied as to compel willing consent by their inherent perfection, backed by,—what else? Humanity is too inherently sinful to stand such a strain. Help is needed to give the “what else.”

Christianity alone can furnish the “what else.” She alone has the requisite purity of motive, the demanded completeness of theoretical righteousness, the essential spiritual power. She alone has no selfish aim in seeking dominion. Her teachings alone embody all the principles of justice. She alone furnishes the spiritual power without which military power must endure to the end of time. Challenge her doctrines; investigate her teachings from their social aspect; expand her fundamental truths and pre-suppositions into cosmic philosophy (the supreme and final test); foresee the results of her teachings if given worldwide application; criticise her adherents, with all their human weaknesses and the shortcomings of their application of her precepts hitherto—all phases of her beliefs and their effects upon the world considered, she, alone, is fit to be entrusted with world dominion. She alone is able to bless if given universal acceptance. To her, alone, may all nations safely come from the rivers unto the ends of the earth. For she, alone, by virtue of her endowment with the indwelling Holy Spirit, possesses the power to reform when her forms threaten to harden; she, alone, has perpetual vitality; she, alone, has truth capable of indefinite expansion to meet all growth in civilization and knowledge. For, she, alone, worships the true God.

THE PROBLEM OF DEMOCRACY. And if one contends that we have gotten away from all practical matters, the speeches of Wilson, Lloyd-George, Balfour, Asquith, and others, who have voiced the aims of the Allies, are sufficient

proof that these able, hard-headed statesmen realize that ideas are the final arbiters of events. And if the older empires of pure force, for ends of ambition, power, wealth, are to have had their day, and if order, justice, progress, are to continue their spread, then we face the problem immediately, of holding the baser factors of humanity in check. For selfishness, lust, greed, animal passion, revenge, hatred, dishonesty, trickery, ambition,—all the incredibly long and incredibly foul list of human weaknesses and wickednesses,—will threaten calamity for all nobly erected social structures. And the hardly less dangerous, perhaps more dangerous, elements of ignorance, low and contracted vision, spiritual and mental feebleness, will be heavy clogs on the wings of freedom. Ignorance, selfishness and sin have formed a triple alliance which no entente has ever succeeded in disbanding. How slow they have made the best efforts for righteousness! How oft they have brought defeat in the hour of seeming victory! How wretched the condition of millions of men, now and in the past, because of their foul and cruel schemes! And the history of Democracy does not read hopefully. Ignorance and selfishness and sin have been her irreconcilable foes, more dangerous when within her bounds than when without; nor has she ever been able to “intern” these treacherous enemies.

The Republics of ancient Greece had in many cases a glorious internal history. Compared with the condition of other peoples, their inhabitants were immeasurably blessed. But all of them went down before the other great Republic, Rome, because of their utter inability to combine. Could Greece have federated as did the republics of the United States, how different the account of the ages! But their inability to surrender local and selfish interests for the common good is a portentous fact, which no student of the history of Democracy should for an instant forget. Rome preserved her military powers unimpaired and unified for a vast endurance in time and effort, but her failure was as disastrous. Internally, she was quite unable to check the

selfish interference of great and predatory wealth with measures for the common uplift. Truly "Bolshevist" uprisings accompanied with their ignorant destruction of the wealth they were unable to gain for themselves or to force others to share by orderly processes, were her only remedy, a remedy worse than the ill,—till her long internal dissensions were ended by the rule of force, the Empire, in place of the rule of debate, the Senate. An enforced Imperial Peace, though at the cost of liberty, seemed and probably was better than endless discussions which settled nothing and forever threatened and frequently produced civil war.

The Middle Age Republics of Italy and the Free Cities of Germany, again, by their splendid internal achievements, by the welfare of their people as compared with the misery of most surrounding communities, are encouraging instances. But all went down before powerful and unified monarchies, or were compelled to surrender their form of freedom for government of dukes, counts, oligarchies and kings, and often this retrogression was the result of their own internal and interminable dissensions.

Modern attempts can fairly be said to furnish more ground for hope. Switzerland, the United States, France and Great Britain with her colonies, seem in good measure to have attained that indispensable surrender of selfishness, the absolutely required fore-going of individual interests for the common weal, so that they may be truthfully said to have founded "Commonwealths." But it is vital to note that this could never have been attained save by a preceding disbursement of almost universal information, so that a measure of victory over ignorance has been won, *pari passu* with the subordination of selfishness. But does not this imply, does it not forcibly prove, that sin has in some measure at least been restrained?

Two events of profound importance have occurred, differentiating modern eras, and furnishing to Europe and America the powerful spiritual energy needed for a Democracy:—the advent of Christianity, altering the whole moral

and spiritual life of Europe, and the Protestant Reformation. Never, as in the countries affected by these mighty movements, has religion stuck so deeply into the moral life of man. Religion is now in Christian lands a "personal" matter. It will not permit a man to sink to the baser level of his unaided weaknesses or unchecked appetites. It drives him constantly toward the better, in his voting as well as in his prayers, in his political efforts as well as in his purely church activities. No government can rise permanently above the average intelligence and morality of its citizens. In all human existence, no factor has been so all-pervasive in elevating and strengthening both, as Christianity. Her influence has far outweighed any other element. And no religion known has even attempted, much less achieved, the benign, the assuaging, the purifying, the uplifting, the educative, the broadening and strengthening enterprises which have been so largely the endeavor and always the accompaniments of her purer forms.

It is not too much to say that no other rival religion—Mohammedanism, Buddhism, Hinduism, Confucianism, Shintoism,—can even exist in democracies. They are in all their underlying modes of thought fundamentally at odds with all the necessary presuppositions of a democracy. Only Christianity is fundamentally, basically, founded upon such conceptions of human nature,—only she teaches and seeks to alter that nature where it needs alteration, by such modes of effort and doctrines of instruction, as not only harmonize with democracy, but far more, which steadily pour into the currents of national life, ideals and motives, beliefs and practices, without whose power no democracy can long endure.

A gathering of statesmen whose influence over the world has never been equalled politically by any former group, has considered a League of Nations to be, presumably, world wide,—to gather into its councils representatives of all peoples, governments, faiths, practices under the sun, if not at its first inauguration, at least, finally. As a scheme for the

solution of social and political problems, it has never been approached. In the magnitude of its effort, in the majestic righteousness of its vision, in the transcendent glory of its hopes, it inspires, it dazzles, it appeals, it burdens, it subdues, all who seek knowingly or unknowingly the Kingdom of God on Earth. Over all nations, no matter what their form of government, it will establish a World Democracy. Over all creeds, no matter what their ground philosophy,—pantheism, fetichism, ancestorism, what not,—including all the incredible farrago of falsities of which humanity is capable in this realm,—it will enthrone, in reality, if not in name, the Jehovah-God of Judaic-Christianity. To all social forms, whatever secret tyrannies they embody, whatever vile practices they tolerate or encourage, or whatever higher comprehensions they have sought with greater or less opposition to realize, it will decree as the world's future standard, the Law of Christ. The Commandments whose noble dictates are yet beyond all other Ways, though spoken over thirty centuries ago, the commentary on them of the Christ, the spotless purity of the Old and New Testaments, their lofty imperatives of justice, righteousness, and reverence for law—nothing short of these, will supply men with a code, a guide, with principles, by whose instruction the difficult tasks of the League may be performed. Their spirit is already couched in its conclusions, though not by name. And to them must there be more and more definite, clearly recognized reference, as the final tribunal.

For there is proposed a "World Corporation," to which we are asked to entrust a huge measure of control over commerce and finance, for economic boycott will doubtless be one of its chief weapons of control, and economic prosperity, through peace, one of its chiefest rewards; also, equal control over our dealings with our national neighbors, in many relationships with which the ordinary corporation has naught to do, moral, educational, and so on. But in any corporation, there is perpetually present the problem of the dishonest, the incapable, the immoral partner. One of this

character will always harm, he may and often does bring to ruin, promising enterprises. The League of Nations proposes a corporation, a partnership, so vast, so powerful, so influential for weal or woe, that it gives one pause. For, again, our former question appalls us, "In whose hands or minds is power, *any* power, safe?" And in this Corporation, we propose to give "stock," "shares," to enroll as "partners," nations which are dishonest, whom no other nation trusts: nations which are incapable of handling the lofty business of this firm, because of their ignorance of its high motives and their incapability of attaining to the required moral vision; nations which are racially and socially immoral, whose close intercourse threatens to rot the stamina of those who mingle with them; nations which are disreputable and threaten to bring suspicion on all the actions of the firm. Nor can it be considered possible to refuse them a membership. The very essence of the League is democracy, not empire, not even the empire of the five Great Powers. And these inferior communities are not only the Central Powers with whose enormous capacity, moral and otherwise, for wreck to all highly endeavored national moralities, we have just waged war. Their capacities for membership are safer than some.

To make the world safe for the League, to make the League safe for the world, naught save the universal acceptance of Christianity will avail. Its superior principles, its perpetual urge of the purest practices, its steadfast refusal to compromise with recognized sins, its demand on all men for a definite personal attitude of obedience to God,—these and these alone will create the urgently needed power, other than military force, on which the behests of the League are to rely.

THE PROBLEM OF THE HOME. Next to the fact of God, probably no fact is so important for humanity as the fact of sex. "Male and female created He them." The most important institution for humanity is the Home. All but helpless creations of heredity and environ-

ment, our sorrows and happiness are prepared for us in large measure by those who brought us forth. And next, our sorrow and happiness are determined in immense portion by the one who is our mate. Consequently, no sociological or political question should ever be considered apart from its bearing on the Home.

For the home furnishes the "raw material" from which states are builded. And on the nature of this material, vitally bettered or worsed as the case may be, by the innermost teachings of the home, are states to depend for the permanence of their structures. Decisively, also, does the home set limits to the success of all social efforts. Where homes are abodes of ignorance or haunts of lust; where the harem supplants the nursery, be it in the Orient or here; from such homes can not come the stable characters which must give a foundation for all high towering and beautiful erections.

Could its purity be universally respected,—“Thou shalt not commit adultery”,—and its own inner life be pure; could its refinement be universally considerable; could knowledge in good measure be everywhere the basis of its reasonings; could obedience and order and law be the spirit of its actions,—“Honor thy father and thy mother,”—and the larger consequential obedience to civic law be its general resultant; could all homes contain an altar to the One True and Living God, and make His Word their final arbiter, their resource and strength and joy—the state built of citizens so reared would surpass Plato’s Republic or Moore’s Utopia; the visions of Henry George and the City of God of St. Augustine would come near to existence somewhere on earth.

Turn the shield. No constitutions, no social systems, no religions, can ever improve the lot of humanity, save in so far as they uplift the home. It is futile, it is purblind, it is ignorant, it is often criminal, to talk of the “uplift of society,” to strive for its betterment, save through the home. True, many social instrumentalities powerfully, even vitally, react upon the home, and in that regard they demand nar-

rowest inspection, but only in so far,—no farther. Their worth is measured in exact degree to their influence for good on the home, their ill in like fashion.

But the burden of its erection and maintenance is heavy. Many there be who would fain shirk its trials. Be there too great wealth, be there poverty, its children are greatly endangered. Be its partners, husband and wife, unhappily mated, its very existence is threatened, with consequences disastrous beyond words; or, at best, its difficulty is vastly magnified while its chief reward is gone. But be the toils what they may, both of body and spirit;—be they wrought in sickness or health, in wealth or poverty, lovingly matched or sadly mismated; yet the home can still do its beneficent work if it still be pure, refined, intelligent, orderly, religious; and all of these *any* home can be in *some* measure, if its founders but sink all lesser considerations in their supreme earthly task,—its perfection.

Lightening these severe burdens is a consideration worthy the study of a statesman. The State has taken over technical education, and with it, many phases of the moral influence we exert on the coming generation. The Church adds her powerful aid to all who are willing to avail themselves of it. Society assists in many lines. All these agencies sincerely aim to perfect the home. But theories whose logical conclusion is its invasion if not its destruction are not few nor are their followers weak. Amid all the welter of discussion, several principles should be firmly held. No proposal should be considered whose aim is the ultimate abolition of the home,—of the life-union, in sacred purity, of one man and one woman, with their children. No settlement of questions of wealth can be accepted which deprives the home of its definitely owned share of *private* wealth. No scheme of social arrangements abolishing this but will deprive the home of some of the most important civic virtues. And no social manners and customs but will be disastrous if they in the smallest degree remove the veil from its sacred intimacies or supplant its best institutions by those of the community.

And, again, nothing would survive of what is best in the home, if Christianity in its historic form should vanish from earth. From first to last in their history, from beginning to end of their teaching, Christianity and Judaism have magnified the home as have no other religions. They have protected its sanctity, strengthened its bonds, furnished Divine Love to aid its feeble human love, and upon it as the unit, Christianity builds her Church. In none but Judaic and Christian lands has the love of husband and wife been so exalted, so purified, so ennobled, and thereby enabled to bring to life its most valuable earthly happiness.

Naught but the universal acceptance of this ideal form of life, through the prior universal acceptance of Christianity, thus making possible the early raising of the children in the most favored surroundings, can furnish for the ages to come that supply of nobly and highly trained men and women who shall have the mental, moral and spiritual powers needful for the New Era, of which we hope the speedy installation.

But no educational or social efforts will succeed if children come from base and ignoble homes. Try Socialism, or Militarism, test Mohammedanism, Buddhism, Brahmanism, investigate Materialism, Pantheism, or what not, by their effects on the Home and the rearing of Children. Turn to the teachings and the resultant homes of Christianity. She will not shirk from the comparison. She challenges it.

THE PROBLEM OF EDUCATION. Let it be the year 1969 or 2019. Another great Conference sits to deliberate on the tangled affairs of men. The nature of their problem, it would be folly to predict. But there will be two features of their situation which can be stated now with surest confidence, features of fundamental, vital, supreme importance,—indeed, one can assert without hesitation that they will be the all-important factors in determining the then situation. One is, the consequences of our present decisions. The other will be, the personal character of the men of that day.

With what attitude of mind and heart will those men look

back upon 1919? How will they think of us? Will they curse our narrow-minded folly or arise and call us blessed? The sole reply to this must be the degree of our recognition of the importance of the first problem, the problem of formative principles. Be our selection of solutions *now*, based on any other than the highest known principles of righteousness, wisdom, spiritual truth, the inevitable effect of lower ideas will have been felt, by their day. Wrongs, sins, lowered standards, baser morals, broken homes, weakened churches, inferior manhood, debased art and literature,—all, at least so characterized in comparison with what *might* have been attained, will be forcing their desperate and deadly conflicts on the darkened lives of man. All these maddened struggles will be made as much more awful than has been our recent conflict, by as much as man has then advanced in the knowledge of hitherto hidden natural forces, which he can then wield with now unprophesiable destructiveness.

But, if happily, we have made the better choice, their problems may happily be only those of ways and means to reach the still nobler and universally happier achievements. Paul again has set before us for all time, The Way. After acute analysis of man's ordinary motives in even the finer activities, he says "And yet I show unto you a more excellent way." Then in words whose perfect beauty and nobility have never been surpassed, he sets forth the Way of Love, "Though I speak with the tongues of men and of angels, and have not love, I am become as sounding brass or a tinkling cymbal," and on through a marvelous recital of Man's possibilities, none of which do ought but curse, if not exalted by and devoted to, purposes of Love;—Christian Love, be it noted, Love based on the Person and Work of Christ. If we by our clear perception of what is involved and required *now*, can turn the steps of the world into that constantly upward reaching trail, then our children may by 2019 be already nearing the heights.

But, much will depend on the character of the manhood

of that day. With what moral conceptions will those men face their problems? With what characters will they confront the temptations of their day? With what intellectual breadth and accuracy will they comprehend their times, or scan the future? Humanly speaking, as far as *we* have power to make or mar, it will *all* depend on the way we shall have educated them.

Education is the sum total of the efforts each generation makes to prepare its children to take up their father's tasks. For by 1969 or 2019 you and I will be in our graves,—all of this generation which now bears on its weary shoulders the burdens of the world, will have perished in the wilderness, not having entered the Promised Land. Other men, with whitening hair, tired faces, saddened countenances, will be striving at the tasks of *then*. Will they be brutaller, crueller, coarser of face and mien than we? What shall prevent? For they will surely be finer of face or coarser? Will it not *all* depend, as far as we are concerned, upon the education we provide for them?

Subtle are the dangers. The wide assumption of education by the State has shaped a system from which, by our separation of Church and State, religion is completely barred. But, in utter defiance of fairness to the mass of Christian citizens whose taxes support these public schools, philosophies, boldly in opposition to religion, may be and often are, openly taught. If the one is barred, the other should be. But they are not. There is constantly pouring into the body politic in consequence a large element of "educated" persons whose attitude toward religion is at least one of indifference and often of pronounced hostility.

The vast, and still to be vaster part, which machinery and applied science play in the business of the world, is responsible for the growing tendency to give the major place in education to the "professional," "material," "technical," "vocational," in fitting the young for their life work. This is necessarily at the expense of the cultural, the develop-

mental, the ideal. But these are absolutely essential in the citizens of a democracy.

Wide-spread evolutionary teachings are tending inevitably and logically to dethrone the religious and spiritual from their place of dominance. But nations do not live by bread alone, "but by every word which proceedeth out of the mouth of God." The "assured results" of modern "Higher Criticism" are rapidly undermining the authority of the Bible and reverence for it. This, in spite of the fact that these so-called "assured results" are not "assured." It is simply false, to say so.

A further consideration of *immense practical import* for citizens of a democracy is the following. Our immense increase in knowledge in every field has become so vast that men can no longer know all. The inevitable is resulting. To be successful in any sphere, to advance knowledge in any line, men must *specialize*. This, at the price of wider vision, with its sure consequence of narrowed sympathies with, and shallower comprehension of, other men's needs and difficulties. But narrow visioned and sympathied men can not vote fairly or justly on general problems.

Many are deluding themselves and others with false educational theories, and thereby are blinded to these confronting dangers. But there can be nothing gained by such a procedure. Our children thus educated,—narrowed, specialized, materialized, in schools divorced from religion,—will be unfitted to play their part in a democracy.

For, that a democracy shall achieve its high ideals of liberty, equality, and fraternity, it must build not merely a state but have a finer citizenship. It needs citizens with sufficient breadth of vision to comprehend the view-point of others, even of men in distant lands. Their sympathies must not be selfishness incarnated, but truly equal to the nobility of self-sacrifice. And sufficiently strongly must these friendly qualities be developed, that many shall have such zeal for unselfish service as shall induce and even morally compel the offer of life for mission work, for uplift

of the degraded, without other reward than the conscience of good deeds. For if the lower peoples be *not* uplifted, then is the League of Nations a farce and a hypocritical sham, a disgrace and a crime.

They must be religious. For only religion furnishes a man with that armament which equips the soul. "Stand fast, therefore, having your loins girt about with truth, and having on the breast-plate of righteousness; and your feet shod with the preparation of the gospel of peace; above all, taking the shield of faith; and take the helmet of salvation and the sword of the Spirit which is the word of God. For we wrestle not against flesh and blood, but against principalities, against powers, against the rulers of the darkness of this world, against spiritual wickedness in high places." How marvelously accurate a description of the true enemies of *our* nobler plans! Germany's highly specialized and materialized and "higher critical" education furnishes quite sufficient evidence of all we have said. At least one excellent authority has told me that in his opinion the matter with Germany was that she was a nation of such "specialists." She was. The inevitable followed. Narrowed in outlook, debased and vitiated in sympathies, weakened in faith and degraded in morals,—her Great Crime became to her no crime, but an achievement.

Our only hope is in Christian education. And here there are considerations of the first importance, pedagogical as well as others.

Biblical History, sympathetically and understandingly studied, (and it is reliable) gives a breadth of mental outlook not surpassed by any other historical discipline. The Doctrines of Historic Christianity, essentially the same in all evangelical denominations, are a training in philosophy, ethics, social principles, world relations, unique in their comprehensiveness,—unique, also, in that their simplicity is accessible to the humblest, yet their vast depth exhausts the most gigantic intellects. There is no better corrective for

the too narrow, too special, too unsocial features of much modern education.

The worship of Christianity constantly uplifts the soul to all that is truly higher in life. It calls all that is pure in Art to its service, makes demands upon every nobler faculty, steadily rebukes the lower, and brings the soul frequently into conscious nearness to God. There is no *better* corrective, (if there be *any* other,) for the imperfect morality of secular education;—for the unceasing warfare of lust and greed against the soul, in daily life; for the powerful tendency to atrophy of the finer capacities, in the pursuit of business and science.

The service of Christianity outspreads the vision to the confines of Earth, for the conquest of all mankind is her divinely appointed duty. It forces respect for one's neighbor and teaches to cherish him and to aid his soul struggles as if one's own. It dispenses charity and sympathy for the lowly, the darkened, the sinning, for "The Son of Man came to seek and to save that which was lost."

An education penetrated with all these features, powerfully indoctrinating with them throughout the formative years of life, and in addition, uplifting all knowledge to the contemplation of its universal Creator, can and it only can, make sure that the anxious-hearted men who shall sit together in 1969 to shape for their posterity, shall not be unequal to their task.

THE PROBLEM OF MANHOOD. After all, every entangled situation, all foul conditions, all sufferings and oppressions, may, humanly speaking, be remedied if those who face them are of sufficiently noble manhood. Between high-minded friends, what separation but may be overcome? Before the assault of men daring all for the right, what stronghold of evil but must submit? All problems wait for their solution for the sufficient number of men of a manhood, sufficiently fine and pure. In their hands, power is safe for others; before their just decisions, the weak find relief; confronted by their uprightness, evils hide. Without their

chivalrous courage,—deprived of their honor,—constitutions become but paper, treaties are but instruments of deceit, fair plans become means for foul deeds.

Socialism, The League of Nations, Democracy, Soviet Republics, Workingmen's Unions, are but schemes, idle dreams, unless *those interests they would serve are equal to the nobility of the scheme.*

In all the discussion of the League of Nations, noblest, perhaps, of all political undertakings, so far, who has asked *whether Man is equal to its demands?* For, the nobler the undertaking, the more difficult its accomplishment,—the severer its strain on human weakness, in proportion to its strong demands. The proposed League makes a clear call for unselfish acquiescence in the common weal. It hopes to end ambition of the lower sort. Glory will fade from the hosts of generals, when War shall be no more. It will requisition all that humanity has of the nobler virtues. It will wage unceasing war on all his weaknesses and sins. This is not written in its Articles, but those Articles can not succeed save as this silent warfare is perpetually and successfully waged.

That therefore religion, education of the fitted sort, high embodiment of principles in the social forms, ennobled homes, are the fundamental work of the League, is clear. Unless to those it shall bend its every energy,—its task, too great for human weakness and sin, will soon be done, ending in sadder failure.

THE PROBLEM OF RELIGION. Menacing seriously all the world's highest interests are two dangers. Be it near or far, there is no question but that all religions save Christianity are confronting dissolution. Their necessary pre-suppositions can not endure the test of science. Their social forms are filled with the suffering which inevitably overtakes all error. That many if not all of them, in their displacement of earlier faiths to make room for themselves, did great good, might be admitted. But their inner imperfections, contradictions, errors of teaching and practice,

mean, when interrogated, that they embody vast essential error and teach, or compromise with, dark sins. For all of this, no effort can prevent the certain suffering in their train. Reform or modification does at best but slightly palliate, not cure. And they have had their day. True, any religion is better than none. The complete divorce of the soul from higher powers leaves her the prey of either the grossest sin or the lowest superstition. "We dare not turn the tiger loose," said Franklin to Paine. For any people the absolute loss of its religion would be an evil so frightful that it is difficult to contemplate. And for the peoples among whom some of these decaying faiths have held sway, there are wanting even the elements of self-control. Reared through centuries of bitter oppression, ages of deep and obscene sins, decades of universal falsity, generations of low and hardened living,—held down by their false faiths, it is true, but equally true, and it is never to be overlooked, *held back from unchecked depravity* by whatever of truth these age-old doctrines may contain,—what cruel eras, what dark scenes, what crash of olden beliefs, what wild devastation, what unchecked license, must face these races, if all their accustomed control be suddenly removed? The resultant calamities will not be confined to their own shores. Witness the spread of Bolshevism.

The second danger strikes more deeply, holds infinitely more prospect of disaster than the first. The only hope of the world being in Christianity, that which assails it, strikes yet more dangerously at the world's well-being. Perhaps never have her ancient faiths been so subtly attacked in her own household as today. The "Higher Criticism," in defiance, often, of arguments to the contrary, has so widely sapped faith in the source of Christianity, the Bible, that the whole system seems at times driving helplessly on the rocks.

For it is not to be denied that the Christianity which has been so benign and beneficent a force in the world, is the *historic form*, as embodied in the recognized creeds of

Christendom. Nor is it to be doubted, that whether the Bible be true or false, these creeds are founded *upon* the Bible, and express summarily its real teachings. They are founded upon it, and themselves accept it *as divinely revealed*, and therefore infallible, in all essential respects, at least. It is not argued whether the Bible deserves this unique place, or not. What is contended is that as an unquestionable historic fact, whatever power Christianity *has* had, *it has derived from this fact*, and it is further urged that if the foundation of Historic Christianity be undermined, its influence will die. For that which will follow will not be Christianity. It will strive to retain the name, (dishonestly, of course, and thereby condemned to disaster,) but it will not be the Christianity which has righteously wrought for 1900 years, and we must face the fact. And that it would be the most tremendous fact of modern times, is not an exaggeration. For the subsidence of Christianity from power among the peoples, its disappearance as a formative factor, would mean the most enormous change in life yet known. No event of the ages would strike so deeply, no occurrence in time would so alter men. For it would concern the nations which *rule* the world, and would vitally alter them. All their controlling principles, all that deeply holds the minds of men in awe, all these profoundest thoughts which finally swerve our fates this way or that, all these would utterly change. How they would change, it is wild to predict, so far as to define their supplanting form. But that they *would* change, who can question?

That now, of all times the world needs to hold fast to its most powerful clue to God, the writer thinks needs no question. For him, Christianity is a divinely revealed belief, given in an unique revelation,—for him, it is the ultimate statement of Truth, which will forever beckon men to higher heights of interpretation. To play upon minute details of its verbal form, is folly, if these methods are exalted to tests of its genuineness, or as disproof of its authority.

But today, in addition, all sorts of attacks are launched

upon her work. Even the War is laid at her door. Her methods, her doctrines, her whole activities, are blamed, criticised, vituperated. It is even asserted that the Coming Democracy will have no room for her at all. The most radical alterations are demanded of her. But no greater calamity could meet society than to attempt these hasty proposals. They come from men not very conversant, in the main, with the true inner workings of the Church, or, at least, hasty in their conclusions. That the powerful and beneficent Methodist bodies, for example, are immediately to re-word their creeds, shatter their Form of Government, abandon their Message of Salvation, and re-organize themselves into Reform Agencies is an idle dream, and a harmful dream. They know their business far too well, the practical men and women who fill the pews, the sane and wise leaders who stand in the pulpits, the able rulers who direct the policies. And this is equally true of other great Christian bodies. But this is the heyday of the street fakir in reform. Most of the charges laid at her door are utterly false, and wholly overlook the fact that the great mass of men and women by whom the War was successfully financed, fought and won, belong to the Church; that the moral insight which made the country willing to enter the War at all was due largely to the lofty lessons of righteousness which she ever proclaims. And so with all the features of the struggle. Had it not been for the Church, for the influence she has silently wielded over the thoughts and ideals of men, the issue had been far different.

But there is danger lest she be turned from her peculiar field. For nothing has the Church been so berated as because she will not consent to abandon her divine mission,—the proclamation of salvation, the preaching of righteousness and the announcement of the need for the power of the Spirit. She is commanded to leave these and to sink to the level of a mere Social Reform Movement. No greater calamity could befall the world than for this to happen. To cease to be the chief agency which links men

to God, to check her steady directing to the heights of effort, to relax her calls to definite conversion of life—this would be the greatest calamity which could befall the world. Historic Christianity, faithful to her belief in her unique and divine mission is and should continue, the world's greatest moral force.

THE PROBLEM OF MISSIONS. The supreme task of the Church is the fulfillment of her goal, the conquest of the world for Christ. Nor can the task delay. The needs of the world, the menacing problems at hand and imminent, the swiftly increasing discovery of means of destruction, swiftly decaying religions and loosening moral bonds, upsurging class and race hatreds, loss of old means of protection, huge masses of desperate races ready to roll in devastating flood, loss of faith to steady the souls of men, forgetfulness of God in scorning his Word,—these are a dark, cyclonic portentous sky-covering cloud. That it all gives the men at Versailles anxious thought, who can doubt? At home and abroad, the Church needs must rally her forces, for the hour is at hand. She must bid defiance to all who challenge her faith, and boldly reassert her ancient doctrines. She must proclaim the necessity for her task and its need for haste. She must summon men to her standards by virtue of warfare which tries men's souls and inner courage more than the trenches of France, which tests their manhood more than the submarine, which has as its consequence the downfall of Humanity if she fail, or the glorious establishment of the Kingdom of God on Earth, if she succeed. She has no lesser aim than the enthronement of the Prince of Peace.

Fulton, Mo.

DANIEL S. GAGE.

REVIEWS OF RECENT LITERATURE

APOLOGETICAL THEOLOGY

The Open Light, An inquiry into Faith and Reality (The Christian Revolution Series, Volume IV.). By NATHANAEAL MICKLEM, M.A., Sometime Scholar of New College, Tutor and Chaplain at Mansfield College, Oxford. With Foreword by Rev. H. Arnold Thomas, M.A., LL.D. (of Bristol). 8vo., pp. 166. London: Headley Bros. Publishers, Ltd., 72 Oxford Street, Wi. 1919.

This book is "an open letter" to "the many who have an instinct or intuition that in Christianity, though hidden and overlaid, there lies the fulfilment of man's need and the answer of his questionings"; and its hope is that it "may help to make Christianity appear both more reasonable and more beautiful" to such.

This new theodicy—for that Mr. Micklem's discussion really is—is carefully thought out, is frank and fearless, is usually suggestive and often illuminating, and is clearly and in many places brilliantly written.

Its key-word is the following paragraph (p. 58): "God, we have seen, must be a person; Jesus, Whose life was love, is the perfect person; therefore God is eternally what Jesus was in time. Thus we have ascended to the first great principle of the Christian religion, from which all theology derives, or should derive, namely that Jesus is the complete and final revelation of the character of God, and that when we would know what God is we must set our eyes upon Jesus to the exclusion of all else."

The weak point is this theodicy, and, indeed, its condemnation, is its misconception of Christ's love. This is set forth out of relation to righteousness, if not as directly opposed to it. Hence, God is to be conceived as love only. In the last analysis this one attribute exhausts his being. Now this is neither true nor workable.

It is not true. Christ was the great revealer of the eternal love of God for sinners. But he revealed also, and just as clearly, the eternal wrath of God against sin. "These" that is impenitent sinners, "shall go away into eternal punishment, (Matt. xxv. 46) where their worm dieth not and the fire is not quenched" (Mark ix. 48). Words clearer and more awful than these in their revelation of the retributive justice of God there could not be; and it becomes us to remember that they were spoken, not by mediaeval theologians, but by him whom our author would represent as a God of love only. Could there be a more glaring misrepresentation?

Nor is this conception of God any more workable than it is true. Love that is only love cannot be love at its highest. The cross is the symbol of such love for the reason that its meaning is that God might "be just in his grace and yet the justifier of him that believeth in

Jesus" (Rom. iii. 26). Regard the cross merely as the expression of divine sympathy with sinners; and at once the question presses, Would that sympathy be worth anything? Who would care for the love of a being who would sacrifice his Son simply to show sympathy. Such injustice need only to be mentioned to be felt to be intolerable. The natural heart cries out against it. Such love stands condemned by its injustice.

Indeed such love cannot endure. In the long run unrighteousness destroys itself, and so it is only as on a foundation of truth and right that we can believe in eternal love.

Beyond this, on the basis of our author a theodicy is out of the question. Strictly speaking, the conception of it is impossible. To justify the ways of God to man implies the primacy of right. Otherwise, there would be no meaning in such attempt. It is difficult to justify the world, if God be conceived as "righteous in all his ways and holy in all his works" (Ps. cxlv. 17); but it is an absurdity to try to do so if he be only love. In the former *God* can make "the wrath of man to praise him," and so can vindicate his permission of sin; in the latter evil must remain not only unexplained but unjustified, for *love* apart from moral considerations will never permit evil that it can prevent.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

Truths Tested by the World War. By CLARENCE EDWARD MACARTNEY, Pastor of the Arch Street Presbyterian Church. 8vo., pp. 48. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication and Sabbath School Work. 1919.

A more timely publication than this by Dr. Macartney could not be. He combats the common cry that the soldiers returning from the great war are going to revolutionize society and especially religion and above all the Christian religion and most of all the Presbyterian form of it. This he does by presenting the fundamentals of our faith and then showing how each one of these has been confirmed by the experience of the war. His treatment is always suggestive and usually satisfying, but in the case of the doctrine of the atonement and that of the resurrection of the body it seems to us peculiarly happy.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

Religion and Culture. A Critical Survey of Methods of Approach to Religious Phenomena. By FREDERICK SCHLISTER, PH.D. 8vo., pp. x, 206. New York: Columbia University Press. 1919.

This book is precisely what its sub-title declares it to be—"a critical survey of methods of approach to religious phenomena." To outline it, it discusses: "Difficulties involved in the attempt to describe religion at large or apart from its cultural setting"; "Universal laws based upon the intensive study of a limited geographical area or historical period"; "The comparative method and the classical unilinear, evolutionary series"; "The problem of the correct interpretation of ethnogra-

phical analoga"; "The relation between magic and religion"; "Spirit as the primordium"; "Magical power as the primordium"; "The anomalous position of emanation and the specific powers and properties of physical bodies;" "The relation of causality to magic, religion and other phases of culture"; "The application of the concept of convergence in the interpretation of causality. Unconscious mental processes."

These various topics are discussed out of a knowledge of the literature, and with a keenness and thoroughness, that leave nothing to be desired. Yet the result is not satisfying. One does not feel that he has gotten anywhere. To quote the author's own words in his criticism of the "Comparative Method" (p. 41), "The facts to which reference is made are so enormously complex and diversified, that, by means of a rigid selection carried out in the service of a special point of view, almost any specific theoretical point can be 'proved'."

Moreover, we cannot divest ourselves of the suspicion—and, indeed, it is much more than a mere suspicion—that this and all attempts to study religion in its lowest terms, its "irreducible minimum," are fundamentally wrong. This would be so even if we could be sure that we had reached the minimum. The point of the whole matter is that it is not in the minimum that we discern most clearly and fully the essence that we are seeking. In this connection what could be more significant and instructive than the following quotation from Edward Caird's "The Evolution of Religion," Vol. I, p. 48? "We may undoubtedly lay it down that the phenomena of the beginning of a life are not to be regarded as the *causes* of the phenomena that follow; but that the former as imperfect manifestations of the principle which is more completely manifested in the latter. Beneath the most elementary phenomena of life there is a unity, which is not exhausted in them; a unity which grows by subordinating the environment to itself, and which, through all its stages, maintain its identity with itself, while it enlarges its sphere of manifestation. This unity, therefore, is the more clearly manifested the further we advance along the line of development. Hence, we cannot from an examination of the first stage of a development pronounce any final judgment whether for good or ill upon the later results of it."

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

Religion and Intellect, A New Critique of Theology. By DAVID GRAHAM of Gray's Inn, Barrister-At-Law, Author of "The Grammar of Philosophy," etc. 8vo., pp. xx, 157. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 38 George St. 1919.

This is avowedly an earnest plea for the enthronement of reason in theology and religion. It is really a bitter attack on churches and clergymen for banishing reason from theology and religion. The author is a Scotch lawyer who has been a wide reader of English literature and a careful reader of philosophy, but whose acquaintance with theology and religion would seem to be somewhat limited. If

he would read Butler's "Analogy," especially Part Second, and above all, Hodge's "Systematic Theology," Vol. 1. chap. 3, the sections in which is discussed "The Proper Office of Reason in Matters of Religion," he would find all that is essential in his own plea for the enthronement of reason stated as clearly as even he could wish and without the defects of his own presentation. Until he has done this, or something equivalent to it, there can be no reason, as there could be no ground, for argument with him.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

Is The World Growing Better? By JAMES H. SNOWDEN, Professor of Systematic Theology in the Wetsrn Theological Seminary, Pittsburgh, Pa. The Macmillan Co. New York, 1919. Price \$1.60.

"Let every weary soul and fainting heart take courage. . . . The universe is friendly. . . . 'Wait on the Lord; be of good courage and he shall strengthen thine heart.' This is the meaning and message of this book." In his own words, taken from the foreword, these brief sentences introduce to us Dr. Snowden's book. The world is studied from many aspects to show that optimism is preëminently reasonable. The titles of the chapters will best outline the argument followed. They are: Fundamental Question of Philosophy; A Practical Question of Experience; Good Out of Evil; Human Responsibility; Dark Views Descriptive Rather Than Comparative; Material Progress; Intellectual Progress; Ethical and Social Progress; The Bible and Progress; Religious Progress; the World War and a Better World; The Evolution of the Ages; Some General Objections Considered; Building the New World; All Things Working Together for Good; Practical Optimism; The Blessed Hope.

A pessimist was once defined as one who took pleasure in fletcherizing his quinine pills. Such a one would not be helped or cheered by this book. But to others it will bring refreshment and encouragement to work with added zest and zeal. The argument is clear, cogent, and convincing. It is cumulative and reaches a climax with the next to the last chapter. "The Blessed Hope" comes more as a benediction than as part of the argument itself. A certain cheeriness about the style with its avoidance of long chapters makes it pleasant and easy reading.

The chief points in which the book offers itself to unfavorable criticism are its too superficial treatment of certain of the positions opposed to its contention, and, its estimate of the present world situation and glowing prophesies for the near future.

The first of these criticisms naturally arises when reading the chapter on the Bible and Progress. Dr. Snowden's argument does give a true outline of some of the Scripture teaching which supports his views but it is not comprehensive enough nor does it provide the needed instruments to cut away the webs of false teaching now so industriously woven to ensnare the unwary Christian. This is unfortunate as amongst Christian people who believe the world is getting worse the

majority would probably be found to give as their chief evidence that "the Bible says so." The chapter on Religious Progress shows the same failing. The method is too fragmentary. The touch is too light. Too frequent use of quotation gives the impression of lack of original, personal, hard thinking. The very factors that make the book so easy to read weaken its force.

The second criticism is more serious. The reader accepting the general truth of what has gone before will come to the discussion of the present times with a certain feeling that now he stands on firm ground where he can judge from his personal experience. He will probably have strong political convictions and may regard certain things as marks of retrogression which another may hail as proofs of advance. Therefore we must view with regret the author's treatment of this as such a "plastic age" and as giving us "such an opportunity as the world has never had before," his trust in democracy as so potent for good, his dream of the disappearance of war forever because of the developing common-sense of men, and his connecting his belief with the improvement of the world with a program of Internationalism, although he is careful to guard his use of this term. Unfortunately these phrases have come to be too much the stock in trade of a certain group of would-be reformers who rejoice in glittering generalities and are the venders of panaceas.

There are two varieties of optimists at present claiming public attention. One group trusts in the fundamental goodness and reasonableness of man. It maintains that if man is only given the opportunity and the freedom to develop he will work his own glorious career and bring on the Age of Gold. To do this he will use various instruments the chief of which will be Democracy. This will work miracles, change man's nature, and by placing new laws on the statute books bring him into lasting peace with all his fellows in all the world. Man is the center of all. Man is glorious and to be trusted. Religion is man's minister, developed by him. God is in man's image and He ought to be very proud of the fact.

The other group places all its hope for betterment in God. It sees Him in mercy reaching down to save man who is of himself little, with but rudimentary perceptions, full of sin and perverted by it. Therefore little trust is placed on any eternal condition or arrangement to remove from men any of the fundamental evils under which he suffers. Neither industrial or international peace can be permanently assured to man by any agreement or treaty. Democracy can accomplish nothing unless the men forming it are changed within. Various laws and international agreements may be very useful to fix progress already made but they can of themselves do nothing to make men better. God can bring on the better age and God is bringing it on by His power working in man and in all that surrounds him. The question of the world's growing better resolves itself into the other question whether men are coming to know God better and to obey Him more faithfully. The need of man is not to make a God more

in harmony with his own desires but to make his life more in harmony with the desires of God.

We would suggest therefore that if Dr. Snowden sends forth a second edition of this cheerful and helpful little book he modify his discussions of present day conditions and his confidence in certain suggested reconstructions of national and international affairs and that he emphasize the work of God in saving the world from sin and so bringing in the better age that is to be.

Princeton.

GORDON M. RUSSELL.

The Idea of Immortality, its Development and Value. By GEORGE GALLOWAY, D.Phil., D.D., Principal and Primarius Professor of Divinity, St. Mary's College, University of St. Andrews. The Baird Lecture, 1917. 8vo., pp. viii, 234. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 38 George St. 1919.

This is a difficult book to review. The reviewer finds himself, from first to last, so thoroughly in accord, both with the purpose and with the development of the argument, that he can only praise; and even praise, if long continued and uninterrupted, is sure to become monotonous.

In his first chapter our author discusses the necessity of the rise of the problem of immortality, the mediaeval and the modern attitudes toward it, how it is influenced by the idea of evolution, the failure of the older proofs of it, the temper of the age with regard to it, the bearing on it of the tremendous crisis arising out of the war, the far-reaching importance of the subject, and what is meant by immortality, holding that the immortality contended for must be personal, and cannot be mere endlessness: "it is fulness and completeness of life."

Having thus introduced his subject, Dr. Galloway goes on to its discussion. He begins by tracing the development of the idea of a future life. He sketches broadly its growth from the lower to the higher culture. Thus he shows that "the conception is a genuine outgrowth of man's nature and represents a persistent human demand."

He then takes up the attitude of science to this question and decides that it is not in a position to draw conclusions either favorable or adverse to the idea. At this point, however, he asks, "whether the facts of biology do not require us to postulate a soul or principle of unity in organic life," and by a clear and in every way satisfactory argument he shows that they do. "That this principle, after it attains its highest development in man, has a reality for itself and does not perish with the present material body" is not incompatible, he claims, with the evidence, although it goes beyond it; and thus science may be regarded as even on the side of immortality, in that it proves a spiritual principle that further evidence may show to be immortal. In this connection he refers to the labours of the Society of Psychical Research: and by a very careful and eminently judicial criticism he reaches the conclusion that "on the most favorable view the inferences drawn from Psychical Research do not warrant a belief in immortality. On any showing they do not imply more than a limited survival of the soul after death.

The evidence, even when rated at the highest, cannot carry us further than a conviction that the souls of the departed linger on in a kind of attenuated existence, and may be utterly extinguished. There is a great contrast between this survival and eternal life." Our author turns, next, to "the conception of immortality as a historic problem of philosophy and endeavors to form an estimate of what the speculative treatment of the question has yielded. He passes in review Plato's discussion of the subject, the dualism of Descartes in relation to it, the theories of Spinoza and Leibnitz, Kant's criticism, those of Hegel and Lotze, and the views of Bradley and Bosanquet. The conclusion to which this survey brings him is "that a metaphysical proof of God will always fall short of demonstration." On the other hand, however, he claims that it "is quite competent for us to criticize a metaphysical system which excludes the possibility of immortality, as the pantheistic schemes of Bradley and Bosanquet do; and to show that they involve inconsistency or do some injustice to the data of experience. But this is not all. If philosophy cannot offer logical proof, it "can at least indicate possibilities and throw out suggestions; and this Dr. Galloway proceeds to do by presenting "a basis for the doctrine of immortality." This basis he finds in the type of thought which discovers "in individuality the key to the meaning of reality." Yet even this key he is careful to say that he does not regard as sufficient. "Here, as in the other ultimate problems of the universe, the patient and ever-searching reason gives place at the last to the upward vision of faith." "The failure of speculative thought to demonstrate immortality is a valid postulate of the moral consciousness."

Accordingly, our author takes up "the ethical argument for immortality." He raises the question whether the conception can be put forward as an ethical postulate or not. That is, "Is immortality necessary to the coherency of our world of values, or, in a large sense, to the rationality of our universe?" That it is, he argues, with Plato, on the ground of "justice," and, with Kant, on the ground of "the incompleteness of man's moral life." He shows how these two arguments tend to coalesce. He examines various objections to them. He denies the possibility of a corporate immortality apart from personality. Indeed, it is only in personal immortality that we can find "the meaning of progress and the goal of social development." Yet even for this great conception we must not claim too much. It gives us no information about the content of the idea, nor does it tell us how it is to be realized. It can not be a mere replica of this life. It offers a solution of the problems under discussion only because it implies the transformation of the present material form of existence. But after all, "it doth not yet appear what we shall be." There must be a world to come: the world that is demands it: that world, however, must be experienced to be known. "Immortality is the object of faith, not of sight; but it is a faith which can give a reason for itself."

"The last chapter considers the place of immortality in a religious view of the world." "Do the demands of the religious consciousness require us to find a place for it in the spiritual scheme of things?" They do. "The ideas of God and immortality develop together." A genuine theism is found to be the best support to the hope of human immortality. This is clearly illustrated in the history of the doctrine in Judaism and in Christianity. As the conception of Jahveh unfolded itself it was felt that for him to leave the souls of the faithful in Sheol was inconceivable; and Christ reveals God in such a character, and so raises our idea of humanity, that its immortality naturally follows. Beyond this, the ethical view of life presupposes and so reinforces the religious view. "The truth is, the ethical conception of life cannot stand by itself: we must either try to reduce it to the natural or carry it up into the spiritual. The former attempt cannot possibly succeed. The alternative is the frank recognition that the ethical view of man and his vocation, when its implications are thought out, leads up to the religious end" and thus joins it in its demand for immortality. In a word, faith in the character of God, especially as revealed in Jesus Christ, is both the last and the sufficient ground of hope of and confidence in our immortality. We must trust him, and we cannot trust him and doubt it. In this connection we must regret that our author speaks just as he does of our Lord's resurrection. We agree with Dr. Galloway that the uniqueness of our Saviour's person forbids our arguing that because he rose we must rise, too; but we wish that he had added and emphasized that all who are "in Christ," because vitally united with him, shall rise and live and reign with him. The doctrine of the union of believers with Christ is as true and as pertinent as is the doctrine of the uniqueness of his person, and there is as much reason why we should argue from the latter as why we should not argue from the former. We must register a dissent, too, from our author's position (p. 224) that belief in the eternal punishment of the impenitent "cannot be reconciled with the Christian idea of God as the living Ground of the universe and the Supreme Spirit 'from whom and through and to whom are all things.'" The continued existence of evil in this sense does not indicate any failure of the divine redeeming purpose. What it does indicate is that God's glorious justice demands eternal praise and, therefore, eternal manifestation as truly as do "the unsearchable riches of his grace." Because God is God, every side of his nature calls for everlasting expression; and if vindictory justice were not one side of his nature, he would be in so far forth defective. It is for the reason that we are ourselves sinners that we find it hard to believe that "God is angry with the wicked every day" and forever.

Perhaps what is most interesting and in one way most important in these Baird Lectures is the section of the fourth lecture in which, as we have observed, the attempt is made to lay "a philosophical basis" for the doctrine of immortality. This attempt seems to us successful. It is, however, too long for us to reproduce and it is too good as

well as too concise for us to abridge. Suffice it to say that it commends itself to reason as possible and even as probable; and that between it and Christian doctrine, as for example the resurrection of the body, there are points of contact and of apparent agreement which commend it further. Of course, there are still difficulties. No one realizes this more keenly than does the author. What shall be the manner of the life eternal? What shall be the continuity between that and the life that now is? As to this and more he leaves us on his own confession confronting a mystery. All that he knows, all that reason can tell us, is that "death stands for a great change." At best it is still "the great adventure." How thankful should we be that we may make it in the arms of him who is not only our "friend that sticketh closer than a brother," but also he who is himself "the resurrection and the life" through whose Gospel "life and immortality have been brought to light." That for the Christian this will be the deepest and most abiding impression of this book, we are sure will not disappoint its author.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.,

SYSTEMATICAL THEOLOGY

Theology as an Empirical Science. By DOUGLAS CLYDE MACINTOSH, Ph.D., Dwight Professor of Theology in Yale University, Author of "The Problem of Knowledge," and "God in a World at War." New York, The Macmillan Co., 1919. Pp. 270.

In this volume Dr. MacIntosh seeks to set forth what he terms an empirical theology, and thus to vindicate for theology a place among the sciences by showing its truly scientific character.

Theology in the days of its supremacy, Dr. MacIntosh says, was defined as the science of God. This definition has been attacked and the more modest one substituted, to the effect that theology is the intellectual expression of religion. The time has come, he thinks, for a counter-attack which will render theology more objective and vindicate its right to be called a science. But this counter-attack must start out from "where theology now is," and whatever else it may be, theology is at least "the intellectual expression of religion," or more definitely "the intellectual expression of experimental religion."

In defining theology in this way, however, Dr. MacIntosh does not think that theology deals with religion as its object or subject matter. The object of theology is God as revealed in religious experience and the history of religions, taking the term 'experience' in its broadest sense. For theology consists of ideas, and the function of ideas is to give intellectual expression to religious experience, to represent by means of ideas the divine reality with which religion is concerned, and in turn to guide to right religious experience.

Such being the case the question is whether theology as "descriptive

of the divine reality" can be made scientific, and by scientific Dr. MacIntosh tells us that he means, not logical harmony with presuppositions, which might be attained by a merely *a priori* method but that modern science admits assumptions and presuppositions only to test them by facts of experience. Theology to become scientific must therefore become empirical, *i.e.*, it must follow the inductive method and must show that, apart from mystical intuition or rational speculation, we have an empirical knowledge of God.

For Dr. MacIntosh this does not mean merely that in our own religious experience we have some knowledge of God, but that theism is the best hypothesis to explain the phenomena of the universe. Thus he lays a basis for a broader and more adequate view of theological knowledge than the so-called experiential theology. He does not reject the theistic arguments nor the idea of a historical revelation in stating his conception of theology as an empirical science, but at the same time in working out his theological views he does not adhere to these above stated principles, and seems to follow to a great extent the method of the experiential theology strictly so-called.

Haing rejected what he terms the "traditional method" because it recognizes an external authority in the Scripture, and rationalism because it is speculative and *a priori* in its method, Dr. MacIntosh proceeds to criticize other views and methods in theology which claim to be empirical. Two types of theology, he says, make this claim—Mysticism and Eclecticism.

Mysticism is rejected by Dr. MacIntosh as dogmatic and too aloof from ordinary experience. He then turns his attention to a criticism of several types of what he calls Eclecticism. This general type of method he terms eclectic because it "picks and chooses" its theological beliefs without compulsion from authority, from mystical intuition, or rational speculation. It has appeared in several types. The first of these is purely individualistic; is based too much on one's likes and dislikes; and is wholly subjective and arbitrary. The eclectic method has, however, sought "social norms" of truth. These are either "religio-psychological" or "religio-historical." The former method is seen in Schleiermacher, and the latter—though in a different way in each—in Ritschl and Troeltsch.

The former method as exhibited especially in Schleiermacher, Dr. MacIntosh criticises as too subjective and as giving no principle by which the truly Christian religious consciousness can be determined, and no norm for determining what doctrines express the Christian consciousness.

The latter method, the "religio-historical," is exhibited first of all by Ritschl. He sought more objectivity than Schleiermacher by appealing to revelation through the historical Christ, but as he never got beyond a mere religious evaluation of this Christ, Ritschl's method also suffers from subjectivity.

The "religio-historical" method as seeking more universal norms of truth is seen in Troeltsch. By virtue of its more universal basis in the

history of religion and its emphasis on rationality as a criterion of truth, Troeltsch's method is more objective than that of Ritschl. But his method does not avail, according to Dr. MacIntosh, to render theology scientific. His "eclectic approval" of Christianity for our time and place and culture is symptomatic of its incurable subjectivity, while its appeal to reason endangers it of falling into the mistakes of Rationalism.

Wobbermin, who calls his method "religio-psychological," adopts really a combination of all the preceding eclectic methods, and it is rejected by Dr. MacIntosh as falling into all their mistakes.

A final eclectic method is the pragmatic one which tests its alleged truths by their workableness in experience and life. But this method, while meeting with more approval from Dr. MacIntosh than any of the preceding ones, is nevertheless rejected as unscientific and as leading only to postulates, not to scientific propositions truly verified.

Accordingly Dr. MacIntosh believes that theology has not yet attained a strictly scientific character, and his aim is to set forth a theology which shall be a truly empirical science.

Theology as an empirical science, Dr. MacIntosh says, depends on religious experience. But theology is not the same as the psychology of religion. All religious experience is proper material for the psychology of religion, but this science has no criterion for distinguishing between truth and falsehood, and between true and false religions and religious ideas. Nor can the psychology of religion say anything about the existence or nature of God. Empirical theology, on the contrary, is dealing with an object known through experience, *i.e.* God. Hence the empirical theologian will have to select from the manifold of religious experience those elements which give a knowledge of God. Consequently he must have norms of truth for detecting that in religious experience which truly gives a revelation of God. Accordingly there are three "crucial problems" for theology as an empirical science—first, is there a knowledge of God as revealed in religious experience? Second, can we formulate laws, on the basis of the data available in religious experience, as to what God will do upon the fulfilment by us of certain discoverable conditions? Third, can theological theory be constructed on the basis of these laws? The answer to the first two of these questions gives us the "data" of empirical theology, back of which data, however, lie the "presuppositions" of empirical theology, and the work of theology as an empirical science culminates in answering the third question by the construction of theological "theory" or doctrine about God.

The presuppositions of empirical theology are the laws of thought and such assumptions as are common to scientific investigation of any sort. There is also to be presupposed all well established results of other sciences. Among this class of presuppositions will come the history and psychology of religion, including the results of historical criticism of sacred books, especially those of the New Testament, particularly in regard to their account of Jesus. There is also presup-

posed the existence of God; that He can be known directly through experience; the immortality of the soul; and the fact of sin and its evil consequences. Part I of the volume is occupied in five chapters with the discussions of these presuppositions of theology.

Having the presuppositions of theology, the empirical theologian must come to a clear understanding as to the empirical "data" and "laws" of theology. The empirical data will embrace all instances of revelation "of the divine in human experience," *i.e.* we must discriminate the "divine" or revealing elements in experience. This is what constitutes revelation. At this point, however, Dr. MacIntosh departs from the broad conception of religious experience as outlined above, and seems to take the term in an individualistic and subjective sense. In the experience of "spiritual uplift," he tells us, through religious dependence, there is an intuitive perception in experience of a Power that makes for a certain type of result (ethical and spiritual) in response to "right adjustment" to it. We recognize its divineness because its quality is characteristic of the religious object. In the religious experience of ourselves and in that of others, then, we have what Dr. MacIntosh calls "a religious apperception," a revelation of God in experience. In passing we may remark that this would seem to imply some previous and predetermining knowledge of God. This is a difficulty which Dr. MacIntosh does not clear up, but we hasten on to the further exposition of his views.

This experiential knowledge of God is found also in the historical religions, especially in Christianity in the Person and Work of Christ. This latter, to which two chapters are devoted, is to be conceived in accordance with the view of Christ given by the results of that particular type of historical criticism of the New Testament already presupposed. Dr. MacIntosh outlines a more radical and a more conservative view of Christ, *i.e.* more radical or more conservative in its attitude toward the sources, but the results differ only in regard to the interpretation of Christ's Messianic consciousness. In each case in accordance with the type of naturalistic criticism already presupposed, Christ is a mere man; His deity, according to Dr. MacIntosh, being the presence in Him of God's spirit. This Dr. MacIntosh calls a "metaphysical deity" as distinguished from one of mere "evaluation" as seen in the Ritschlian theology. It is in these chapters on the "empirical data" of theology, that the discussion of the Person and Work of Christ finds its place in the author's system.

After ascertaining the data from revelation in Christ, the empirical theologian turns inward to the revelation in the Christian experience of salvation. Here he finds such data as "conviction of sin," repentance, faith, regeneration, perseverance, fulness of the Spirit, sanctification or growth in grace. The whole series of ideas usually treated in systematic theology under the "Application of Redemption," thus find their discussion here as simply "data of empirical theology."

Having set forth "the empirical data" of theology, the empirical theologian must state "general laws" on the basis of his empirical data.

This he does, first by making hypotheses and testing them by experience. These hypotheses are to be taken from "pre-scientific" views on religious matters. Then a second way of arriving at general laws is to start from particular facts of religious experience, and by the application of the methods of induction outlined by J. S. Mill, the theologian can state the laws of spiritual experiences or empirical data such as salvation, regeneration, conversion, &c., *i.e.* the spiritual "data" whose laws are to be stated.

Thus far, according to Dr. MacIntosh, we have not left the sphere of experience and generalization on the basis of experience. But empirical theology has a final task. It has to construct a "theological theory" or doctrine of God on the basis of, and to account for, the preceding data and laws. In a word, the empirical theologian must seek a doctrine of what God is, to account for what He does, as Dr. MacIntosh puts it. Here the method is similar to that pursued in determining the laws of theology. The theologian is to start from pre-scientific intuitions of experimental religion and test them by criticism. When this is done, a distinction will readily be found between what a plain man of profound religious experience "really knows and what he only thinks he knows." Another inductive method to be followed in constructing "theological theory," is to start by postulating the view of God "which seems practically necessary," and then to prove or refute it by proving or refuting the necessary deductions from it. Following this method in Part III on "Theological Theory," the author states his doctrine of the moral attributes of God, the metaphysical attributes of God, the relation of God to the universe, and eschatological deductions, in four successive chapters, closing with a chapter on the Problem of Evil. He concludes the volume with an Appendix giving a sketch of the philosophy of religion, and its relation to theology as an empirical science.

We have used so much space in speaking of merely formal and methodological questions that the reader of this notice may feel that we have given no idea of the author's concrete doctrinal positions. This, however, is because this formal element appears to be the one of chief interest to the author and constitutes all that is distinctive about his book. His theological positions are not new. Thus his view of the metaphysical attributes of God, in a general way, may be characterized as Ritschlian. God, for example, is powerful enough to guard and save us, and this is all that the Divine omnipotence means. God knows enough to guide His omnipotence as thus conceived. He knows enough of the present and the future for the realization of this purpose of salvation. This is what His omniscience signifies. This is called by the author a "pragmatic" and "experimental" view of these Divine attributes. As to the Trinity, Dr. MacIntosh's view may be said to resemble modalism; the doctrine of the Christian Church on this subject is explicitly denied. His view of the Person of Christ is humanitarian. He claims to assert the deity of Christ. He criticises the Ritschlian view as reducing Christ's deity to a mere "evaluation"

of Jesus, whereas he asserts that the Divine Spirit dwelt in Christ more than in other men. But he establishes no qualitative difference between Christ and Christians. Dr. MacIntosh's view of the Atonement is a form of the Moral Influence theory.

The nature of his theology is thus apparent. What is of interest is whether he has validated his claim to make theology scientific and whether he has grounded his claim of the truth of the theological views which he sets forth. It is accordingly to these underlying questions that we shall direct our attention in some closing remarks.

No one can quarrel with the use of the inductive method in theology. It is the only possible method if theology is to be a science. But the application of the inductive method of itself will not suffice to render theology scientific. To this end it is necessary that its "data" or objects be real, and its presuppositions well grounded. It is here that we believe that Dr. MacIntosh fails, and that he fails not only in the grounding of his presuppositions, but also that he forsakes induction and becomes dogmatic.

The first great presupposition is the real knowledge of God in experience and in Christ. In regard to the former, Dr. MacIntosh claims that we have an intuitive perception of God in the experience of "spiritual uplift." Here we experience a Power whose "divineness" we recognize because its quality is "characteristic of the religious object." But how do we know what quality or qualities are characteristic of the religious object? Dr. MacIntosh does not tell us. But obviously it can only be through an idea of God derived from revelation in nature and the human mind. In using the term revelation in this connection we do not depart from experience, but use the term experience in a broader sense that the mere feeling of dependence to which Dr. MacIntosh appeals. This is only to say that a conception of God derived from general revelation conditions our general religious consciousness, and is presupposed by it. We do not get our knowledge of God directly through religious feeling.

In regard to revelation of God in Christ, Dr. MacIntosh cannot justify his claim that we know God especially in Christ. He says it is because we know that God is "Christlike." But how do we know this? Not because Christ is divine in any real sense; not because Christ is an authoritative teacher; but only because Christ is seen to be what Dr. MacIntosh would like God to be on "pragmatic" grounds. On such grounds Dr. MacIntosh cannot get beyond Troeltsch's idea that Christianity is the best religion we have experienced thus far in human history. He cannot show that Christ really reveals God. In claiming more than Troeltsch does he goes beyond what he can prove, and so cannot claim that his theology is scientific.

Or look at his other great presupposition, that of the results of the historical criticism of the New Testament, and the resulting view of Jesus. It is not scientific to presuppose as settled the results of a historical criticism determined by naturalism. Theology of course cannot hope to be scientific in the sense of escaping ultimate philos-

ophical problems. The New Testament gives one account of the origin of Christianity—a supernatural one. If this is believed to be absolutely impossible then some naturalistic explanation of the origin of Christianity must be sought. But if not impossible, then the question remains whether the New Testament explanation is not the most reasonable and adequate. Dr. MacIntosh simply assumes and presupposes a naturalistic philosophy and the results of a historical criticism determined by it. He makes no attempt even to answer objections to the older liberal view which he seems to presuppose, a view very much called in question not only by other types of so-called historical criticism likewise determined by naturalism, but as well by believers in the New Testament. Dr. MacIntosh has not grounded his naturalism; he has not grounded his particular explanation of the origin of Christianity. After saying that the historical sources are Mark, Q. and Paul's letters, Dr. MacIntosh of course finds the miraculous element and the high claims of Jesus in his sources. He then proceeds to go back of his sources in a matter of pure conjecture, not of scientific induction from established facts. The fact that others have done this before does not render his procedure scientific. Where he thinks he can explain a miracle of healing in a naturalistic way, he adopts this explanation. In cases where the account occurs in his sources, and the miracle is a physical one which he cannot explain, he says that "possibly" we ought to accept the hypothesis of a gradual addition of legendary details to a story of what was originally a natural event. Where the claims of Jesus in his sources are inconvenient for his theory, he attempts some explanation which will go behind the sources and save the intellectual and moral integrity of Jesus. Hence it is perfectly clear that Dr. MacIntosh has left behind scientific and inductive method, and simply presupposes an anti-supernaturalistic philosophy. He would reply that the believer in the New Testament accepts a supernaturalistic view of the world. This is true. But this simply goes to show that there are certain philosophical or metaphysical presuppositions underlying historical criticism as well as theology, which presuppositions must be adequately grounded if theology is to claim to be a science. Dr. MacIntosh, as we said, makes no attempt to ground his naturalistic presuppositions. He simply presupposes a naturalistic philosophy and one type of naturalistic historical criticism—a type by no means accepted by all naturalistic critics of the New Testament. All this is purely arbitrary, and is not scientific procedure at all. No historical student of the New Testament can avoid these ultimate questions, be he naturalistic or super-naturalistic. We think, however, that it is not too much to say that the New Testament account of the origin of Christianity is the most reasonable one if supernaturalism is possible, and that supernaturalism is possible to believe if one is a theist. But Dr. MacIntosh is a theist. It is without justification, therefore, that he presupposes a naturalistic view of God's relation to the world, and then seeks to explain away the supernaturalistic element in the New

Testament in the manner we have indicated. To justify his claim that his theology is scientific he would have to show that, though we believe in God, He cannot act in a supernatural manner, and then he would have to show that the type of naturalistic explanation of Christianity which he simply presupposes as if it were universally accepted in scientific critical circles, is the most reasonable one in view of ascertained facts.

In point of fact, Dr. MacIntosh does not even follow the method he advocates in many places where he is constructing his theological "theory." He simply takes the doctrines of the Christian Church, and subjects them to a criticism from the point of view of what he calls "the modern man," drawing from these doctrines what he regards as the essential truth which he thinks has found faulty expression in the Christian doctrine. Here his procedure is identical with that of the old liberal theology and with that of some types of rationalism which he has condemned as unscientific.

The road which leads to a science of theology or a theology which is a science, leads through many a rocky pass of philosophical and historical Apologetics. It is not so easy as the smooth way traversed in this volume.

Princeton.

C. W. HODGE.

The Creeds and Modern Thought. A Paper Read at Christ Church, Oxford before the Nicene and Origen Societies on December 5th., 1918, to which are added Brief Notes on the Discussion. By CHARLES HARRIS, D.D., Late Lecturer in Theology, St. David's College, Lampeter, Examining Chaplain to the Bishop of Llandoff. London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1919. Pp. 61.

In this paper Dr. Harris distinguishes between what he thinks are the permanent and the changing elements in Christian Theology, and seeks to show that the "Apostles' Creed" sets forth abiding elements in Christian truth which can never become antiquated, though theology is a progressive science and must assimilate all that is true in modern thought.

The essay is attractively written, and while one may dissent from some of the author's statements, he will be instructed by reading it.

Princeton.

C. W. HODGE.

The Secret of Progress. By W. CUNNINGHAM. Cambridge University Press. 1918. Pp. xii, 179. Price 5s net.

This little book by the Archdeacon of Ely has an attractive title. Progress is one of the most cherished ideals of the civilization of the West, and the man who can give us its formula to translate into action would certainly be counted among our benefactors. The present author tells us that he became so interested in the work of Professor William James in the *Varieties of Religious Experience* that he decided to carry out the method in sketching the development of the spiritual

consciousness of man. The opening section points out the fact that for progress there is needed not only material resources, but spiritual power. This latter comes to existence whenever the consciousness of man embraces the various revelations of God. Its enemy is self-assertion. The remainder of the treatise is then occupied with tracing the development of this consciousness from its beginnings in Abraham, who found God both "reliable and accessible," through the Hebrew Theocracy, with the witness of Psalmists and Prophets, to Jesus Christ. Then follows the description of this consciousness in Christendom as exemplified in the Apostolic Church, the Middle Ages, and the great disruption that attended the Reformation. This brings us to the present time in which the spiritual consciousness reveals itself as a spirit that strives for a united witness to Christ in the midst of many differences.

The book is not so remarkable for sustained power of argument as for brilliancy of detached statements. Is there real progress in the world? The answer might be negative in view of the great disaster that seems to be the crowning achievement of modern industrial civilization. But the reason is not far to seek. It is due to development of organized production along with indisposition to accept the control needed to make human activity reach its highest efficiency. What is the remedy? To abandon the self-assertion that destroys others in order that self may have, and to persuade men to fix their mind on a spiritual factor—God who manifests himself to human experience. But how is this last to be gained? The author does not favor the Calvinist with his insistence on objective Biblical revelation as the all sufficient guide of human life. Still less does he favor the Anabaptist with his subjective vagaries and private revelations for individual circumstances. The solution is to be looked for in a Church that will bear a united witness to Christ. Where this church is to be found the Archdeacon leaves the reader to discover for himself. This book will repay perusal because it is a serious attempt to consider one of the serious questions of the day.

Lincoln University, Pa.

GEORGE JOHNSON.

EXEGETICAL THEOLOGY

Die Auferstehung Jesu. Von FREIDRICH SPITTA. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. 1918. Pp. 113.

Spitta's discussion of the resurrection of Jesus is concerned with a critical analysis of the literary sources, a constructive treatment of their historical content, together with a consideration of the opposing critical interpretation, and a concluding summary of results indicating the significance of the resurrection of Jesus for early Christianity and for Christian faith of the present time. The argument is interesting and in some respects thoroughly convincing. Its refutation of the "critical legend" of the flight of the disciples to Galilee is both acute and sound, as is also its criticism of the vision-hypothesis, the temporal priority

and Galilean location of the appearance to Peter, and the elimination of the empty sepulchre as a substantial factor in the origin of the primitive Easter faith. Spitta is thus enabled to do greater justice to the documentary evidence which connects the origin of faith in the resurrection of Jesus locally with Jerusalem and temporally with the third day. Yet Spitta's discussion, like that of his critical opponents, suffers from two fundamental defects—its subjectivism, especially in its literary criticism of the sources, and its inability to share the supernaturalistic premise of the documentary evidence. Both result in arbitrary treatment of the sources and the latter leads directly to a rationalizing interpretation of the resurrection itself which, even with the aid of Spitta's skill, cannot escape the crushing attack to which it was subjected by Strauss.

Princeton.

W. P. ARMSTRONG.

PRACTICAL THEOLOGY

The Social Gospel and The New Era. By JOHN MARSHALL BARKER, PH.D., Professor of Sociology in Boston University School of Theology, 8vo., pp. ix, 232. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1919. Price \$1.75.

The central purpose of Dr. Barker is: 1. To give a clearer and more adequate conception of the significance and value of the kingdom ideal and spirit. 2. To survey the widening field of opportunity for social service in which the Church should enter and coöperate more earnestly to actualize the triumph of God in human affairs. 3. To suggest some of the well-tested methods in the field of experience by which an approach can be made through the coördination of social forces and collective action to make the Church a greater constructive agency in the social life of mankind. This purpose he has well fulfilled. His discussion is so comprehensive that it does not seem possible that anything of importance has been omitted. His judgment is eminently judicial and is based on first hand information. His treatment of subjects is always just: *e.g.*, the place and worth of the individual are never lost sight of in the social; the spiritual is never absorbed in the social. In his closing chapter he comes out strongly against the popular physiological psychology and its materialistic conception of the evolution of religion in general and of Christianity in particular; and he insists vigorously on the necessity of supernaturalistic intervention, if "the divine order of human society" is ever to be established. All this, and much more is excellent. And yet Dr. Barker's book fails to inspire. At least, it fails to inspire the reviewer. It is not that he would not have Christians, as Christians and because Christians, give themselves whole-heartedly to social reformation. This is largely what they are for. That the Church, however, *as an institute*, should regard this as her great work is another matter. It would seem to involve a

departure from her distinctive mission. The Church is "the pillar and ground of the truth" (I Tim. iii. 15). Her commission is to "go into all the world and preach the gospel to the whole creation" (St. Mark xvi. 15). This is the greatest of social tasks, but can it be done and the almost countless others which Dr. Barker urges be done, too? If they are given the places of prominence insisted on for them by our author, must not *the* work of the Church go undone or at least be imperfectly done? Paul, at any rate, felt that his "ministry was to testify the gospel of the grace of God" (Acts xx. 24); and when he went to Corinth—and no city ever needed social reformation more than it did—he "determined not to know anything among them save Jesus Christ and him crucified" (I Cor. ii. 2). Preaching, not social reorganization, he felt to be his great work. What right have we, then, even in the interest of health and even of good morals, to reverse this inspired conception?

This subject is of such vital importance, and especially today, that the reviewer ventures in conclusion to quote at length the, in the main, admirable words of W. Cunningham, D.D., F.B.A. ("Christianity and Social Questions," p. 223): "The Church indeed consists of men, each of whom, as a citizen of an earthly kingdom, is called upon to do his political duties, as well as his other duties, in the name of the Lord Jesus. For ordinary purposes, in ordinary life, it may not be important, or even perhaps possible, for a man to distinguish that which is incumbent upon him as a child in the family of God. But the distinction is of vast importance in regard to those who are called to office and ministry in Christ's Church. The terms of their commission lay down the limits of what they are to do by Christ's authority; they have no commission to put the affairs of society right, or to eradicate the evils in this present naughty world. In the gospel of the grace of God, they have committed to them the supreme means of touching men personally, and inspiring them with high but practical ideals. This is the grandest work to which any man can give himself: and it is a miserable thing if he fails to put his best energies into this task, and prefers instead to compete with journalists and politicians in guiding some project for social reform. It is to forsake the fountain of life, and to strain at accomplishing some apparent improvement by taking up implements that are less certain and less effective, even for seeming human welfare, than the means of grace instituted by Christ Himself. In his official capacity, as called to preach the gospel of Christ, the minister is bound to set forth that which is good and to strive to attract men personally. The Old Testament prophetic office, with its denunciation of evil-doers, survived in St. John the Baptist's time, and his bold rebuking of vice; but it is at all events a very subordinate part of the Christian minister's duty, and one which is not to be discharged on a wholesale fashion without serious risk of alienating those whom it might have been possible to win. It is needful to look to the terms of Christ's commission, both as to the duties that are to be done and the manner of doing them. He sent his apostles on

evangelistic work, and bade them administer the sacraments and exercise pastoral care; but he did not enjoin them to agitate for social reforms."

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

The War and Religion. A Preliminary Bibliography of Material in English Prior to January 1, 1919. Compiled by MARION J. BRADSHAW for The Committee on the War and the Religious Outlook. 8vo., pp. vi, 136. Issued by Association Press, New York: 347 Madison Avenue. 1919.

Under the headings: I. "General Influence of the War on Religion;" II. "Religion in the Army;" III. "Christianity and War;" IV. "The Church and its Task in the Light of the War;" V. "Christian Belief as Affected by the War;" VI. "Christianity and Social Problems;" VII. "Christianity, the State and Internationalism;" VIII. "The War and Education;" IX. "Collections of Sources,"—under these headings some two thousand books, pamphlets and review articles, with a few exceptions all published before January 1919, have been classified and presented in this valuable and attractive volume. Asterisks indicate the more important books or papers, and in many cases annotations by the compiler at least suggest their contents and purpose. The work has been carefully done and well done, but it is easy to see that it is not complete. Indeed, it does not claim to be. "A preliminary bibliography," we may expect that the next edition will supply the omissions noticeable in this.

Social Christianity in the New Era. By THOMAS TIPLADY, Hon. Chaplain to the Forces, Author of "The Cross at the Front," "The Soul of the Soldier," etc. 8vo., pp. 190. Fleming H. Revell Company: New York, Chicago, London and Edinburgh. 1919.

As has been well said, "This is a book of Christian idealism which will make leaders think for themselves and keep on thinking until remedies are found." It aims to set forth what ought to be the attitude of the church toward the many and various and difficult problems of the new era and the new world with which the close of the great war has confronted us. Almost all of its ideals are sane. Most of them are distinctly scriptural. Some of them, as "Ploughshares for Swords," "The Church and Industry" and "The Emergence of Women" deserve the highest praise. Only two adverse criticisms seem to be called for: 1. The omission of all special discussion of the burning question as to capital. We are told that the business man needs a larger capital for his enterprises than does the minister or the doctor for his, but that he ought to take no more out of the business for his own personal use than does the minister or the doctor; and this is virtually all that is said. As most will feel, however, it is very far from being all that needs to be said. Surely, for example, capital ought to be regarded

as a trust from God, and, therefore, instead of being divided up among all, to be retained and administered by those to whom God has intrusted it.

2. The dignity of labor and the blessedness of work are not appreciated. The ideal would seem to be as few hours as possible rather than as many as one can be effective in. It is doubtful, however, whether civilization can be maintained on such a scheme. Indeed, as Dr. Clow has well said in his admirable book, "Christ in the Social Order," p. 177, "When we remember the facts there is a feeling that the cry for leisure is overdone. It is in some cases only the cry of laziness disguising itself. Men used to speak of the dignity of labor. They now covet the dignity of idleness."

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

The New Citizenship. By PROF. A. T. ROBERTSON, M.A., D.D., Fleming H. Revell Co. 1919. Pp. 157. \$1 net.

That the book is abreast of the times is shown by a glance at the Table of Contents: The Leadership of Jesus; The Brotherhood of the Race; Democracy's Day; Men, not Money; Woman the New Citizen; Children the True National Wealth; The Enlightenment of the Masses; Coöperation in the Commonwealth; Justice vs. Privilege; Order vs. Lawlessness; Patriotism vs. Pacifism; The New Social Order.

Prof. Robertson speaks freely, and in general with excellent judgment, upon these questions of the day. Woman suffrage is approved. The truth is firmly grasped and vigorously expressed that Christ is Lord of all, of nations as of men. The distinction between the natural and the gracious Fatherhood of God is clearly drawn (p. 33).

High praise is accorded to President Wilson. "We have in President Woodrow Wilson a man who seems anxious to solve public problems in the spirit of Jesus. He has become the moral leader of the world today (*The British Weekly*, Aug. 1, 1918) not merely because of his high office. He has taken Christ with him into his office and Jesus has put into his hand the hearts of a billion people who look to him for guidance in the world conflict" (p. 27). "Washington united the colonies into a federation of free commonwealths and made them safe for democracy. Lincoln welded this federation into a union of free men. Wilson has unified the American nation, and will make the world safe for democracy. One freed the Colonies, the second a race, and the last will, under God, free the world" (p. 108).

The sentences are almost always short, and the reader feels at times that he is borne along the train of thought by a series of jolts and jerks. And the thought at times is rather disconnected as if the material were thrown together somewhat carelessly. Upon what authority is the number of slaves in the Roman Empire limited to seven millions? (p. 59)?

Princeton.

J. RITCHIE SMITH.

The Secret of the Cross: A Plea for the Re-presentation of Christianity. By EDMOND HOLMES. E. P. Dutton Co. 1919. Pp. 170. \$1.50 net.

This is another attempt to reconstruct Christianity by tearing away the foundations on which it rests. Of the historic religion which bears the name of Christ, little remains. We are told indeed that it has proved to be a failure, that the world is turning away from the Church, and lapsing into irreligion. Gross errors have fastened upon Christianity which must be rooted out before the world can be won to faith. We must abandon our faith in miracles. There is no distinction between natural and supernatural, no direct divine intervention in the course of nature or providence. After quoting the definition of a miracle from the New English Dictionary, the author adds, "If this is what a miracle means, it may safely be said that miracles do not happen, or that if they do happen they are not miracles" (p. 14). Prophecy is simply clairvoyance (p. 17). We can save Christianity only by getting rid of the supernatural.

The God represented here hovers on the verge of the impersonal (pp. 83, 85). The familiar distinction is drawn between the God of the Old Testament, and the God Whom Jesus revealed. "Because Christ, for purposes of argument, appealed to the Jewish Scriptures and seemed to regard them as authoritative, and because he seemed to identify himself (according to his reporters) with the Messiah of Jewish prophecy and expectation, Christianity accepted the God of the Jews as the God of the Universe; and the consequent confusion between that jealous, vindictive, and bloodthirsty autocrat and the all-loving Father Whom Christ revealed to mankind has been the evil genius of Christendom" (p. 65). But it should be obvious that Christ himself never gave the slightest indication that the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, of whom he spoke, was not the Father Whom he came to represent to men. It is admitted indeed that Christ inherited the Jewish traditional conception of God (p. 9), but his mind upon the matter is not decisive for us.

"There is no authentic word of God. . . . There are many sacred Scriptures. . . . The Upanishads, it may fairly be contended, have more spiritual truth in them than the Old Testament. But no one Scripture can claim to be *the Word of God*" (p. 133).

"If Christ really said 'there be some standing here, which shall not taste of death, till they see the Son of man coming in his Kingdom,' he was the victim of a strange delusion; and in that case one can only say that the greatest of men have their hours and their moods of weakness" (p. 105 note). Evidently there is no authority anywhere to which we are bound to submit, neither in the Scripture nor in Christ, and Reason is the final judge. "The heart of man is its own Supreme Court of Appeal" (p. 119). The doctrines of the incarnation and the Holy Spirit must be rejected as they have been formulated in the creeds of the Church; but they contain the essential truth of "the potential oneness of man with God" (p. 118). Man must attain the end of life

by "throwing his will-power on the side of the ideal self" (p. 110). The inner light must be our guide. There is no place here of course for redemption or regeneration. Prayer in the sense of petition is discredited (p. 129). "If a man is to live aright, he must find strength and guidance in himself; he must trust his own nature, with its unexplored depths, its infinite possibilities, its inexhaustible capacity for good. . . . But if he is to do this, the shadow of the supernatural must cease to chill and darken his life" (p. 139). "In fine, we must trust for guidance, in the sphere of belief as of conduct, to the inward light, to spiritual intuition working in harmony with reason, to the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, Who is for each of us the soul of his soul and the life of his life" (p. 142). By the *Holy Spirit* is meant evidently not a divine Person, but the godlike in man, the higher nature, which must overcome the lower. The religious training of children "is as mischievous as it is delusive" (p. 149). "As a socializing and humanizing influence Christianity has on the whole been a failure" (p. 156). We read with surprise that "Christ himself said little or nothing about a future life" (p. 150). Unselfish love is represented as the ruling spirit of the true life, the higher life, but there is no redeeming work of Christ, no inward grace of the Holy Spirit, from which that love may be derived. Man is thrown back upon himself, and must find in his own heart the strength to overcome the evil and pursue the good.

The book is destructive, not constructive, and presents to us a system of rationalism in place of a divine revelation.

Princeton.

J. RITCHIE SMITH.

Fighting for Faith. The Justice of our Fight, the Reasons for our Faith. By GEORGE F. PENTECOST, D.D., Pastor of Bethany Church, Philadelphia. George H. Doran Co. 1918. Pp. 306. \$1.50 net.

The volume contains ten sermons, six of them dealing with the war, the others with the Fact of Christ, Incarnation, The Atonement, Resurrection Guarantees. In marked contrast to most of the sermons of the day they are long, averaging nearly thirty pages each. The style is clear and strong, and the justice of the allied cause is vigorously maintained, while Germany and the powers associated with it are denounced in unsparing terms. The title of the first sermon is World Rulers of Darkness, and Spiritual Wickedness in High Places; or, The Devil in the Kaiser.

Here as often we note that the incorrect renderings of the Authorized Version are retained in the pulpit after they have been abandoned by scholars. "The love of money is the root of all evil" (p. 136); "God Manifest in the Flesh" (p. 230 and 281); "All the promises of God are in him yea and in him Amen" (p. 252). "Hereafter ye shall see the Son of Man" p. 295).

The doctrine of a limited atonement is rejected. "The only limit placed upon the atonement is placed there by man's unbelief" (p. 274). Salvation is thus made to rest ultimately upon the will of man and not upon the will of God. "It is nowhere in the Scriptures declared or

even intimated that the atonement changed God's mind or attitude toward man or extinguished his wrath" (p. 250). Yet it satisfies the Divine Justice and Holiness (p. 278).

As is almost inevitable when a number of sermons are devoted to the same theme there is a good deal of repetition in those discourses which treat of the war.

Princeton.

J. RITCHIE SMITH.

On to Christ. By EDWIN A. McALPIN, JR., D.D., President of the College Board of the Presbyterian Church, U.S.A. George H. Doran Co. 1919. Pp. 180. \$1.25 net.

Special stress is laid upon the failure of the churches to reach our young men, and illustration is drawn from the author's experience of three months in one of the army cantonments. The main hindrances to the spiritual work of the church are America's lack of spiritual reaction; the critical controversy; the substitution of entertainment for inspiration; the lay religion, by which is meant the introduction of business methods to take the place of spiritual power; and the materialistic spirit (p. 41). Denominations are "an outgrown relic of a former age" (p. 78), and should give place to a united church. When it is said that Christ "gave His Church a prayer instead of a Creed" (p. 145), a misleading distinction is drawn. He gave the Church both prayer and creed, unless the word *creed* is taken in a very restricted sense. He taught us what to believe as well as how to pray.

The account given of the choice of Matthias to take the place of Judas will not commend itself to most students of the Word (p. 152).

Much that is said of the weakness and failure of the church should be carefully pondered in the spirit of humility. The author has no new remedy to suggest, but summons the Church to faith and prayer and a profounder belief in the life beyond the grave.

Above all our faith and hope must rest in Christ. It is he that must draw the churches together, win those who are outside the Church, and establish the Kingdom of God. The watchword of the New Era is *On to Christ*.

Princeton.

J. RITCHIE SMITH.

Christianity's Unifying Fundamental. By HENRY F. WARING. George H. Doran Co. 1919. Pp. 175. \$1.25 net.

An interesting account is given of the way in which this volume came to be written. "From a score or more of men of widely different denominations and the rest outside of the church altogether—came a significant request. They asked for a night a week until they would be helped through their differences and doubts to a conviction that they would be able to express and support. Inspiring months of these conferences were followed by a score of public lectures, after each of which questions from the audience were answered. What follows is the precipitate from the laboratory of these experiences." Truth of vital importance is presented in a clear and vigorous way. Christ is

recognized as the source and centre of Christian life and experience. Of special interest is the closing chapter on Joy. Christianity's unifying fundamental is declared in rather cumbrous phraseology to be "Fellowship with Christlike Deity, that makes for Christlike humanity" (p. 82). The Fourth Gospel does not represent Jesus "in terms of Greek philosophy" (p. 59). The book betrays no great measure of originality, but where shall originality be found among us, upon whom the ends of the ages are come?

Princeton.

J. RITCHIE SMITH.

The Poet of Science and Other Addresses. By WILLIAM NORTH RICE, Professor of Geology (Emeritus) Wesleyan University. The Abingdon Press. 1919. Pp. 225. \$1.25 net.

The general thought in the mind of the author, as he tells us in the preface, "is the adjustment of Christian faith and life and institutions to the ever-changing conditions which come with the lapse of time. Underlying all of them is the conviction that the great need of the moral life of humanity in our own age and in every age is 'not a new Gospel, but the Gospel anew.'" It is a volume of decided interest, and turns our thoughts to questions of prime importance.

The opening paper is a high and deserved tribute to Tennyson as the poet of Science. Four reasons are given why he may worthily wear this title. (1) "he was an observer of nature at first hand, and his descriptions are always phenomenally true." (2) "he draws his material in large degree from recondite facts of science and from scientific theories." He is shown to have been particularly at home in astronomy and geology. (3) "the mosaic truthfulness of his view of nature." In this respect he is preferred to Wordsworth. (4) "he, more than any other, has given literary expression to the philosophy and the religious life of a scientific age. He is the prophet bard of the age to which his manhood belonged."

We do not follow Dr. Rice so readily when he turns from science and poetry to theology. But the papers dealing with religious themes are of marked interest because they are the work of a Christian scholar who is yet at various points of harmony with the common faith of the Church. We respect his frankness and ability in dealing with these weighty matters even when we are compelled to differ from him. Not only is the doctrine of verbal inspiration and the inerrancy of Scripture rejected (p. 134), but contradictions and mistakes are recognized in the Gospels and Epistles both in the history and the doctrine (pp. 134-137). "The one book of the New Testament in regard to which it is substantially certain that it does not belong to the apostolic age is the so-called Second Epistle of Peter" (p. 129). John is regarded as the author of the Fourth Gospel, and probably of the Apocalypse (p. 128). And the gratifying conclusion is reached that "we can have a reasonable confidence that the New Testament presents to us in its main outline a veracious picture of the life and character and teaching of Jesus" (p. 139). "Of this I feel sure, that

to all ages the New Testament will be the canvas on which the world will behold the lineaments of the face of Jesus,

‘Most human and yet most divine,

The flower of man and God.’”

However he may turn aside at times from the common faith of the Church, Dr. Rice holds that “History warrants us in the belief that the main outlines of the faith which the Church has felt throughout all ages are true” (p. 68). It is the details of creed and philosophy that must be modified from age to age. The fact of sin and need of salvation are clearly shown. “If I were to name the peculiar quality which characterizes Christian character. . . . I should be disposed to use the old Methodist phrase, ‘conviction of sin’” (p. 95). “Integrity is transferred into holiness only when the soul in penitence and self-abasement gazes upon the divine radiance in the face of Jesus” (p. 96).

As the author is a Methodist, it is natural that he should not speak kindly of Calvinism (pp. 178, 179); yet “we recognize today a truth in Calvinism and a truth in Arminianism, though we may frankly confess ourselves unable to coördinate these two truths” (p. 180). And he freely admits that in the controversy between Arminians and Calvinists in New England the Calvinists had the better of the argument. “I think we are bound to recognize today that the logical victory in the controversy was with the Calvinists, but that their opponents had the practical truth” (p. 181). “No theological system was ever so logical as extreme supralapsarian Calvinism, but it was the most abhorrent system of theology ever invented. It was abominably logical. I think the Calvinists had the advantage not only in logic, but also in exegesis. Paul the Apostle inherited a good deal of his theology from Saul the Pharisee, and I think there is no reasonable doubt that the Epistle to the Romans does teach the doctrine of foreordination. But Arminianism is a good working theology” (p. 181).

“The noble psalm of creation which is preserved to us in the first chapter of Genesis divides the creative work into six stages followed by a period of rest. That poetic arrangement of the creative work was undoubtedly suggested by the existence of the institution of the Sabbath prior to the date of the psalm” (p. 147). The system of pewrenting is properly condemned (p. 191). In order to attract people to the church a larger place must be given to music, especially at the evening service, and moving pictures should be introduced (p. 194). And the gospel must be preached wherever people are gathered together, “in the parks, at the seaside resorts, in the shops.” “For this new evangelism we need a deeper, more intense conviction of sin” (p. 195). In harmony with the general attitude of the Church, as expressed by its representative assemblies, the author looks for “the sudden fulfillment of the growing hope of the ages in the establishment of a League of Nations” (p. 222). But it is recognized that our hopes rest ultimately upon God. “The prejudices of race, the jealousy between rich and poor, the antagonism of capital and

labor—all human problems and all human miseries—must find their solution and belief in the religion of Jesus Christ" (p. 223). Evidently we should read *relief* instead of belief.

With these words we may fitly close our review of a volume which is at once scholarly and devout.

Princeton.

J. RITCHIE SMITH.

The Model Prayer, and Other New Testament Studies, Expository and Devotional. By C. A. MITCHELL, PH.D., D.D., Professor of New Testament Literature and Exegesis, Omaha Theological Seminary: The Gorham Press. 1918. Pp. 154. \$1.25 net.

There are seven studies, entitled The Model Prayer; The Fatherhood of God; The Keynote of the Christian Life; Life's Record; Pathway and Goal; St. Paul's Love Chapter; a Story of Love, the Supreme Christian Grace.

The treatment of the doctrine of God in the Old Testament is unsatisfactory because it is incomplete. Reference should certainly be made to Ps. lxviii.—"A father of the fatherless, and a judge of the widows, is God in his holy habitation." It should be clearly brought out that in the Old Scripture God is usually represented as the Father of the chosen people rather than of the individual. And some allusion at least should be made to the question which fills so large a place in theological thinking, whether God is the Father of all men, and if so, in what sense. The distinction should be clearly drawn between the natural and the gracious relation which God sustains to men.

The treatment of love in the closing chapters is interesting and instructive. High praise is given to Prof. Warfield's paper on "The Terminology of Love in the New Testament," which appeared in this REVIEW for January and April, 1918. It is said of ἀγάπη that it "was sometimes debased in sense, especially in comedy (as Aristophanes) and satire (Lucian)." Compare with this the statement of Prof. Warfield: "ἀγάπη appears first in the Septuagint, and has not as yet turned up with certainty in any secular author" (PTR, January, 1918, p. 30). It is said that φιλέω is never used in the New Testament of the love of men for God (p. 141); yet in I Cor. xvi. 22 we read, "If any man loveth (φιλεῖ) not the Lord, let him be Anathema." We are told that "Since love is an attitude of spirit, a disposition of the one who loves, it may conceivably exist in the total absence of any object of love" (p. 150). Here a distinction should be made between the disposition to love and the exercise of love. The disposition may exist without an object, but it would remain a mere inclination or tendency or capacity. It is true that God had the disposition of Love before creation, when He alone existed; but it is also true that in the mutual love of Father, Son and Spirit that disposition was exercised and expressed from the beginning. Familiar lines of Coleridge are badly treated on p. 154.

Princeton.

J. RITCHIE SMITH.

GENERAL LITERATURE

George Washington the Christian. By WILLIAM J. JOHNSON. 8vo., pp. 299. The Abingdon Press: New York, Cincinnati. 1919.

This is a book of deep interest and of real value. It is a "complete and comprehensive study of the religious side of Washington's life." It is not so much an analysis of the religious side of his character as it is a presentation of its development and its expression. "The chronological order has been followed from birth to death." The evidence is placed before the reader and he is invited to form his own conclusions. This evidence consists of what Washington himself said in his letters, diary, orders to the army, addresses and state papers and of authentic incidents in his life, gathered from many quarters. These sources, embracing seventy-five volumes, have been carefully tabulated and accurately described; and the book is so well indexed that any incident desired can be easily located and as easily referred to its source.

On the whole, this large mass of evidence would seem to have been handled fairly and discriminatingly. Here and there, as was natural to be expected, the suspicion of a too favorable bias on the part of the writer may be suggested. This, however, is rare; and the reader can scarcely fail to be brought to the conclusion that the convergence of so many and so various and so independent lines of proof establish, that Washington throughout his life, was a firm believer in the providence of God; that he was a communicant in and a consistent member of the Episcopal Church: that to a degree unusual then and now he was a man of prayer; in a word, that his Christian faith was the deepest root of his blameless and singularly unselfish life.

As another has said, "The history of George Washington is not always a recital of brilliant exploits in the field—the cunning strategy of the commander; nor is it always a narrative of startling movements in the cabinet—the secret diplomacy of the statesman; but it is *always* the consistent record of a man true to himself, true to his country, true to his God."

We can scarcely commend this volume too highly. It gives the very kind of reading that these troublous times need.

Bolshevism and Social Revolt. By DANIEL DORCHESTER, JR., Author of "The Sovereign People." 8vo., pp. vi, 12. The Abingdon Press: New York, Cincinnati. 1919.

Those familiar with our author's other book "The Sovereign People," will not be surprised to have this one referred to in terms of highest praise. Both volumes are well informed, clear and strong in style, philosophical in the best sense of the word, and throughout sound because Scriptural. We do not know of so good a presentation of the relation of Bolshevism to social revolt as that which we have in the book before us. It should be studied by every lover of God and country.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

Soldier Silhouettes on Our Front. By WILLIAM L. STIGER, Y. M. C. A. Worker with the A. E. F. Illustrated by Jessie Gillespie. 8vo., pp. 209. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1918.

The purpose of this book is succinctly given in the author's foreword. He says, "I have tried in this book to set down some of my experiences. I have had but one object in so doing and that object has been to give the father and mother, the brother and sister, the wife and child and friend of the boys 'Over There' an accurate heart picture. I have tried to show their experiences on the transports, when they land in France, their welcome there, the reactions of the trench life; not the life itself; something of their self-sacrifice, their willingness to serve even unto the end, their courage, their sunshine."

The book is dedicated to "Doctor Robert Freeman, Pioneer Religious Work Director of the Y. M. C. A., and the Hundreds of Preacher-Secretaries . . . and the Churches that Sent Them."

There are thirteen chapters, each giving some Silhouettes of persons or scenes in army life. A remarkable example of alliteration is shown in the selection of subjects, and it is not as artificial as might first appear. Silhouettes of Song, of Sacrifice, of Sacrilege, of Service, of Sorrow, of Suffering; Soldier, Sky, Spiritual, Sunshine Silhouettes do at first perhaps, suggest affectation. Such device to catch the eye and ear is perilous. It tempts to over-indulgence, and used too freely it becomes tiresome and mechanical. Mr. Stiger has not justified in his chapters the fear awakened by his alliterate captions. On the contrary, he shows himself to be a literary artist whose pen pictures illuminate every scene which he presents. The innumerable lines of service and sacrifice to which the Y. M. C. A. preacher-secretary was called are pictured with a rare charm and simplicity. It is probably the best apologetic that has appeared for a great Institution some of whose operations overseas have called forth caustic criticism from many quarters. The significance of the defence here offered is found in the fact that the book was sent to press before the situation of the Y. M. C. A. became so acute, and without apparent consciousness upon the part of the author that it would be possible to call in question the fidelity and efficiency of the phenomenal work accomplished. In view of the host of facts marshalled to illustrate the courage, loyalty, sacrifice, patience, tact, love, sympathy and devotion to Christian service of the average preacher-secretary one is easily prepared for the statement made in the chapter on Soldier Silhouettes, as follows: "And of all the lights o' war one must know that the lights of the Y. M. C. A. huts cast their beams not only into the hearts of these lads but across the world, and sometimes I think across the eternities, for in these huts innumerable lads are seeing the light that never was on land or sea, and are finding the light that lights the way Home."

If this most entertaining volume may be taken as a fair exhibit of what the Y. M. C. A. did for our soldier boys "Over There," carping criticism however malignant and persistent will not diminish the meed

of praise which history will award to a great agency raised up and qualified of God to minister to the physical, moral and spiritual welfare of millions of men exposed to the peculiar hardships, temptations and perils incident to "The War of All Ages."

Princeton.

SYLVESTER W. BEACH.

The Religion of The Tommy. War Essays and Addresses. By H. P. ALMON ABBOTT, M.A., D.D., Dean of Trinity Cathedral, Cleveland. Pp. 144. Milwaukee: Morehouse Publishing Co. 1918.

A prolific writer of war books has recently complained that "publishers refuse even to read the manuscripts offered to them in great numbers by men who saw active service in the World War and are eager to get their experiences into print." That is to say that war books are no longer in demand by the reading public. Authors of the war period may therefore be considered to have had an advantage over those who come later into the field and whose appeal is to a surfeited public. Dean Abbott's volume appeared at the psychological moment. Its opportuneness not less than the distinguished name of its author insured the book a generous reception and a wide reading. It consists of a series of pungent essays on War topics and descriptions of actual camp life overseas as seen by a visitor. Such topics are discussed as The Religion of the Tommy, The Call of Europe, Faith and the War, The Church and the Reconstruction Period, etc., etc. Dean Abbott is a master in the art of literary expression. His style fascinates and delights. He has culture and scholarship, and is a true humanist if that be defined as a spirit concerned in all that is human. The book, however, is disappointing. It is written with a bias; it has a subjective setting. The impression cannot be resisted that the conclusion reached by the author are based upon a very narrow induction, and that they reflect more the theological predilections of the distinguished author than "The Religion of the Tommy." It is by no means certain that Tommy would advisedly select Dean Abbott as his sponsor, or would be found ready to allow that his religion is in any sense so unique as to justify the putting of him in a category all to himself. Indeed the author inadvertently remarks, "that the religion of the Tommy is the religion of the average man." Why, then, this search for something abnormal or subnormal, a type rare and grotesque, in the religion of the soldier? He is described as "strong on works" and with "no conception of justification by faith." In grief of heart let it be said that exactly that is the habit of mind of most men. If it be indeed true that Tommy "repudiates with a fervor of masculine honesty the suggestion that the sufferings of Christ were a substitution for his own sinfulness," and professes to be "man enough to take his own punishment when punishment is due, and considers it an impoverishment of his self-respect to permit any one else to pay the price for him," that can hardly be described as a new state of mind or heart such as to justify us in placing the subject of it in a class in any sense peculiar. All this sounds very familiar to our ears. If the soldier is saying what the

Dean puts into his mouth, others have been saying it since the day when "the offence of the Cross" began. It is to the credit of the Dean, in respect to both naïveté and candor, that he puts forth a statement like this: "These men are laying down their lives that we may live—and through their vicarious sufferings we are freed." The author believes that the Church must adjust itself to the peculiar religion of the Tommy. To this end the creeds of Christendom must be greatly modified and mollified. In fact they must be rationalized. But that is not all. Moral standards must be somewhat lowered to meet the exigencies of times like these. The Dean thinks that "little sins must not be magnified." "The Church must bespeak a broader charity of behavior than is to be met in the outside world." It is much to be regretted that the opportunity to show a constructive programme for the Church of Christ in these days of reconstruction should have been missed by our author whose position of influence and leadership awakened the reasonable hope that in his utterances we might discern a commanding voice indicating a true pathway of advance in this dark hour of bewilderment and fear.

Princeton.

SYLVESTER W. BEACH.

The Fight for the Argonne. Personal reminiscences of a "Y" Man. By WILLIAM BENJAMIN WEST. With an Introduction by Burges Johnson. 12mo., pp. 124. New York: The Abingdon Press. 1919. Price net .75.

"A vivid picture of the experiences of a Y. M. C. A. man with the fighting forces that won the stubbornly contested battle in the Argonne Forest. A record of heroism, sacrifice, and service unsurpassed."

Here are seven chapters giving at first hand the experiences of a "Y" man during the days of the decisive battle of the World War. The author is one of the secretary-preachers whose task was to drive a Flivver rather than to hold hut meetings or stand behind the counter. None the less did he make "full proof of his ministry." To the sick and wounded and dying; to the brave men going "Over the Top" and returning when their work was done he went about doing good. Ceaseless and exhausting and perilous labors of love are mentioned quite incidentally and only because they form a part of the scenes described. In the graphic and thrilling pictures thrown on the screen the driver of the Flivver appears always in the background and as a very small detail. That the story is necessarily more or less autobiographical is hidden in the high light in which the figures of our brave boys who saved France and the world are revealed. Incidentally let it be said that no one can read this little book without reaching the conviction, whatever his previous misgivings, that the part played by the Y. M. C. A. preacher-secretaries was one of self-sacrifice, rare good sense, all-around usefulness, and loyalty to Jesus Christ and His saving message to men.

The illustrations interspersed add interest to the volume. They are photographs presumably taken by the author himself.

Princeton.

SYLVESTER W. BEACH.

PERIODICAL LITERATURE

American Catholic Quarterly Review, Philadelphia, July: MARTIN J. LES, National Ideals; R. F. O'CONNOR, Joseph de Maistre: MARC F. VALLETTE, A Glance at Some Important Facts in Early American History; DARLEY DALE, Mediaeval Latin Poetry; T. L. BOUSCAREN, Responsibility and Environment; G. E. PRICE, Symphony of the Hours; E. VON RYCKEN WILSON, The Catholic Pilgrim and Explorer in the Dawn of Geography.

American Church Monthly, New Brunswick, October: GEORGE P. ATWATER, A National Board of Strategy; J. G. H. BARRY, On a Certain Conception of Liberty; HERBERT M. DENSLOW, Use of the Bible in Public Worship; LUCIUS WATERMAN, Prayer Book Revision in 1919; WALKER GWYNNE, Further Revision of the Eucharist; CHARLES C. EDMUNDS, Remarriage of the Innocent Party. *The Same*, November: HARVEY OFFICER, Monks and Millionaires; LEICESTER C. LEWIS, The Church as a Force for Internationalism; WILLIAM S. BISHOP, Augustine, Ancient Saint, Modern Man; HERBERT S. GOWEN, The Old Testament and Comparative Religion; FREDERICK C. GRANT, Message of the Book of Jonah. *The Same*, December: JOHN C. MCKIM, The Oxford Movement and the World War; JOHN H. HOPKINS, Some Contributions of the Episcopal Church to Christian Unity; THOMAS J. LACEY, The Abyssinian Church; HIRAM R. BENNETT, On Clerical Reading.

American Journal of Theology, Chicago, October: A. EUSTACE HAYDON, Theological Trend of Pragmatism; CHARLES H. DICKINSON, Our Soldiers' Doctrine of Death; GEORGE W. GILMORE, Tantrism—The Newest Hinduism; H. T. ANDREWS, The Legacy of Jesus to the Church; WILLIAM MUSS-ARNOLT, Puritan Efforts and Struggles, 1550 to 1603, II; EDGAR S. BRIGHTMAN, The Lisbon Earthquake: A Study in Religious Valuation.

Anglican Theological Review, Lancaster, October: Messages to the General Convention; SAMUEL B. MERCER, Morals of Israel: ii. Early Prophetic Morals; LESTER BRADNER, Some Educational Ideals of the Church.

Bibliotheca Sacra, Oberlin, October: L. FRANKLIN GRUBER, The Creative Days; DAVID F. ESTES, The Divine Transcendence; CHARLES W. SUPER, The Philosophy of Prohibition; W. H. GRIFFITH THOMAS, The Victorious Life (ii).

Catholic Historical Review, Washington, July-October: CHARLES E. CHAPMAN, A Great Franciscan in California: Fermín Francisco de Lasúen; V. F. O'DANIEL, Cuthbert Fenwick: Pioneer Catholic and Legislator of Maryland; LAURENCE M. S. LARSON, Church in North America (Greenland) in the Middle Ages; JOHN ROTHENSTEINER, Paul de Saint Pierre, the First German-American Priest of the West; CHARLES L. SOUVAY, Questions anent Mother Seton's Conversion.

Church Quarterly Review, London, October: ROLAND ALLEN, Concerning Some Hindrances to the Extension of the Church; A. BEVIL BROWNE, Prayer Book Enrichment; A. E. TAYLOR, The Philosopher of

Mysticism; E. W. WATSON, American Civil Church Law; G. H. BOX, Book of Judges.

East & West, London, October: BISHOP OF BATHURST, "White Australia"; H. HEATON, The Brahmin Schoolboy; W. BARBROOKE GRUBB, Problem of the South American Indian; C. E. TYNDALE-BISCOE, Teaching the Book; D. J. STEPHEN, A Hindu Missionary Society; A. F. R. BIRD, Essays in Selfgovernment; J. C. FORRESTER, Progress of Missions; J. SMYLY, Medical Education in China; L. W. COLEMAN, Java.

Expositor, London, September: FRANK GRANGER, The Slave and the Workman in the Greek New Testament; JAMES MOFFAT, Cyprian on the Lord's Prayer; R. L. MARSHALL, The War and New Testament Criticism; G. MARGOLIOUTH, Fifth Chapter of Book of Judges; VACHER BURCH, Meaning and Function of "Church" in Matthew 18:15 ff. *The Same*, October: G. G. FINDLAY, The World-Hope of Scripture; JAMES MOFFATT, Augustine on the Lord's Prayer; D. S. MARGOLIOUTH, Matthaean Narrative of the Nativity; E. W. WINSTANLEY, Outlook of the Apostolic Fathers; T. HERBERT BINDLEY, Eschatology of the Lord's Prayer. *The Same*, November: A. T. ROBERTSON, The Use of *ἵπτερ* in Business Documents in the Papyri; W. BARTLETT, Saints at Ephesus; J. A. ROBERTSON, Jesus the Householder; ROBERT MACKINTOSH, Moral Necessity of the Atonement; W. F. ADENEY, The Nature of the "Advent"; FRANK GRANGER, Communist Production of the Greek New Testament; F. R. MONTGOMERY HITCHCOCK, Some New Testament Notes.

Expository Times, Edinburgh, September: Notes of Recent Exposition; B. B. WARFIELD, Praying for the Erring; A. G. HOGG, Suggestions toward a New Liturgical "Credo"; A. MITCHEL HUNTER, Calvin as a Preacher. *The Same*, October: Notes of Recent Exposition; HERBERT E. RYLE, Thirty Years ago; FRANCIS C. BURKITT, William Sanday; F. R. TENNANT, Divine Omnipotence; Contributions and Comments. *The Same*, November: Notes of Recent Exposition; ARCHIBALD HENDERSON, Church's Message for To-day; HUGH R. MACKINTOSH, Christ and God; F. R. TENNANT, Conception of a Finite God.

Harvard Theological Review, Cambridge, October: FREDERIC PALMER, Isaac Watts; JAMES H. ROPES, Reasonable Appeal of Book of Revelation; H. C. ACKERMAN, Psychology of Mysticism and the Divine Immanence; ROBERT J. HUTCHESON, Nature and Validity of Conscience and Moral Principle.

International Journal of Ethics, Concord, October: DAVID SNEDDEN, Some New Problems in Education for Citizenship; J. DASHIELL STOOPS, The Inner Life as a Suppressed Ideal of Conduct; ALAN DORWARD, Some Deductions from the Doctrine of Consequences in Ethics; ROBERT SHAFER, Henry Adams; EDWARD A. ROSS, Lumping versus Individualism; J. W. SCOTT, Democracy and the Logic of Goodness; JAMES H. TUFTS, War-Time Gains for the American Family.

Interpreter, London, October: C. E. RAVEN, The Ideal of the Kingdom; HAROLD ANSON, Jesus and the Kingdom of Heaven; A. W. F. BLUNT, Modern Eschatology; LILY DOUGALL, Christianity and the

Power of Physical Healing; HENRY D. A. MAJOR, The Good Shepherd; T. HERBERT BINDLEY, Some Misunderstood Symbolism; R. GORDON MILBURN, Old and New Creeds; C. M. BLACK, Vox Clamantis, an Exegetical Study of a Persistently Misread Scripture; T. WALKER, The Temptation of Jesus—an Exposition.

Irish Theological Quarterly, Dublin, October: H. KEANE, Sacrament of Penance in St. John of Chrysostom; T. FAHY, Early Christian Lyrical Poetry; VINCENT J. McNABB, St. Thomas and Moral Theology; W. B. O'DOWD, Development of St. Augustine's Opinions of Religious Toleration; T. E. BIRD, First Epistle of St. Paul.

Journal of Negro History, Lancaster, October: E. ETHELRED BROWN, Labor Conditions in Jamaica Prior to 1917; M. N. WORK, The Life of Charles B. Ray; W. R. RIDDELL, The Slave in Upper Canada; Notes on Slavery in Canada; More Letters of Negro Migrants of 1916-18.

Journal of the Society of Oriental Research, Chicago, October: SAMUEL A. B. MERCER, The Anaphora of Our Lady Mary (Ethiopic Liturgy); JOHN A. MAYNARD, A Neo-Babylonian Grammatical School Text; SAMUEL A. B. MERCER, Was Iknaton a Monotheist?; STEPHEN LANGDON, Contribution to Assyrian Lexicography.

Journal of Theological Studies, London, July: C. H. TURNER, St. Maximus of Turin *Contra Iudaeos*, with a Description of the Verona MS.; C. J. CADOUX, Johannine Account of the Early Ministry of Jesus; F. C. BURKITT, Professor Torrey on 'Acts'; C. LATTEY, Semitisms of the Fourth Gospel; F. C. BURKITT, On 'lifting up' and 'exalting'; G. L. MARRIOTT, Isaac of Ninevah and the Writings of Macarius of Egypt; Gennadius of Marseilles on Macarius of Egypt; A. SOUTER, Oxford MSS. at Antwerp; J. H. BAXTER, St. Augustine's *Rule*; A. E. COWLEY, Emendation of Psalm lxxxv. 9. *The Same*, October: C. H. TURNER, La Tradition manuscrite de la correspondance de Saint Basile, by the late J. Bessières; H. DANBY, Bearing of the Rabbinical Code on the Jewish Trial Narratives of the Gospels; V. BURCH, The Threnus Seilae; H. M. SLEE, Note on St. Luke 13:6-9 and Matthew 3:10 as parallel to Luke 3:9.

London Quarterly Review, London, October: STEPHEN GRAHAM, The Hope for Russia; W. BARDSLEY BRASH, Jesus and the Common People; CHARLES GARDNER, George Eliot; T. H. S. ESCOTT, Spiritual and Literary Legacies of the War; EDWARD J. THOMPSON, Toru Dutt; H. RANSTON, Xenophanes the Iconoclast; A. MARMONSTEIN, The Treasures in Heaven and Upon the Earth; F. J. C. HEARNshaw, Strikes: Their Ethical Aspect; W. T. DAVISON, Methodism and Modernism; J. AGAR BEET, Unity of Doctrine in the Wesleyan Church.

Methodist Quarterly Review, Nashville, October: FRANK M. THOMAS, What the World is Facing; E. E. HOSS, The Father of Tennessee; JOHN W. FRAZER, The Idea of Sin; ARTHUR W. NAGLER, Mithras or Christ? HUGH H. HARRIS, Psychology of Religion and What it has Attempted; ALBERT L. SCALES, Studies in Philosophy of William James; GEORGE F. MELLEN, Bishops Unawares; ROBERT E. ZEIGLER, "The Nearer Heathendom"; EDWIN D. MOUZON, Methodism Facing the New Era; R. H. BENNETT, Versailles the Magnificent.

Methodist Review, New York, September-October: GEORGE P. ECKMAN, Bishop Franklin Hamilton; GEORGE C. PECK, Sarah Mehl, a Newspaper Idyl; JOHN A. FAULKNER, Miracle and the Modern Man; CHARLES G. SHAW, Balzac's Brutal Facts in the Light of The New France; JAMES B. SCOTT, A Layman's Diagnosis of Certain Church Aches; A. L. SEMANS, "The Faultless Painter"—Browning's Gospel of Aspiration; Neighbor Nameless on Ministering. *The Same*, November-December; WILLIAM A. QUAYLE, Church Spires; F. B. STOCKDALE, The Law of Obedience; L. J. BIRNEY, The Incarnation To-day; J. R. VANPELT, Hard Sayings of the Master; EVELYN R. NICHOLSON, Through Casa Guidi Windows To-day; E. A. SCHELL, Future of the Balkans; WILLIAM HARRISON, "Wesley the Anglican"; HARRY W. FARINGTON, Christ in the French Army.

Monist, Chicago, October: J. C. BUSHNELL, Logic of the Sciences; JOSHUA C. GREGORY, Development of the Notion of Cause; ALBERT J. EDMUNDS, The Six Endings of Mark in Later MSS. and Imprints of the Old Armenian Version; J. M. STILLMAN, Paracelsus as a Reformer of Medicine; PHILIP E. B. JOURDAIN, Indefinables and Indemonstrables in Mathematics and Theology; JAMES LINDSAY, A Catalanian Philosopher: Antonio Comellas y Cluet; J. E. TURNER, Lotze's Theory of Subjectivity of Time and Space.

Moslem World, Cooperstown, October: The Urgency of the Hour; DUNCAN B. MACDONALD, From Arabian Nights to Spirit; MARIE B. BEDIKIAN, A Message of Good-Will; PERCY SMITH, Another Plea for the Vernacular; LYDIA S. MCGAGUE, Egypt in 1857-1881; GEORGE F. HERRICK, Literature for Turkish Moslems; W. G. SHELLABEAR, Christian Literature for Malayasia; JOSEPH D. BRYAN, Mohammed's Controversy with Jews and Christians.

Reformed Church Review, Lancaster, October: JOHN L. BARNHART, Moral Equivalent of War; RAY H. DOTTERER, Limitations of God; J. M. MULLAN, Community Co-operation; ARTHUR MACDONALD, Suggestions of the Peace Treaty of Westphalia for the League of Nations; JOHN C. GEKELER, The Anabaptists and Their Contribution to Modern Life; FREDERICK C. NAU, Present-day Piety and Religion; A. W. BARLEY, A Safe Democracy; DAVID DUNN, The New Idealism in the Era of Reconstruction.

Review and Expositor, Louisville, October: F. M. POWELL, Some Notes on Preaching and Preachers prior to the Reformation; RYLAND KNIGHT, Facing the Future; W. E. HENRY, Our Lord's Resurrection and Himself; WILLIAM W. EVARTS, Effect of the Napoleonic Wars on Great Britain; W. DOUGLAS MACKENZIE, A Study in Theological Method; E. E. NORTHEN, Authorship of Second Peter.

Southwestern Journal of Theology, Fort Worth, October: J. B. GAMBRELL, Out of the Old into the New; W. J. MCGLOTHLIN, Meaning of the Campaign to God's Kingdom; R. H. PITT, Mobilizing a Democracy; J. M. DAWSON, The Campaign and the Baptist Problem of Enlistment; W. H. KNIGHT, The Campaign and Doctrinal Integrity.

Union Seminary Review, Richmond, October: DAVID J. BURRELL,

My First Sermon; ANDREW W. BLACKWOOD, A Clinic in Homiletics; EUGENE C. CALDWELL, Holy Spirit in the Book of Acts; WILLIAM T. RIVIERE, Some Impressions of Philosophy in a French University; W.H. MILLS, The Church's Duty to the Country Church; WILLIAM C. CUMMING, Do Paul and James Contradict Each Other?; P. FRANK PRICE, Some Unsolved Problems of Missionary Work.

Yale Review, Concord, October: H. G. MOULTON, The Rising Tide of Social Unrest; HENRY N. MACCRACKEN, The Peace, from a Cracker Barrel; CHARLES SEYMOUR, The League of Nations; EDITH WHARTON, Harems and Ceremonies; FIRMIN ROZ, France and America in Peace; EMILE CAMMAERTS, Belgium since the Armistice; OLIVER LODGE, Death and After; FREDERICK E. PIERCE, American Scholarship; CHARLES F. KENT, The Birth of Democracy; WILLIAM V. DUNCAN, A Siberian Note-Book.

Bilychnis, Roma, Luglio-Settembre: Giovanni Costa, Giove ed Ercole; VINCENZO CENTO, L'essenza del Modernismo; GIOVANNI PIOLI, L' "Etica della simpatia" nella "Teoria dei sentimenti morali" di Adamo Smith; Mancanza di garanzie nello schema e nel nuovo codice di diritto canonico; GIOVANNI LUZZI, La visione di Dio. *The Same*, Ottobre: UGO D. SETA, La visione morale della vita in Leonardo da Vinci; GIOVANNI COSTA, Giove ed Ercole; Paolo Orano, Positivismo—Filosofia pura—Religione; GIUSEPPA LESCA, Sensi e pensieri nella poesia di Arturo Graf; GIOVANNI MEILLE Psicologia di combattenti cristiani; Mancanza di garanzie nello schema e nel codice di diritto canonico.

Ciencia Tomista, Madrid, Septiembre-Octubre: ALONSO GETINO, Centenario y Cartulario de nuestra Comunidad; LUIS URBANO, Los prodigios de Limpias a la luz de la Teología y de la Ciencia; PEDRO N. DE MEDIO, Evolucionismo y transformismo según la ciencia; J. G. ARINTERO, La verdadera perfeccion cristiana implica vida mística; J. M. GARCIA GRAIN, Modernidad de la "Summa contra gentiles."

Gereformeerd Theologisch Tijdschrift, Baarn, September: J. RIDDERBOS, Wet en belofte in het Oude Testament en in het Farizeesche Jodendom; G. KEIZER, De Christelijke Gereformeerde Kerk in Amerika. *The Same*, October: T. HOEKSTRA, De Toepassing: J. RIDDERBOS, Wet en belofte in het Oude Testament en in het Farizeesche Jodendom; J. W. GEELS, "De Mensch" uit Psalm 8 in Nieuw-Testamentisch licht. *The Same*, November: Ds. J. LOUW, Het goddelijke en menselijke in den Persoon van Jezus volgens den brief aan de Hebreëen.

Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie, Lausanne, Juillet-Octobre: PIERRE BOVET, La sentiment religieux: étude de psychologie; ARNOLD REYMOND, Les tendances générale de la science hellénique; ANTONIN CAUSSE, La législation sociale d'Israël et l'idéal patriarcal. I.

PRESBYTERIAN HANDBOOK

1919 EDITION
NOW READY

SINGLE COPY, 5 CENTS
\$3.00 PER HUNDRED
POSTPAID

Your greeting and church
notice may be printed
in this space

Prices (extra) for printing
notices furnished on request.

PRESBYTERIAN BOARD OF PUBLICATION
AND SABBATH SCHOOL WORK
— PHILADELPHIA, PA. —

EVERY MEMBER SHOULD HAVE A COPY

The Presbyterian Handbook

is prepared by the Stated Clerk
of the General Assembly

Rev. Wm. Henry Roberts, D.D.

and contains a mine of valuable in-
formation with which every good
Presbyterian should be familiar.

It makes a splendid Christmas or
New Year's greeting from pastor to
people, and many thousands of them
are used in this practical way every
year.

Send your order early to the near-
est Depository of the Board.

COUNTERFEIT MIRACLES

By BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1918. 8vo, pp. vi, 327. Price, \$2.00 net.

"One opens this book with no especial eagerness of expectation. The title makes no very urgent appeal. It sounds remote and scholastic, and we turn to the perusal of the book as one girds himself for a task that will be laborious and probably wearisome. This impression is quickly dispelled. The reviewer has the impression that the most illuminating introduction he can give to this work will be simply to put on record his own unbounded delight in the reading of it. What is it? A thoroughgoing review of extra-biblical, religious thaumaturgy from early Christian times to the present day. . . This whole subject needed exploration by a competent student, with adequate historical apparatus and with sufficiently critical mind to sift the evidence and to undertake the careful and judicious discrimination which is the first condition of dealing with problems so varied and complex. Dr. Warfield has done his work thoroughly and well. Every minister, teacher, and intelligent Christian layman with a sense of contemporary needs and dangers should not only read the discussion but become acquainted with the literature to which reference is made."—Louis M. Sweet, in *The Biblical Review*.

THE ACTS

An Exposition By CHARLES R. ERDMAN. Philadelphia: The Presbyterian Board of Publication, 1919. Crown 8vo., pp. 176. Cloth, 75 cents net.

"Professor Charles R. Erdman of Princeton has published through the Westminster Press, Philadelphia, an exposition on "The Acts" which will be welcome to every sincere student of the Scriptures. The wonderful story of rapid expansion of the Christian Church as recorded in "The Acts" is here made more vivid and vital. Professor Erdman's explanations and interpretations constitute a new revelation of this record of heroic achievement and inspired eloquence."—*The New Era Magazine*.

THE WALL AND THE GATES

By J. RITCHIE SMITH. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1919. 8vo., pp. 278. Price \$1.50 net.

"Some Sermons are edifying and some are otherwise. This book belongs emphatically in the former class. There is instruction, consolation, enthusiasm, encouragement, visions and foundations for everyone. To glance at its table of contents inspires hope; a perusal of its pages deepens faith, and to sit with it for an evening makes one feel stronger and nearer to his Master when he gets down upon his knees. There is scholarship and literature in happy combination. The Scriptures are richly interpreted and the spirituality of the book will commend it to all who love God."—*The United Presbyterian*.

STUDIES IN THE BOOK OF DANIEL

A Discussion of the Historical Questions. By ROBERT DICK WILSON. New York and London: G. F. Putnam's Sons; The Knickerbocker Press, 1917. 8vo, pp. xvi, 402. Price, \$3.50.

"It is difficult within a short space to give an adequate account of the way in which Professor Wilson acquits himself in the task of meeting all the objections that adroit and learned combatants have been alleging with a view to undermine faith in the historical character of Daniel and his prophecies. He seems always to take the statements of some at least of the Higher Critics almost more seriously than the critics themselves, and then institutes an inquiry about as thorough as in the nature of the case is possible, with the result that the conclusion is forced upon us that after all the Destructive Critics have mistaken their own *ipse dixit* for evidence, and baseless assumptions for the conclusions of an inductive science."—John R. Mackay, in *The Monthly Record of the Free Church of Scotland*.

ELECTION

By BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication, 1918. 16mo, pp. 22. Price, Ten cents.

"A strong, forceful and instructive setting forth of the Scripture teaching as to this great doctrine of divine grace."—*The Herald and Presbyter*.